What doe the Philosopher Fear?

[Laird]

But something can exist Eternally and begin the process of creation using It's Self as the building material.

Sure, but that simply leaves open the question of why it (something) rather than nothing exists. It doesn't really solve any problems that need solving.

Why couldn't it also have the power to create more of that which it already is, rather than having to cannibalise itself - albeit that it might have to work to gain these additions?

Where does it get this power?

From its own nature.

And if Ex Nihilo creation is fine, why is Physicalism not acceptable?

Because "physical" matter as proposed by physics is not creative; it simply follows the laws of physics. There's no way for it to reach beyond itself and add consciousness to its repertoire. It can't even imagine such a thing because it has no imagination to start with. It has no free will, nor any true intelligence. How, then, could it freely and intelligently create consciousness?

But let's say that what I've written above is wrong: then, at worst (for my position) matter has created mind, and a true (i.e, interactive) dualism eventuates - but this dualism is what I've been advocating for all along, so it's hardly fatal to my position!

We're having new thoughts and experiences, but we aren't creating new thinkers/experiencers from scratch.

But it's not really from "scratch", is it? There's something that exists already, namely, God - God isn't creating from scratch, but by or from Him/Her/Itself.

[Laird]

To elaborate a little: physicalism is unacceptable because of its logical inconsistency, not because of any impossibility of matter creating mind (even though I endorse that as impossible). If matter could create mind, then the only consistent outcome would be interactive dualism, which is what I'm already arguing for, so it's no loss to me to allow for that possibility (no loss other than that I would have to give up my argument for its impossibility, that is).

Sure, but that simply leaves open the question of why it (something) rather than nothing exists. It doesn't really solve any problems that need solving.

Something exists because we're here, and since Something can't come from Nothing then Something/Someone has always existed in some fashion.

Why couldn't it also have the power to create more of that which it already is, rather than having to cannibalise itself - albeit that it might have to work to gain these additions?

If it has some kind of infinite reserve of "stuff" that becomes matter/consciousness, then this leaves the question of what the "stuff" is.

If God's "Body" is infinite not sure "cannibalize" would apply?

From its own nature.

Isn't this just giving a being, "God", powers by fiat? How does it do what is logically not possible? (Note this is why some people have ended up Pantheist/Pandeist/Panentheist over other kinds of theism where God is apart from Creation).

Because "physical" matter as proposed by physics is not creative; it simply follows the laws of physics. There's no way for it to reach beyond itself and add consciousness to its repertoire. It can't even imagine such a thing because it has no imagination to start with. It has no free will, nor any true intelligence. How, then, could it freely and intelligently create consciousness?

If God has fiat powers, then I don't see why matter can't have fiat powers. Unless there's some explanation for why God has, as part of Its nature, the ability to create "stuff" where there was Nothing before.

But let's say that what I've written above is wrong: then, at worst (for my position) matter has created mind, and a true (i.e, interactive) dualism eventuates - but this dualism is what I've been advocating for all along, so it's hardly fatal to my position!

Well I would rather say that neither matter nor God can just make stuff from Nothing. Though not sure this would be dualism, after all the consciousness could just be stuck in matter and bound by its laws. This mind-in-matter could then, arguably cease to exist when the structure that engenders it breaks down.

But it's not really from "scratch", is it? There's something that exists already, namely, God - God isn't creating from scratch, but by or from Him/Her/Itself.

"From" I think is fine. "By" seems impossible unless there is an infinite pool of "stuff" God uses like a sculptor uses clay, or an artist uses paint. Though it seems this "stuff" would have to have some kind of mentality embedded within it.

[Laird]

Something exists because we're here, and since Something can't come from Nothing then Something/Someone has always existed in some fashion.

But that's an argument from knowledge; it's not a true metaphysical explanation. It is logically possible that it is/was not (never was) the case that Something exists/existed (in other words, in terms of modal logic, there is a possible world of Nothingness). Your argument doesn't explain on a metaphysical level why that logical possibility (possible world) is not the case - it only points out that we know that it is not.

There's still, then, a sense in which a whole bunch of stuff exists "out of nothing" - at least in comparison to the alternative of Nothing - the sense in which we have no explanation for why it exists compared to that alternative. It still seems to me to be a sort of "granted" miracle in at least the sense of "Something rather than Nothing" if not strictly "Something from Nothing".

Also, I'm not convinced that "has always existed" makes sense if it implies an infinite past, since as you know I accept the argument that - due to the logical problems of such a thing - an actual infinite cannot exist.

If it has some kind of infinite reserve of "stuff" that becomes matter/consciousness, then this leaves the question of what the "stuff" is.

If God's "Body" is infinite not sure "cannibalize" would apply?

Depending on what you mean by "infinite", I'm not convinced that this makes sense. An infinity of potential: sure. But an infinity of "stuff"? Hmm.

Isn't this just giving a being, "God", powers by fiat? How does it do what is logically not possible? (Note this is why some people have ended up Pantheist/Pandeist/Panentheist over other kinds of theism where God is apart from Creation).

Why is it not logically possible? Where's the contradiction? The logical impossibility that I see is for Something to come from Nothing at a universal level: for there to be literally Nothing at all - including in particular no potentiality - and from that literal Nothingness (without potentiality) for an actuality to spring forth. The logical contradiction here is that to create Something there has to be at least the potential to create, which (true) Nothingness lacks, yet it creates anyhow.

I don't see, though, why it would be impossible for God to possess that potentiality, and to use it to actualise souls and the matter with which they interact.

