A proponent of panpsychism argues moral truth is inherent in consciousness

[Edited to better reflect that your sentence is conjectural.]

So, what it would come down to on that conjecture then is that there is no (ultimate) objective grounding for morality: morality would be (ultimately) grounded in "whatever those guys up there say it is".

Right?

It seems to me that the nature and definition of what is the moral ground of reality would naturally, inherently be whatever the creator or creators of that reality decided it should be. Like the laws of physics, apparently very finely tuned by intellignce to foster and allow carbon-based life as we know it to develop in the Universe.

In that case, for you to say that a soul is "yours" is like saying that your husband or wife is "yours" - it merely indicates a relationship between two conscious beings, rather than one of selfhood. On the other hand, when I say that a soul is "yours" I mean that it is the core of your self. So, you are working with a different definition, and, apparently, by my definition, you do not believe that humans have a soul.

Right?

I agree there is this problem with my view of the matter - but this view is based on observation. What about the evidence I cited? I'm not sure how to resolve this. Actually I think the issue must be rather complicated in that what can seem to be a separation of two different beings could be instead two greatly different levels of consciousness in a single overall being, where the higher level of consciousness can even be active simultaneously with that of the other lower one, and can make choices that would never be made by the other lower consciousness. We don't have the least idea of the ultimate depths of consciousness. Just one example would be multiple personality disorder, where the apparently separate pesonalities can be quite aware of each other but have radically different points of view and personalities even with certain different bodily characteristics like allergies.   

By the way I notice you don't dispute my examples of apparent evidence that the soul and the human self are in some sense quite separate. Do you dispute these examples of such apparent evidence?

I think you're onto something here which needs a little clarification, so here goes in my own words:

I think we need to distinguish between (morally) good choices/acts and good outcomes (in a morally relevant sense). Here's my view on this distinction: positive experiences are always good outcomes in a morally relevant sense, even if they are not the result of morally good choices or acts (i.e., even if they are accidents like stumbling on a 20 dollar bill). Morally good choices or acts are those which are intended to cause good outcomes in a morally relevant sense (i.e., positive experiences) and can reasonably be expected to do so (even if they accidentally and unintentionally don't, such as when money given generously is used to buy whiskey).

So, when we talk about "the ultimate good", we can talk about ultimately good choices/acts, or ultimately good outcomes... or we can talk about both, in which case, we could suggest that, unqualified, "the ultimate good" is when an ultimately good choice or act leads to an ultimately good outcome. That is to say that it is ultimately "better" when the act of generosity of giving away money leads to the outcome of hunger satiation rather than inebriation.

I think the ultimately morally good is simply an act of kindness, compassion and love to another; there is not a moral dimension to just positive experience since positive experiences can be defined simply as some form of pleasure whether bodily pleasure or emotional or both. This could be higher or lower, but it still is just pleasure - getting a heroin fix or eating a great meal or enjoying reading a great novel or listening to a Beethoven symphony. In my view these are still all positive experiences but with no moral dimension, no "ought".

[Laird]

It seems to me that the nature and definition of what is the moral ground of reality would naturally, inherently be whatever the creator or creators of that reality decided it should be.

In that case, you seem to be a moral relativist in at least two senses:

1. The sense in which morality is grounded by ("relative" to) whatever the creator(s) of reality decide(s).
   
2. The sense in which humans have their own ("relative") morality which differs from that of the creator(s).
   

Here's a question to get better clarity on your position:

Are you contending that even if both we humans and "the powers that be" had access to exactly the same set of facts about reality, it could still be the case that we as humans (rightly, by our definition) judge their system as immoral, and they (rightly, by their definition) judge that same system as moral?

I agree there is this problem with my view of the matter - but this view is based on observation. What about the evidence I cited? I'm not sure how to resolve this. Actually I think the issue must be rather complicated in that what can seem to be a separation of two different beings could be instead two greatly different levels of consciousness in a single overall being, where the higher level of consciousness can even be active simultaneously with that of the other lower one, and can make choices that would never be made by the other lower consciousness. We don't have the least idea of the ultimate depths of consciousness. Just one example would be multiple personality disorder, where the apparently separate pesonalities can be quite aware of each other but have radically different points of view and personalities even with certain different bodily characteristics like allergies.

I don't think it makes sense to say that a single self can undergo more than one coherent stream of phenomenal experiences at a time.^[1] Thus, when you suggest that there are "two greatly different levels of consciousness in a single overall being", you are necessarily using "being" loosely, because usually we understand a "being" to have (be) only one self, whereas on your suggestion this "being" necessarily has (is) at least two selves (because - it seems according to your proposal - it contains two separate coherent streams of phenomenal experiences).

Similarly, with MPD/DID, plainly, the dominant self cannot be the same self as (that of) any of its alters, because if it was, then it and its alter would have exactly the same phenomenal stream, which they apparently don't. You can't at the same time (as the dominant self) be experiencing the phenomenal stream of your dominant self whilst not experiencing the phenomenal stream of an alter and (as the alter) be experiencing the phenomenal stream of an alter whilst not experiencing the phenomenal stream of your dominant self, which is what would be required if dominant and alter were the same self, and which is logically contradictory - so the dominant self and each alter are necessarily distinct selves.

