Darwin Unhinged: The Bugs in Evolution

I'm sure there are philosophical rejoinders to all of them. I am personally more impressed by the great accumulation of empirical evidence.

What evidence could disprove the idea that everything that is can be described by a current or future physics where all fundamental entities are non-mental?

What evidence could disprove the idea that everything that is can be described by a current or future physics where all fundamental entities are non-mental?

Absolutely no evidence, in this twisted sort of reasoning. "Everything that is" obviously includes any evidence against the theory, so this imagined theory can explain absolutely anything including evidence against itself. That sounds a little analogous to Darwinism, which is unfalsifiable and with some just-so stories can explain anything in biology. It seems to me that this is essentially appealing to speculation, to magic, especially to the almost religious faith in scientism and physicalism. Sure, we can always imagine that somehow, someday, there will be some way to reconcile the stark logical conflicts between physicalism and the obvious existence of mentality and its productions. Someday, over the rainbow. The same category as imagining that there are 1000 invisible angels dancing on the eraser of that pencil over there. Maybe so, maybe someday we'll be able to see them.

This reminds me of Reber and Alcock's response to Etzel Cardeña's paper, "The experimental evidence for parapsychological phenomena: A review".    

"Our position is straightforward. Claims made by parapsychologists cannot be true. The effects reported can have no ontological status; the data have no existential value. We examine a variety of reasons for this conclusion based on well-understood scientific principles. In the classic English adynaton, “pigs cannot fly.” Hence, data that suggest that they can are necessarily flawed and result from weak methodology or improper data analyses or are Type I errors. So it must be with psi effects."

(From the psiencequest thread)  

Alcock and Reber are claiming that psi effects violate the current laws of physics, are simply impossible, and accordingly they simply cannot really exist. In their absolute faith in scientism and materialism all empirical evidence for psi effects no matter how good it is, is a priori invalid, no examination required. Of course it doesn't need to be investigated - we already know there is nothing there. They simply throw any and all conflicting data out the window as a matter of principle.

This is essentially saying that all empirical evidence that conflicts with the current consensus scientific theory is invalid. In this poor excuse for a scientific method, having what appears to be a good theory totally trumps absolutely any evidence to the contrary. Any and all such evidence must a priori be mistaken or fraudulent, regardless of quality and amount. Regardless of the strength of the data. 

This incredibly rigid closed-minded position totally throws the tried and true, real, scientific method out the window. Look at it in the light of the history of science. If this methodology had been followed most of the current laws of physics and the rest of the edifice of modern science would never have been developed. We would still believe phlogiston explains combustion, and electromagnetic waves travel in the ether medium. After all, all the evidence to the contrary is impossible and must be invalid, in the current consensus theories of phlogiston and the luminiferous ether.

Sure, we can always imagine that somehow, someday, there will be some way to reconcile the stark logical conflicts between physicalism and the obvious existence of mentality and its productions. Someday, over the rainbow.

Aren't the logical conflicts based in philosophical argument?

Regarding parapsychology, there are materialist explanations for Psi?

Aren't the logical conflicts based in philosophical argument?

Good point - they are. But my main point has been that philosophical argumentation appears to be able to go on indefinitely; I prefer to anchor myself in these disputes on the more solid ground of empirical evidence. With the existence of a mass of good hard empirical evidence, the only resort of the physicalists is attacking its actual validity through self-defeating and very questionable strategems like Reber and Alcock's denial of the ontological validity of any and all evidence for parapsychological phenomena because they supposedly conflict with current established laws of physics. At least, this boils the endless philosophical debate down a lot, to this one issue of the ontological status of empirical evidence. 

Regarding parapsychology, there are materialist explanations for Psi?

Of course, numerous theories have been proposed. They seem to be in two categories, communicational theories and observational theories. The former are based on the conjecture that there exists some hypothetical radiation, field of force or whatever, which could transmit signals from one brain to another brain, using the analogy with radio, radar or other known forms of telecommunication, and the latter are based on or inspired by, special interpretations of quantum theory. But there have been so many problems with them none have been really viable. These objections have been based both on empirical data (like with communicational theories there not being any inverse-square fading of psi with distance as would be expected with some sort of EM field-like effect), and philosophical (like pointing out that communicational theories gloss over what is the key problem, namely how the information is encoded and decoded (and that this inevitably involves mind which is unacceptable to physicalism). While with the observational theories, pointing out that they succeed only by dint of the fact that they also surreptitiously import mentalistic concepts; which disqualifies them as physical theories.

There is an interesting discussion of this in this article.        

Again, I prefer to ground myself on the empirical evidence that bears on the question rather than endless philosophical argumentation. In this area the argumentation then boils down to the relatively simple issue of the ontological status of empirical evidence. Physicalists are reduced to attacking its basic validity, which is a very double-edged sword.

