In response to the final video (I haven't watched the others), "What happens to consciousness when clocks stop? | Bernard Carr & Bernardo Kastrup", I want to comment on some things Bernardo said.
Between
29:15 and 30:19, he affirmed that the solution to the decombination problem involves the idea of multiple time dimensions: it is the case that he and Hans are the same person
apparently at the same (unidimensional) time, only because there are
actually multiple dimensions of time, such that, really, they are the same person talking to himself
across a timeline.
In the course of this, he also affirmed that he is the same person who was his childhood self back when he was a child.
Then, between
1:54:00 and 1:57:44, he at the same time affirmed that there is no fixed identity - that he is "completely different from what I was when I was five years old" - and described the possibility of a true time travel in which, when travelling to the past, one's identity is restored to the exact state it was in at that time, including one's memories, such that one has no way of knowing one has time travelled, and that this could be happening to us at every moment - we could be flitting between past and future randomly with the illusion of linear time.
I found this new (aspect of his) solution to the decombination problem interesting, because I'd never heard/seen him express it before. It does, though, seem to be fatally problematic, at least in the sense that it is supposed to be resolving the problem with the notion of there being only One True Self
identified by Titus Rivas.
There seem to be two possibilities for the scenario in which Hans and Bernardo are the same person talking across a timeline. One is that in which there are two separate timelines which run in parallel: Hans is on one and Bernardo is on the other, and they somehow are able to communicate across them
as though they were on the same timeline. The problem here is that if these timelines are disconnected and simply run in parallel, then there is no reason to consider that Hans and Bernardo are really the same person in the same way in which Bernardo now is the same person as Bernardo was as a child.
The other possibility is that in which Bernardo and Hans are on a singular timeline in which one of them is on an earlier part of it, and will later (from his subjective perspective) arrive at the later part in which he seems to have the identity of the other. This
would allow for the possibility that Hans and Bernardo are really the same person in the same way in which Bernardo now is the same person as Bernardo was as a child, but - aside from the semantic issue of its seeming to be incompatible with Bernardo's reference to
multiple timelines given that this is a singular timeline - it comes with its own problem: the impossibility of conversation.
Here's what I mean by that. Let's say that Hans is on the earlier part of the timeline, and Bernardo on the later part. Let's now say Hans says something to Bernardo. He won't be able to respond until, from his subjective perspective, he traverses the timeline to arrive at the point at which his identity has become that of Bernardo. So far, no problem: he simply responds as Bernardo to his earlier identity as Hans. Now, though, the problem appears: how can he respond to Bernardo as Hans when he has left that identity (on the early part of the timeline) far behind? The answer is: he can't.
Both possibilities, then, fail, and this does not refute Titus's argument.
The problem with the second possibility might in a sense be dissolved by the time-travelling idea that Bernardo later expressed though, so let's consider that idea. In its ultimate extrapolation, there is only One True Self (who is not just Bernardo talking to Hans, but
every person talking to
every other person) who randomly time-travels through an otherwise static block universe into each otherwise apparently distinct person at random points.
There are several problems with this idea though, one of which is fatal. The first is merely one of redundancy: if this is the true refutation of Titus's argument, then the "talking across timelines" solution is not just fatally (it seems to me) problematic for the reasons I gave above, but unnecessary.
The second, also non-fatal, is one of implausibility: that our linear temporal experience is merely an illusion into which we drop at random is not just counterintuitive but seems to violate the principle that we should posit straightforward solutions where we have no need to posit counterintuitive ones, and given that the only reason to posit this notion is to justify an
already counterintuitive idea (that of the One True Self), the principle is violated.
The third is fatal: on Bernardo's maximally monist view, the One True Self, strictly, is
everything, and it is incoherent for
everything - which
encompasses and includes all time - to travel
within and bounded by time, let alone to become (be) a subset (personal identity) of Itself.
[Edited to add the third and final, fatal problem, and to tighten other wording.]