Analytical argument against physicalism

It looks as if the epiphenomenalists are not invoking some sort of mechanism, but some sort of magic. Nature just happens to magically generate an entire additional continuum of existence for absolutely nothing, since no new complexity is added to the neural processing necessary for "cogitation". I would think that they would have the prevailing attitude of the intelligentsia that magical thinking is irrational and unscientific.

Well, yes. See what Hein van Dongen and I write about this implicit magic in Exit Epiphenomenalism: 

"Epiphenomenalists present the following argumentation for their physicalism: 1. From a theoretical point of view, it is more parsimonious to adopt the physicalist position, because a) the physical laws are as far as we know valid for all types of physical organization, including the human organism and its brain *10. b) there is not a single empirical bit of evidence for a psychogenic effect on reality *11. 2. Interactionism is "inconceivable". It would boil down to "magic", as Jackendoff puts it *12. How could something mental cause something material? We will immediately leave this second point aside. If we cannot conceive of a psychogenic influence, then the somatogenic causation of the psyche is even more inconceivable, and it is on such "magical" causation that epiphenomenalism is explicitly based." 

Physicalism simply can't deal with consciousness.

[Laird]

Well, reductionism is one of the basic types of materialism, whereas epiphenomenalism is a physicalist type of (property) dualism.

Reductionism denies that there are real (rather than just apparent) qualia. You might say that reductionists (or reductive materialists) reduce the whole mind to brain processing, except for consciousness, which they consider non-existent.

Epiphenomenalism does recognize the existence of consciousness, so that is a very big difference. 

I think the refutation of reductionism is very straightforward and does not need to be discussed in a separate thread. How on earth would anyone want to deny the existence of his or her own subjective experiences? And if there is no consciousness, how is it that we have the "illusion" that we have subjective experiences, when that illusion can't be a subjective experience itself? 

Reductionism, for me, is the philosophical equivalent of insanity (just like eliminative materialism, which even claims we don't need "outdated" concepts like thoughts or feelings).

Interesting. Thanks. One of the reasons I asked is because I recently had a discussion about consciousness with a friend of mine - a very intelligent guy, was dux of our high school, but chose the path of a medical specialist (in intensive care), and thus has had a heavy academic and professional life without devoting much time to philosophical matters. Anyway, I've since then been trying to pin down which theory of mind matches his views best, and settled on reductionism... but given now that you say that reductionism denies real qualia, then even this doesn't fit, since he's not an idiot and doesn't deny the reality of consciousness.

Perhaps if I share his views with you, you will be able to label him neatly and tidily and put him in a little box.

Basically, he is reductionist to the extent that he believes that reality consists in layers of abstraction determined by the base layer of physics. i.e. physics fully determines the next abstract layer of chemistry, which fully determines the next abstract layer of biology, which fully determines the next abstract layer of consciousness (which as I said he recognises as real). So, he's not an emergentist, because he doesn't think there's anything truly novel or irreducible about consciousness - consciousness and its contents are all implicit in and reducible to the base layer of physics - but, and here's the kicker, nor does he appear to be an epiphenomenalist, because he believes that consciousness can causally affect itself.

He justifies this with an analogy to weather. Here's how I put it to him in a recent email trying to mirror his views back to him to check whether I understood him correctly (he hasn't responded yet but I think I've got this right):

In our face-to-face discussion, you used the analogy of weather. I understand that what you mean to say by this is that just as we can say that at its level of abstraction, weather phenomena cause other weather phenomena (e.g., the evaporation of water vapour off the ocean causes coastal clouds, which the wind causes to blow inland, and which causes rainfall upon the land) - a causal description that is an abstraction that ultimately reduces to a causal description in terms of basic physics (sub-atomic particles, the four fundamental forces, stochastic quantum mechanical events, etc) - so we can say that consciousness and all its associated mental phenomena do, at their level of abstraction, cause other mental phenomena (e.g., when I thought such-and-such, it caused me to become angry), even though - likewise - this causal description is ultimately an abstraction that reduces to a causal description in terms of basic physics.

Does my friend's view on consciousness seem to fit any existing philosophy of mind of which you're aware, Titus? Would you agree that "reductionism" is the best fit? Does it seem coherent? I offered a couple of arguments against it in my email but would like to get your own take before sharing them.

Interesting. Thanks. One of the reasons I asked is because I recently had a discussion about consciousness with a friend of mine - a very intelligent guy, was dux of our high school, but chose the path of a medical specialist (in intensive care), and thus has had a heavy academic and professional life without devoting much time to philosophical matters. Anyway, I've since then been trying to pin down which theory of mind matches his views best, and settled on reductionism... but given now that you say that reductionism denies real qualia, then even this doesn't fit, since he's not an idiot and doesn't deny the reality of consciousness.

Perhaps if I share his views with you, you will be able to label him neatly and tidily and put him in a little box.

