An alternate look at Naturalism

Appealing to convenient definition aside, does not the supernatural/natural interface strike you as troublesome?

It would be interesting to see whether a definition of "supernatural" could be formed which is useful (e.g. still leaves us with a possibility of obtaining knowledge which is progressive, distinguishes between ideas which are true or false, allows us to make predictions, generates novel information and observations), but excludes it from study by methodological naturalism (i.e. excludes reference to events or experiences). 

I'm stumped as to how this would work, though. It's easy if "supernatural" is not useful, and would fit with scientists' disinterest as it wouldn't offer any sort of explanation. But I don't see any indication that supernatural proponents would agree to this.

Linda

It would be interesting to see whether a definition of "supernatural" could be formed which is useful (e.g. still leaves us with a possibility of obtaining knowledge which is progressive, distinguishes between ideas which are true or false, allows us to make predictions, generates novel information and observations), but excludes it from study by methodological naturalism (i.e. excludes reference to events or experiences). 

I'm stumped as to how this would work, though. It's easy if "supernatural" is not useful, and would fit with scientists' disinterest as it wouldn't offer any sort of explanation. But I don't see any indication that supernatural proponents would agree to this.

Linda

Indeed. We now have to marry what we’ve learnt in this thread with the movement’s historical call for increased funding for scientific research. 

Perhaps the next step would be for laird, kam or valmar (or anyone!) to describe what they consider ‘natural’ (ie within nature) before we ponder further that which lies outside it?

I don't think it has any bearing on the fact that methodological naturalism rejects supernatural explanations a priori, if that's what you're getting at.

I mean, if you are going to say that anything that has any effect in the world is by definition not supernatural, then you've effectively defined the supernatural out of existence! At best you could say that you've banished it to some parallel realm which has no causal impact upon our own realm. It's pretty clear that this is neither a common sense understanding of "the supernatural", nor the understanding of the supernatural on which methodological naturalism is based.

This is just trying to have one’s cake and eat it. If one posits something that is outside the pervue of methodological naturalism, it seems disingenuous to criticise it for rejecting what you posit. (Technically, ‘it’ isn’t rejecting, but is unequiped to offer anything, by definition)

It isn’t me that is supporting a supernatural agent shaping nature so I’m unconcerned about defining ‘supernatural’ out of existence. However, doing so may be helpful in bringing to the table a less closed-minded, richer view of ‘nature’.

Indeed. We now have to marry what we’ve learnt in this thread with the movement’s historical call for increased funding for scientific research. 

Perhaps the next step would be for laird, kam or valmar (or anyone!) to describe what they consider ‘natural’ (ie within nature) before we ponder further that which lies outside it?

I already have - from my point of view. I've said there is no separation (see post #35). Nevertheless, we were discussing methodological naturalism which you have decided to define in your own way, ignoring all the definitions we have quoted. It is a separation that materialists have made to constrain science. They say that there is the natural world - which they can approach with science - and there is the so-called supernatural, by which they mean divine action or anything spiritual - which is excluded from science. At best that is a matter for theologians and philosophers but not for rational, intelligent people like scientists and materialists. 

I believe that was the point of Valmar's original post when he wrote:

Okay... well, for most, this [naturalism] is synonymous with reductive physicalism and materialism. But why does it have to be? Depends wholly on what is within your scope of "natural", doesn't it?

You have decided that you want the thread to be another attack on ID so you are persistently ignoring the actual discussion - as Laird demonstrated in his long list of quotes. It doesn't really matter what I consider to be 'natural', or Laird or Valmar, etc., what matters for this discussion is what is allowed and what is prohibited when it comes to science. If we were to replace the term "supernatural agent" with "intelligent agent" or "God" with "mind at large", would that satisfy materialists? I think not. 

I already have - from my point of view. I've said there is no separation (see post #35). Nevertheless, we were discussing methodological naturalism which you have decided to define in your own way, ignoring all the definitions we have quoted. It is a separation that materialists have made to constrain science. They say that there is the natural world - which they can approach with science - and there is the so-called supernatural, by which they mean divine action or anything spiritual - which is excluded from science. At best that is a matter for theologians and philosophers but not for rational, intelligent people like scientists and materialists. 