Good point - they are. But my main point has been that philosophical argumentation appears to be able to go on indefinitely; I prefer to anchor myself in these disputes on the more solid ground of empirical evidence.

Interesting. I suspect it will be a [relatively] long time before the empirical evidence is recognized by academia, likely after the philosophical arguments have convinced more people materialism is false. (Though I think related fields will also need to advance, for example quantum biology.)

Apparently some philosophers don't even consider empirical evidence to be relevant to philosophical questions, at least in their particular areas of expertise, in this case psychology and economics. The abstract below is from the recent paper Is Empirical Research Relevant to Philosophical Conclusions? by Erik Angner. The concept of evidence is essential to and central to science and much of society in areas such as jurisprudence. Fortunately for the viability and future of philosophy as a field of study this contention appears to be very much a minority position. 

"Much recent philosophical literature on happiness and satisfaction is based on the belief that empirical research is relevant to philosophical conclusions. In his 2010 book What is This Thing Called Happiness?, Fred Feldman begs to differ. He suggests (a) that there is no evidence that empirical research is relevant to long-standing philosophical questions; consequently, (b) that philosophers have little reason to pay attention to the work of psychologists or economists; and (c) that philosophers need not fear embarrassing themselves by being ignorant of important scientific findings that bear directly on their work. Relying on an example invoked by Feldman himself, this paper makes the case that all three theses are false. The argument suggests a picture according to which science and philosophy stand in a symbiotic relationship, with scientists and philosophers engaging in a mutually beneficial exchange of ideas for the advancement of the general knowledge."

Apparently some philosophers don't even consider empirical evidence to be relevant to philosophical questions, at least in their particular areas of expertise, in this case psychology and economics. The abstract below is from the recent paper Is Empirical Research Relevant to Philosophical Conclusions? by Erik Angner. The concept of evidence is essential to and central to science and much of society in areas such as jurisprudence. Fortunately for the viability and future of philosophy as a field of study this contention appears to be very much a minority position. 

Do you have the specifics of Feldman's argument, because it seems to me that perhaps Feldman was speaking specifically about defining "happiness" as opposed to the entirety of philosophy not needing to refer to anything from science.

I do think at times philosophy can show a certain avenue of reasoning is flawed, for example - to be germane to the thread - Intelligent Design, at least in its investigation of mutation, can be shown to be pretty much worthless in determining whether there is a Creator of reality.

Do you have the specifics of Feldman's argument, because it seems to me that perhaps Feldman was speaking specifically about defining "happiness" as opposed to the entirety of philosophy not needing to refer to anything from science.

I can't find a link to the body of Angner's paper, just the abstract. It's not clear whether Feldman was applying his words to all of philosophy or just to the specific sub-category of the philosophy of the nature of "happiness" and the validity and relevance of the empirical research pertaining to it. Unfortunately both he and his reviewer Angner were ambiguous about this and generalized their wording in such a way as to imply the entirety of philosophy even though their discussion concerned just happiness.

I do think at times philosophy can show a certain avenue of reasoning is flawed, for example - to be germane to the thread - Intelligent Design, at least in its investigation of mutation, can be shown to be pretty much worthless in determining whether there is a Creator of reality.

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I certainly agree with that concerning one of the great general values of philosophy.

Re. Intelligent Design: as it has been defined for some years by authorities such as Discovery Institute, ID the scientific enterprise does not make any claims regarding the nature of whatever intelligent agent or agents are responsible. ID is the research and body of scientific knowledge showing that all the evidence of biology and paleontology leads inexorably to the conclusions that life was designed and that the evolutionary process inextricably involved design (as an essential addition to microevolution via RM & NS). This scientific enterprise just follows the evidence where it leads without the blinders of neo-Darwinian orthodoxy. No assumptions or claims about the nature of this intelligence. 

ID certainly makes no claims that all of reality, the universe and man are the creation of a Deity such as the Christian God. Thus a philosophical argument is not needed to show that ID the scientific enterprise can't show this. Of course, it is a fact that many leading adherents and proponents of ID are Christians, but they generally try to keep their religious beliefs separate from their scientific pursuits.

Of course, it is a fact that many leading adherents and proponents of ID are Christians, but they generally try to keep their religious beliefs separate from their scientific pursuits.

But do they recognize that there is nothing in the field of ID, at least as it relates to biology (but arguably physics fine-tuning as well) that should make one think the God of any religion is true?

It seems to me [their] efforts are meant to buttress their religious beliefs, but as you mention with Egnor and cloning this seems to be a turn in the wrong direction inviting unnecessary potential for defeat. What if future science shows the refutation of any claim to design, will they all - if still alive - abandon their faith?