Free will re-redux

I really am at a loss to understand what you are talking about. What is your definition of free (or determined, for that matter)? Does the possibility that there are historical factors involved in making the decision constitute some form of determinism? What about if I have the choice between two flavours of ice cream. I can go with chocolate because I know I like chocolate. But I like vanilla too. The current state of the world has nothing to do with my choice, however. I might just be in the mood for vanilla. I might just imagine the taste and think - oh, yes, vanilla this time.

As I say, I don't really think anyone here is following your line of reasoning. Maybe you should tell us how you think it works?

I'm using the standard definition of libertarian free will: "In particular, libertarianism is an incompatibilist position which argues that free will is logically incompatible with a deterministic universe. Libertarianism states that since agents have free will, determinism must be false." [Wikipedia]

"I might just be in the mood for vanilla": But this is part of the current state of the world, is it not? If your vanilla-mood invariably results in choosing vanilla, then that is deterministic. Which means we have to take a step back and ask how you got in that mood. If your vanilla-mood does not invariably result in vanilla, then what else is involved in the decision?

Perhaps the confusion lies in states of mind such as moods, desires, and so forth. It seems as if you think they result in an ice cream choice in an indeterministic manner. But what actually happens to map your state of mind into a choice, or, stepping back, what actually happens to produce that state of mind?

I'm not sure why my model of things matters to this question. But I'm just assuming that I make the ice cream decision deterministically, perhaps with a few coin flips thrown in. Like a computer would.

~~ Paul

Though, thinking about more it this feels like a bit of a spot, because you're denying free will under the basis that there's not a good explanation on how it occurs, but then free will is inherently felt and experienced by everyone, including knowing when an action was not free like losing your temper, your face twitching or someone zapping you in the head. 

It's like denying consciousness because we can't explain it in quarks and atoms, or cavemen denying gravity because they don't have the barest comprehension of what it is. Just because we currently lack a proper explanation does not mean it does not exist or apply.

Thinking about what you want to know more I think that the freedom comes from the ability to change. Even with all pressures applying to you picking a certain option, you are able to switch to choosing another. Unlike determinism where there was never an option, you do have the option to choose something different. Something else COULD have happened. But then I'm not looking up answers to your question, somebody else will probably have something better.

I'm denying free will because I think there is no logical room for it. But, truly!, I'm suspending that assumption for this conversation because I'd like to hear an explanation. After all, I have no proof that there is no logical room.

I realize that something else could have happened under libertarian free will. But why did the thing that happened happen and not the other thing? We agree it was not predetermined nor did I flip a coin. 

~~ Paul

No I know that's why you guys are so confused. Paul is only asking WHAT makes the decision. Because even a conscious agent NEEDS a reason to pick either option. He's asking how do they decide without the reason, like a prime mover, what makes someone choose either option if they aren't influenced by anything. Because without influence the hypothetical person will just sit there like a rock, or will pick one randomly.

Except I don't think anyone is saying there is no influence. It's just that the influence isn't entirely deterministic. My wants and desires influence my decision. But through what steps?

~~ Paul

That's interesting. So is annihilation 'bad' news for you, then ?

Sorry, I don't understand the question.

~~ Paul

Says who?

Paul is asking for a process, for a logical, sensical sequencing of how a free decision is made.  He wants to look inside the machine of consciousness and be shown the step-wise mechanics of choice.  You seem to have picked that up with the highlighted sentence above.

Perhaps there isn't a process (or "reason" as you put it), at least in the sense of our current understanding of "process"?  Perhaps consciousness and free will are intractable to our traditional, process-oriented, scientific method, logic-based method of understanding physical things?  Perhaps its something else; something that doesn't conform to our traditional approach to knowledge of physical things.

Of course it may not be and the ever present promissory note from science will ultimately bear fruit.  Perhaps free will be shown to not exist and to be deterministic and/or "random".  But the underlying request remains incoherent to me:  If we have free will and it is NOT reducible to determinism and/or randomness how would it ever be shown in process form; in a flow chart?  The request itself seems to require a causal chain of some type which, again, seems to make the request incoherent/inconsistent.

Perhaps I'm missing something.

I do think the procedure needs to be logical, but I certainly don't require that it be mechanical, step-wise, or algorithmic.

In some sense I agree that it may be impossible to present an indetermined method of making a decision in any sort of logical, sequenced manner. I do think there has to be a causal chain, or my decisions can't cause anything to happen. My problem with this is that I'm not sure why I should go to the bother of believing it. It seems a matter of faith and most certainly promissory.