Basically, he is reductionist to the extent that he believes that reality consists in layers of abstraction determined by the base layer of physics. i.e. physics fully determines the next abstract layer of chemistry, which fully determines the next abstract layer of biology, which fully determines the next abstract layer of consciousness (which as I said he recognises as real). So, he's not an emergentist, because he doesn't think there's anything truly novel or irreducible about consciousness - consciousness and its contents are all implicit in and reducible to the base layer of physics - but, and here's the kicker, nor does he appear to be an epiphenomenalist, because he believes that consciousness can causally affect itself.

He justifies this with an analogy to weather. Here's how I put it to him in a recent email trying to mirror his views back to him to check whether I understood him correctly (he hasn't responded yet but I think I've got this right):

In our face-to-face discussion, you used the analogy of weather. I understand that what you mean to say by this is that just as we can say that at its level of abstraction, weather phenomena cause other weather phenomena (e.g., the evaporation of water vapour off the ocean causes coastal clouds, which the wind causes to blow inland, and which causes rainfall upon the land) - a causal description that is an abstraction that ultimately reduces to a causal description in terms of basic physics (sub-atomic particles, the four fundamental forces, stochastic quantum mechanical events, etc) - so we can say that consciousness and all its associated mental phenomena do, at their level of abstraction, cause other mental phenomena (e.g., when I thought such-and-such, it caused me to become angry), even though - likewise - this causal description is ultimately an abstraction that reduces to a causal description in terms of basic physics.

Does my friend's view on consciousness seem to fit any existing philosophy of mind of which you're aware, Titus? Would you agree that "reductionism" is the best fit? Does it seem coherent? I offered a couple of arguments against it in my email but would like to get your own take before sharing them.

This clearly is reductionism or reductive materialism. He does not deny "consciousness" in the cognitive sense of awareness, but he does deny consciousness in the sense of irreducible subjective or phenomenal experiences or qualia. This is basically the position defended by Daniel C. Dennett.

In general, one could say that reductionists accept the validity of any concepts as long as these don't imply anything irreducible to purely physical processes.

[Laird]

This clearly is reductionism or reductive materialism. He does not deny "consciousness" in the cognitive sense of awareness, but he does deny consciousness in the sense of irreducible subjective or phenomenal experiences or qualia. This is basically the position defended by Daniel C. Dennett.

In general, one could say that reductionists accept the validity of any concepts as long as these don't imply anything irreducible to purely physical processes.

Thanks, Titus. In your view, does anything incoherent follow (directly or indirectly) from his denial of the irreducibility of subjective or phenomenal experiences or qualia? Or does the incoherence lie elsewhere? As I said, I have my own view on this, but am curious to first probe yours.

[Laird]

P.S. Even though this view is reductionism or reductionist materialism, given that it doesn't deny the reality of consciousness, is it not, too, a type of dualism?

Thanks, Titus. In your view, does anything incoherent follow (directly or indirectly) from his denial of the irreducibility of subjective or phenomenal experiences or qualia? Or does the incoherence lie elsewhere? As I said, I have my own view on this, but am curious to first probe yours.

Well, either subjective or phenomenal experiences or qualia are REAL (as such) and therefore irreducible, or they are NOT real (as such), but simply an abstract way of talking about (or shorthand for) non-phenomenal processes. In the second case, what we call phenomenal experiences really can be reduced to non-phenomenal neurological processes.

It is not incoherent to claim that you're a philosophical zombie without phenomenal consciousness (because that is part of the definition of a philosophical zombie), but you can't claim you're a zombie but still really experience things (phenomenally). That would be incoherent. Either you do experience something phenomenally or you don't really experience anything, but not both at the same time.

P.S. Even though this view is reductionism or reductionist materialism, given that it doesn't deny the reality of consciousness, is it not, too, a type of dualism?

No, because reductive materialism is incompatible with any type of ontological dualism. So a better word for his view is: incoherent .

[Laird]

Well, either subjective or phenomenal experiences or qualia are REAL (as such) and therefore irreducible

And there's the rub: my friend doesn't accept that the latter follows from the former. He thinks that consciousness can be both real and reducible, and he wants an argument from me as to why I deny this (to me it's self-explanatory, so it's hard to construct an argument - but I ended up coming up with a couple of them).

And there's the rub: my friend doesn't accept that the latter follows from the former. He thinks that consciousness can be both real and reducible, and he wants an argument from me as to why I deny this (to me it's self-explanatory, so it's hard to construct an argument - but I ended up coming up with a couple of them).

Well, either he is wrong (for the reason I've just given) or he simply uses the word "consciousness" as a word for "higher levels of cognition" and like Dennett rejects the existence of qualia.  
In that case, you're simply talking about different topics.

[Laird]

OK, so, Titus, we've established in this thread and another your arguments against (1) epiphenominalism, (2) panpsychism, and (3) reductionism. Now, how about emergentism? Do you think any form of emergentism is tenable (e.g. Orch-OR)? Why / why not? Again, I have my own views but would like to hear yours. (Feel free to reply in a new thread if you think the discussion warrants one).