Free will and determinism

Is IIT inherently non-deterministic, or is Tononi starting to change his position?

David

He says it fundamentally requires non-determinism in that video @quirkybrainmeat posted...admittedly I think this has somewhat been his opinion all along but I could be wrong about that.

Yes, this is my quandary.

What is there in indeterminism besides possible true randomness? And how does it participate in the making of a free decision?

~~ Paul

Nice to see you posting, here, Paul.

Of course - the term "true" randomness is illogical, beyond being a feeling.  Randomness is a measurable relationship between objects and activity.  Randomness - about randomness - is like a John Von Neumann quote.

  Anyone who attempts to generate random numbers by deterministic means is, of course, living in a state of (original) sin.

The idea behind this misconception, may be the that genetic evolution's ability to change is mutations that are random to fitness.  We all know in the modern day that is is, plain wrong.  Genomes change by changing the probability for future survival strategically.  The message creating and receiving systems of biology encode intent, function and regulation.  These activities are not random to fitness.

Back to "free will".  I think that selection, as a pragmatic and functional activity needs to be parsed.  I see selection as the mind enforcing  intent, function and regulation.

selection as the mind enforcing  intent

Incoherent to me.  You've used a completely subjective description (intent) to try and define free will through this notion of selection.  Explain intent in terms of free will for example.  Feels like an infinite regress would be forthcoming.

The Born Rule and Free Will: Why Libertarian Agent-Causal Free Will Is Not “Antiscientific"

Ruth Kastner

In the libertarian ``agent causation'' view of free will, free choices are attributable only to the choosing agent, as opposed to a specific cause or causes outside the agent. An often-repeated claim in the philosophical literature on free will is that agent causation necessarily implies lawlessness, and is therefore ``antiscientific." That claim is critiqued and it is argued, on the contrary, that the volitional powers of a free agent need not be viewed as anomic, specifically with regard to the quantum statistical law (the Born Rule). Assumptions about the role and nature of causation, taken as bearing on volitional agency, are examined and found inadequate to the task. Finally, it is suggested that quantum theory may constitute precisely the sort of theory required for a nomic grounding of libertarian free will.

Her commentary about the paper on the Transactional Interpretation site:

It seems that many scientists are eager to throw in the towel on free will. This somewhat technical article, published in Probing the Meaning of Quantum Mechanics: Superpositions, Dynamics, Semantics and Identity , Eds. D. Aerts et al, (2016) https://doi.org/10.1142/10185 , explains why that is a serious mistake. If anything, our best physical theories actually suggest the opposite: that Nature demands volition.

Note -> apologies, I deleted my previous post where I thought there were two distinct papers, or one being a revision of the other. There's one paper but she does have a few blog posts on the subject on that site, of which here are a few samples I've admittedly not yet read:

The Serious Flaws In the Popular Dismissal of Free Will

Let me begin by stating up front: I do not claim to know whether we do or do not have free will. We may have free will, or we may not. The only strong claim I wish to make here is the following: if we do not have free will, it is not for the inadequate reasons presented thus far. Since neuroscientist and anti-free-will polemicist Sam Harris has been among the most prominent of standard-bearers for the claim that we lack the power of volition, I will focus here on his arguments as summarized in his book “Free Will.”

Free Will: Why We Should be Skeptical of the Skeptics

It has become quite popular lately to view the notion of free will as a misconception to be ‘debunked.’ To be sure, if we really do not have free will, we should be prepared to face that fact. But is it really a fact? I will argue here that key arguments against robust free will are seriously overrated. These are:

(1) Physical theory implies a block world (i.e. all events exist, including future events).
(2) Physical law, including indeterministic quantum physics, is inconsistent with free will.

Free Will Part II: No need to be disillusioned

Last week I argued that agents making free choices do not in fact have to violate any physical law, in view of quantum indeterminism. Rather than being a ‘slave’ to the quantum statistics, as some philosophers have argued (e.g. Ted Sider, 2005), a choosing agent can be governed by quantum propensities while still having enough ‘wiggle room’ to make free choices—choices that are fundamentally caused by the agent’s volitional powers.

Nice to see you posting, here, Paul.

Of course - the term "true" randomness is illogical, beyond being a feeling.  Randomness is a measurable relationship between objects and activity.  Randomness - about randomness - is like a John Von Neumann quote.


The idea behind this misconception, may be the that genetic evolution's ability to change is mutations that are random to fitness.  We all know in the modern day that is is, plain wrong.  Genomes change by changing the probability for future survival strategically.  The message creating and receiving systems of biology encode intent, function and regulation.  These activities are not random to fitness.

Back to "free will".  I think that selection, as a pragmatic and functional activity needs to be parsed.  I see selection as the mind enforcing  intent, function and regulation.