Are they in some close relationship? Presumably so. Could they even be sharing mental resources? Again, it seems likely. But they're by definition not the same self.

By the way I notice you don't dispute my examples of apparent evidence that the soul and the human self are in some sense quite separate. Do you dispute these examples of such apparent evidence?

I neither dispute nor affirm them, I simply think they're using the wrong word given the situation they're trying to describe. What they call a "soul" is, in my view given the understanding you've conveyed to me, by definition no such thing, and should be referred to using a different term. Perhaps "higher spiritual counsellor/mentor/advisor/dictator/tormentor" or the like.

I think the ultimately morally good is simply an act of kindness, compassion and love to another; there is not a moral dimension to just positive experience since positive experiences can be defined simply as some form of pleasure whether bodily pleasure or emotional or both. This could be higher or lower, but it still is just pleasure - getting a heroin fix or eating a great meal or enjoying reading a great novel or listening to a Beethoven symphony. In my view these are still all positive experiences but with no moral dimension, no "ought".

I think the sense in which positive experiences have a moral dimension in the form of an "ought" is the sense in which they are the objective of moral choices/acts (they are what we "ought" to be intending morally). The whole point of acts of kindness, compassion, and love, after all, is to cause positive experiences (in both giver and receiver). Do you disagree with that? And if you do, then can you suggest what the point of kindness, compassion, and love is if not to cause positive experiences?

[1] Titus Rivas helped to convince me of that, in part through his page Is noetic monism tenable? (which I've referenced before), and in part via personal communication. See also this shorter article of Titus's which I've just found: Cogito plus Noetic Monism leads to Solipsism.

It seems to me that the nature and definition of what is the moral ground of reality would naturally, inherently be whatever the creator or creators of that reality decided it should be. Like the laws of physics, apparently very finely tuned by intellignce to foster and allow carbon-based life as we know it to develop in the Universe.

If an evil person were to become a god and decided to make a reality where moral intuition justified their depravities, surely we'd say that this was a perversion of moral sense rather than a different set of moral laws?

I think if morality varies between realities then we're just talking about preferences. This is why Plato held gods/God cannot simply make something Good because they command it.

Whatever the Good might be, like mathematics Its truth would have to be Universal.

Dare I suggest the relevance of the Alignment Wheel from Dungeons and Dragons?



“Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.”
  -Immanuel Kant

If an evil person were to become a god and decided to make a reality where moral intuition justified their depravities, surely we'd say that this was a perversion of moral sense rather than a different set of moral laws?

I think if morality varies between realities then we're just talking about preferences. This is why Plato held gods/God cannot simply make something Good because they command it.

Whatever the Good might be, like mathematics Its truth would have to be Universal.

In my view there must be an intelligent source that is the origin of even the Universals (otherwise the Universals are complex specified information of a high order that either always existed (a watch without  a watchmaker), or these Universals came into being from absolutely nothing (but nothing can come from absolutely nothing - absolutely nothing is not even space and time and laws of physics and laws of logic). This intelligent source may also be the origin of the much greater amount of complex specified information constituting the physics laws of the physical universe and all of its matter and energy, and of the spiritual order.  Or the origin of the physical universe and the spiritual order could be subsidiary powerful spiritual entities created by the central Cause. In all these cases there would be a single Universal moral ground. Some aberrant immoral god establishing an aberrant evil morality would be an impossibility - an untenable thought experiment.

In my view there must be an intelligent source that is the origin of even the Universals (otherwise the Universals are complex specified information of a high order that either always existed (a watch without  a watchmaker), or these Universals came into being from absolutely nothing (but nothing can come from absolutely nothing - absolutely nothing is not even space and time and laws of physics and laws of logic). This intelligent source may also be the origin of the much greater amount of complex specified information constituting the physics laws of the physical universe and all of its matter and energy, and of the spiritual order.  Or the origin of the physical universe and the spiritual order could be subsidiary powerful spiritual entities created by the central Cause. In all these cases there would be a single Universal moral ground. Some aberrant immoral god establishing an aberrant evil morality would be an impossibility - an untenable thought experiment.

So is the Good defined by this Source Entity, or does the Good exist eternally but is a part of the Source Entity?

It seems for morality to have weight it would have to be the latter?

It seems for morality to have weight it would have to be the latter?

Why?  Aren't you putting rules/logic on this intelligent source with this logic?  Sort of an anthropomorphic approach?

Why?  Aren't you putting rules/logic on this intelligent source with this logic?  Sort of an anthropomorphic approach?

I'm just thinking that if something is Good just because the Source says it is then we'd have to conclude that all sorts of evil acts could have been Good.

But I wouldn't agree with that.

I'm just thinking that if something is Good just because the Source says it is then we'd have to conclude that all sorts of evil acts could have been Good.

But I wouldn't agree with that.

Got it.  Thanks.

Seems harder to square notion that Good (and by definition Evil?) just a priori exists and presupposes the Source; doesn't it?  Where did Good/Evil come from?