“Physical stuff” can’t do this and that - a false Dichotomy

No we don’t know this at all.

We do know that conscious observation appears to collapse the superposition.

You simply don’t understand the subject of QM.

That's very convenient. Have you considered that maybe you don't, especially when you make statements implying that you understand much more than you realistically can? After all, you don't seem to believe in superpositions.

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/16/opini...atter.html

I assert that no philosophical truth can exist behind a paywall

I find the above discussion rather daunting, but I am encouraged by the fact that this is sbu's thread. Perhaps he is becoming less certain about materialism?

David

I assert that no philosophical truth can exist behind a paywall

I find the above discussion rather daunting, but I am  encouraged by the fact that this is sbu's thread. Perhaps he is becoming less certain about materialism?

David

I have a subscription to NYTimes, so I could look at the article sbu linked to. I think the article can be disregarded, since it is dead in the water (apparently closed-minded) materialist scientism as regards the nature of consciousness. It is in the Opinion section and is titled "Consciousness Isn’t a Mystery. It’s Matter", by Galen Strawson.

This quote near the beginning shows the mindset:

"...Bertrand Russell in the 1950s in his essay “Mind and Matter” (remarked): “We know nothing about the intrinsic quality of physical events,” he wrote, “except when these are mental events that we directly experience.” In having conscious experience, he claims, we learn something about the intrinsic nature of physical stuff, for conscious experience is itself a form of physical stuff.

I think Russell is right: Human conscious experience is wholly a matter of physical goings-on in the body and in particular the brain."

I assert that no philosophical truth can exist behind a paywall

I find the above discussion rather daunting, but I am  encouraged by the fact that this is sbu's thread. Perhaps he is becoming less certain about materialism?

David

Let me reply with this excellent quote by David Chalmers “No position on the mind–body problem is plausible.
Materialism is implausible. Dualism is implausible. Idealism is implausible. Neutral monism is implausible.”

Let me reply with this excellent quote by David Chalmers “No position on the mind–body problem is plausible.
Materialism is implausible. Dualism is implausible. Idealism is implausible. Neutral monism is implausible.”

And what is the greater context surrounding this quote? Why does he hold this belief?

And what is the greater context surrounding this quote? Why does he hold this belief?

I took this quote form a paper on Idealism: https://philpapers.org/archive/CHAIAT-11.pdf

By the way, the NyTimes article (paywalled) I linked to was on Bertrand Russell's neutral monism.

I took this quote form a paper on Idealism: https://philpapers.org/archive/CHAIAT-11.pdf

By the way, the NyTimes article (paywalled) I linked to was on Bertrand Russell's neutral monism.

Was it really so hard to include the full paragraph from the conclusion...???

5 Conclusion

I do not claim that idealism is plausible. No position on the mind–body problem is plausible.
Materialism is implausible. Dualism is implausible. Idealism is implausible. Neutral monism is
implausible. None-of-the-above is implausible. But the probabilities of all of these views get a
boost from the fact that one of them must be true. Idealism is not greatly less plausible than its
main competitors. So even though idealism is implausible, there is a non-negligible probability
that it is true.

With the full paragraph, and not just a cherry-picked portion, we can see what he's truly trying to say ~ that one of them must be true, and that Idealism isn't any less plausible than Materialism, and that this means that there is, as he puts it, a non-negligible probability that it is true.

I expected better from you than for you to... cherry-pick a few sentences that makes it look like Chalmers is saying something different than what he's really saying.

Indeed, when he says that "none-of-the-above in implausible", that there is a possibility for something to be somewhat true.

The implication being that we do not have a full-enough picture of the mind-body problem to meaningfully say that any of the positions are plausible or implausible.

The implication being that we do not have a full-enough picture of the mind-body problem to meaningfully say that any of the positions are plausible or implausible.

And what alternative conclusions could have been made from the quote I made?

And what alternative conclusions could have been made from the quote I made?

Your severely truncated version that provides a distorted picture of Chalmers' overall position?

Only conclusions that misrepresent Chalmers' views per the linked paper.

In reality, in the paper, he sees a lot of promise in cosmic Idealism:

I conclude that there is significant motivation for cosmic idealism. It shares the general motivations
for panpsychism, which are strong, and has some extra motivation in addition. Compared
to micro-idealism, it deals much better with the problems of spacetime and of holism, and it at
least has some extra promise in dealing with the problem of causation and the all-important
constitution problem. Compared to non-idealist forms of panpsychism and panprotopsychism, it has
some advantages in simplicity and comprehensibility, while it has both benefits and costs with
respect to the constitution problem. I do not know that the constitution problem can be solved, but
there are at least avenues worth exploring.

Overall, I think cosmic idealism is the most promising version of idealism, and is about as
promising as any version of panpsychism. It should be on the list of the handful of promising
approaches to the mind–body problem.

Your severely truncated version that provides a distorted picture of Chalmers' overall position?

Only conclusions that misrepresent Chalmers' views per the linked paper.

In reality, in the paper, he sees a lot of promise in cosmic Idealism:

Off to a slow start today, right? I used the quote to present my own position to David (our David). I'm sure if (our) David was interested in the position of David Chalmers he would ask explicitly about it or create a new thread to discuss it.