I'm not sure what is wrong with true randomness. Isn't it truly random which particle decays next? Yes, it's possible that we just don't know the deterministic way in which the next decay is "chosen."

Notice I said "possible" true randomness. But, meanwhile, I'm perfectly happy to discard true randomness and reword my questions:

What is there in indeterminism, ignoring any possible true randomness? And how does it participate in the making of a free decision?

~~ Paul

The Born Rule and Free Will: Why Libertarian Agent-Causal Free Will Is Not “Antiscientific"

Ruth Kastner


Her commentary about the paper on the Transactional Interpretation site:


Note -> apologies, I deleted my previous post where I thought there were two distinct papers, or one being a revision of the other. There's one paper but she does have a few blog posts on the subject on that site, of which here are a few samples I've admittedly not yet read:

The Serious Flaws In the Popular Dismissal of Free Will


Free Will: Why We Should be Skeptical of the Skeptics


Free Will Part II: No need to be disillusioned

I will read these articles. But I notice they seem to make an assumption I don't understand, which assumption also seems to be made in many other articles I've read.

It seems that people assume that if my decision comes from some sort of agency, from volition, from me, then it is free. I don't see how that follows, unless it is part of the definition of libertarian free will that I have not picked up on. I'm happy to grant any sort of agency as the source of the free decision. But I do not understand how that agent makes a free choice. Postulating any sort of decision-making agent does not automatically entail free decisions by that agent.

Is it possible that people are satisfied with deterministic decisions by an agent, as long as those decisions can have apparently indeterministic effects on the world?

~~ Paul

Incoherent to me.  You've used a completely subjective description (intent) to try and define free will through this notion of selection.  Explain intent in terms of free will for example.  Feels like an infinite regress would be forthcoming.

I understand that as soon as someone declares "subjectivity" the world of measured science is supposed to be negated. 

Bullshit materialism is called.  Intent is measured as fungible/functional work product from decision-making.  ie - "she intended to kill them" or "drinking tea is better than coffee for my digestion".  Would any person not try identify the intent behind shooting at people. Avoiding antacids as a selected outcome is highly probable intent.

In the perspective of informational realism, what is subjective information is clearly open to objective measurement as structured patterns of mutual information.  Mutual information between organism and physical and informational environments.  Please, I am no expert, but when the current news is full of AI products that is starting to dominate as they gathers mutual information about the subjective lives we lead - not .  Real and actual skills in the data collection and predictions of intentions --- is huge business.  The root of this is the suppression of the sciences of meaning.

ok, you asked a fair question --- intent is the application of willful selections.  A selection is the outcome of probable alternatives.  Intentions of humans, over time, is their character.  A person or animal's character is a real pattern of structured information.  Character is subjective, but important evidence in a real court of law.  Is character just a product of brain electrochemistry or are real events taking place in terms of informational products and outcomes.

I'm not sure what is wrong with true randomness. Isn't it truly random which particle decays next? Yes, it's possible that we just don't know the deterministic way in which the next decay is "chosen."

Notice I said "possible" true randomness. But, meanwhile, I'm perfectly happy to discard true randomness and reword my questions:

What is there in indeterminism, ignoring any possible true randomness? And how does it participate in the making of a free decision?

~~ Paul

First, radioactive decay is not a random state, only per "particle"!!  There are firm patterns established from data.  That is how they calculate a half-life.  It is random, if one believes that quantum states are weird and each particle is important in a special way.  There is surely old thinking that clings to the metaphysical "true randomness" around.

Indeterminism is an abstraction in philosophy, but is an actual state of affairs in information science and math (see below).  Selections are made in a pragmatic real-world.  Some selections are made by a willful character, that predicts intended outcomes.  Tests can document selections and infer patterns in individuals and groups.  You can freely fail a test.  You usually have to willfully focus and plan practice time for learning 

One definition of true randomness can be the following. Can we foretell the times at which decays will happen such that there is any nonzero correlation between the observed and theoretical times? If the answer is no, then the sequence is random. One can define this notion more rigorously through Kolmogorov Complexity. Thus, informally, we talk about randomness as futility of foresight: we can have no foresight into true randomness. 

https://physics.stackexchange.com/questi...tive-decay

I will read these articles. But I notice they seem to make an assumption I don't understand, which assumption also seems to be made in many other articles I've read.

It seems that people assume that if my decision comes from some sort of agency, from volition, from me, then it is free. I don't see how that follows, unless it is part of the definition of libertarian free will that I have not picked up on. I'm happy to grant any sort of agency as the source of the free decision. But I do not understand how that agent makes a free choice. Postulating any sort of decision-making agent does not automatically entail free decisions by that agent.

Is it possible that people are satisfied with deterministic decisions by an agent, as long as those decisions can have apparently indeterministic effects on the world?

~~ Paul

Pretty sure this was covered in the 65 page thread. But maybe something to ask Steward about if she replies to you.