As for feeling like my decisions are free: I don't have that feeling. I have no feeling one way or the other, because I do not experience the entire decision-making event.

~~ Paul

I think you may have put yourself on a path to no destination Paul.  Your question seems intractable at best and unknowable at worst.

I also think its problematic that you are asking a question about something you don't know AND are putting constraints on the answer with the requirement that the answer be "logical".  That may be further complicating things for you.

I think you may have put yourself on a path to no destination Paul.  Your question seems intractable at best and unknowable at worst.

I also think its problematic that you are asking a question about something you don't know AND are putting constraints on the answer with the requirement that the answer be "logical".  That may be further complicating things for you.

As the old saying goes: logic shmogic.

If someone has an illogical answer that is compelling, I'd sure love to hear it. I guess I might as well suspend the logic requirement since I've suspended everything else.

Again, though, without some form of explanation, I'm not sure why I'd go to all the bother of believing I have free will. I'm not sure exactly what I would be believing.

~~ Paul

Some mind-bending thoughts on this:        ( Paper at https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9412004.pdf )

"Perfect determinism was considered earlier by Boscovich [4], Leibniz and Laplace (see Barrow [2]). The main argument is similar to the one used by Penrose: if all our laws, say, of motion, were in the form of equations which determine the future uniquely and completely from the present, then a “superbeing” having a perfect
knowledge of the starting state would be able to predict the entire future.

The puzzling consequence appears as soon as one tries to carry out this prediction!

Godel was interested in this problem as well. According to notes taken by Rucker ([46], p.181) Godel’s point of view is the following:
It should be possible to form a complete theory of human behaviour, i.e. to predict from the hereditary and environmental givens what a person will do. However, if a mischievous person learns of this theory, he can act in a way so as to negate it. Hence I conclude that such a theory exists, but that no mischievous person will learn it. In the same way, time-travel is possible, but no person will ever manage to kill his past self.
And he continues:
There is no contradiction between free will and knowing in advance precisely what one will do. If one knows oneself completely then this is the situation. One does not deliberately do the opposite of what one wants."

From Roger Penrose (same paper):

"It seems to me that if one has strong determinism (ruling the Universe), but without many worlds, then the mathematical scheme which governs the structure of the universe would probably have to be non-algorithmic. For otherwise (if it were both deterministic and algorithmic) one could in principle calculate what one was going to do next, and then one could ‘decide’ to do something different, which would be an effective contradiction between ‘free will’ and the strong determinism of the theory. By introducing non-computability into the theory one can evade this contradiction—though I have to confess that I feel somewhat uneasy about this type of resolution, and I anticipate something more subtle for the actual (non-algorithmic!) rules that govern the way that the world works."

If the determinism/randomness dichotomy rules the Universe (as Paul seems to believe), mind and consciousness and therefore the process whatever it is by which apparently subjectively free choices are made are probably noncomputable, meaning non-algorithmic and incapable of being generated by strong AI computers. This means whatever the process is it can't be visualized and described by a logical series of computational steps as in a computer program.  It seems to me that means our rational logical intellect fundamentally can't comprehend whatever this process is. This comprehension is what Paul demands, and it would probably be impossible.

If the determinism/randomness dichotomy does not rule the Universe including Man then consciousness, agency, subjectivity and intentionality themselves are allowed to be ultimately not deterministic and therefore to not be subject to any sort of limitation to the deterministic/random dichotomy. This allows room for true free will choices.

As with the Universe is deterministic case, Nature does not have any obligation to provide a design of this (either apparently free or truly free will choices) that allows human comprehension.

As for feeling like my decisions are free: I don't have that feeling. I have no feeling one way or the other, because I do not experience the entire decision-making event.

~~ Paul

This is where the bi-level mode of analysis is valuable.  Free willful output and actual selections from agency, as decisions, are informational events.  They can occur and there can be a nearly identical physical states before an after.  The transformations that are physical are objective, assuming an actual event.  The environment and the agent are measurable in the moment, as to physical aspects.  How do you not experience the physical event?

I stand ready to defend the transforms that occur in decision making, in terms of changing probabilities, informational objects and programs that construct and deconstruct information objects.


good to see you back

Because without influence the hypothetical person will just sit there like a rock, or will pick one randomly.

Why?