I believe that was the point of Valmar's original post when he wrote:


You have decided that you want the thread to be another attack on ID so you are persistently ignoring the actual discussion - as Laird demonstrated in his long list of quotes. It doesn't really matter what I consider to be 'natural', or Laird or Valmar, etc., what matters for this discussion is what is allowed and what is prohibited when it comes to science. If we were to replace the term "supernatural agent" with "intelligent agent" or "God" with "mind at large", would that satisfy materialists? I think not. 

If this were to be (another) thread bashing materialism why dress it up as something else?

MN is a tool to explore our reality. Bernado himself will tell you that none of its findings are inconsistent with idealism, so I’m not sure where you’re going with this MN=materialism facade.

Of course the point about what, according to those who make such distinctions, constitutes "supernatural" is also interesting because we run into the problem of consciousness. Clearly we are conscious and therefore, presumably, consciousness is natural. But if we say there is evidence for consciousness operating independently of the brain then this evidence is immediately marked non-scientific or pseudo-science. Clearly then, the materialists have drawn the demarcation lines and will only allow a physical cause for consciousness: a property of the physical brain.

Btw kam, I’m ok with your definition of nature, because there is no need for supernature (unless Laird can find a space for it ;))

If this were to be (another) thread bashing materialism why dress it up as something else?

MN is a tool to explore our reality. Bernado himself will tell you that none of its findings are inconsistent with idealism, so I’m not sure where you’re going with this MN=materialism facade.

It isn't any of that. It is a thread discussing MN. Idealism is just my worldview - the thread is not about my worldview or Bernardo's or anyone's. It is about how MN shackles science to materialism. The facade is what you have constructed to mask that fact.

MN shackles science to nature.

MN shackles science to nature.

OH FFS. Going round in circles. Do we really have to start the thread again and repeat everything? Instead I suggest you steel yourself and look again at Laird's long list of quotes. 

Here's yet another, this one from the SecularWeb site. Note particularly the words "monistic materialism of most current naturalism".

[5] Arthur Danto says the following: "There is ... room within the naturalist movement for any variety of otherwise rival ontologies ... it is a methodological rather than an ontological monism ... leaving [philosophers] free to be dualists, idealists, materialists ... as the case may be." See "Naturalism," in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1967), 448. 

Contrary to Danto, however, dualism--either mind/body, natural/supernatural, or man/nature--and idealism do not seem reasonable for naturalists given the current state of science. The non-reductive, monistic materialism of most current naturalism is evidenced in several ways: (1) methodological naturalism's reliance on empirical inquiry makes impossible any epistemological appeal to the supernatural as an explanatory principle; (2) philosophical naturalism's exclusive adherence to this empirical methodology makes any dualistic ontology unverifiable if the dualism includes any non-physical entity, such as a supernatural entity which cannot be grounded in empirical evidence; and, (3) given modern naturalism's reliance upon science for the construction of its ontological categories, it receives no support for dualism from science. 

Given the current data to support the hypotheses emanating from cognitive science and neurobiology regarding the constitution of mind from physical processes in the brain, viewing the material world as a product or manifestation of mind is becoming less and less plausible, making idealism correspondingly less plausible. The same is true for mind-body dualism. (See E.O. Wilson, "The Mind," in Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998). The unlikelihood of any kind of dualism, a position defended by John Dewey, is also pointed out today by Hilary Kornblith: "It is surely clear that science does not currently offer any support to dualism, there being no research projects which make any reference to non-physical stuff. While it is also clear that current science is incomplete, this should give no comfort to dualists. One cannot draw conclusions about the existence of particular sorts of things from the fact of our present ignorance." See "Naturalism: Both Metaphysical and Epistemological," in Philosophical Naturalism, ed. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, vol. 19, Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), n51.