If God has fiat powers, then I don't see why matter can't have fiat powers.

Well, as I wrote previously, creativity, free will, and intelligence don't seem to apply to matter, and they would seem to be necessary to create conscious souls and minds with the complexity that ours have.

Unless there's some explanation for why God has, as part of Its nature, the ability to create "stuff" where there was Nothing before.

I don't know of an explanation but can offer the same sort of knowledge argument as you offered above: we know from personal experience that consciousness can be creative, free willing, and intelligent, and thus that God can be too, which seems grounding enough for the possibility that God can create "more stuff" than already exists.

after all the consciousness could just be stuck in matter and bound by its laws.

But there are good arguments against the logical coherence of that sort of epiphenomenalist view, including one by our very own Titus Rivas (which you "liked", no less!).

But that's an argument from knowledge; it's not a true metaphysical explanation. It is logically possible that it is/was not (never was) the case that Something exists/existed (in other words, in terms of modal logic, there is a possible world of Nothingness). Your argument doesn't explain on a metaphysical level why that logical possibility (possible world) is not the case - it only points out that we know that it is not.

"From an in-construable beginning comes lifetimes of transmigration. A beginning point is not evident..."
  -Buddha

If it all started from Nothing, we wouldn't be here. Instead, since Something can't come from Nothing, we know that while possible it can be ruled out.

I don't see why there has to be a metaphysical explanation. I don't even know what such an explanation would look like?

    There's still, then, a sense in which a whole bunch of stuff exists "out of nothing" - at least in comparison to the alternative of Nothing - the sense in which we have no explanation for why it exists compared to that alternative. It still seems to me to be a sort of "granted" miracle in at least the sense of "Something rather than Nothing" if not strictly "Something from Nothing".

 
But there is no miracle, just the observation we're here and the logical axiom that Something can't come from Nothing.

    Also, I'm not convinced that "has always existed" makes sense if it implies an infinite past, since as you know I accept the argument that - due to the logical problems of such a thing - an actual infinite cannot exist.

Well there's either an infinite regression or some "Out of Time" explanation. Both have issues, though the latter has doesn't make sense to me.

    Depending on what you mean by "infinite", I'm not convinced that this makes sense. An infinity of potential: sure. But an infinity of "stuff"? Hmm.

So you think there are only a finite number of souls/spirits in all of the Real?

    Why is it not logically possible? Where's the contradiction? The logical impossibility that I see is for Something to come from Nothing at a universal level: for there to be literally Nothing at all - including in particular no potentiality - and from that literal Nothingness (without potentiality) for an actuality to spring forth. The logical contradiction here is that to create Something there has to be at least the potential to create, which (true) Nothingness lacks, yet it creates anyhow.

How does potential become actual without actuality? And the moment the Void has "potentiality" it seems to me it is an infinite "stuff" what can be used to fill the Real with all the varied spirit worlds.

Extant entities have potential, I don't see how there is "potential" just floating by itself?

    I don't see, though, why it would be impossible for God to possess that potentiality, and to use it to actualise souls and the matter with which they interact.

I think this just makes "potentiality" a kind of "actuality", since as you say "potentiality" is different from "Nothing".

    Well, as I wrote previously, creativity, free will, and intelligence don't seem to apply to matter, and they would seem to be necessary to create conscious souls and minds with the complexity that ours have.

Why would these qualities be necessary? Once you include an instance of fiat power then it seems difficult to claim matter can't produce minds using a different variation of fiat power that doesn't need those qualities.

    I don't know of an explanation but can offer the same sort of knowledge argument as you offered above: we know from personal experience that consciousness can be creative, free willing, and intelligent, and thus that God can be too, which seems grounding enough for the possibility that God can create "more stuff" than already exists.

All observable cases use creativity/free will/intelligence to make "stuff" out of existing "stuff".

    But there are good arguments against the logical coherence of that sort of epiphenomenalist view, including one by our very own Titus Rivas (which you "liked", no less!).

To me an argument against epiphenomenalism is tied to the impossibility of Something from Nothing or more specifically A can only be the cause of B if there is already something within A that can produce B. If one can have consciousness arise by fiat in matter, then how is it that it can be definite that it is not bound by this same matter?

Remember that even the physicalist Dennet rejects epiphenomanlism while maintaining that the physical with its attendant deterministic "laws" is all there is. Once we give God fiat powers it is all too easy to give fiat powers to the physical.

[Laird]

But there is no miracle, just the observation we're here and the logical axiom that Something can't come from Nothing.

You don't think that it's miraculous that there might have been Nothing but instead there is Something? I find that to be the most awesome mystery of existence. Just saying, "Well, there just so happens to be Something, and, you know, that's the end of it" seems to me to utterly belittle the mystery.

Well there's either an infinite regression or some "Out of Time" explanation. Both have issues, though the latter has doesn't make sense to me.

Granted, and fair play. "Out of time" explanations are also problematic. I understand that this is one of Kant's antinomies. However, "eternal" existence, it seems to me, more plausibly is taken to be "existence from outside of time which affects time" than "existence whose past is infinite", given that the latter juts up against the problem of an actual infinity.

I guess that all of that is to say that the former makes more sense to me (even though I'm not entirely comfortable with it).

So you think there are only a finite number of souls/spirits in all of the Real?

Yes. Again, though, I understand that this (infinity versus finitism) is one of Kant's antinomies, so it might point to a deeper resolution.

How does potential become actual without actuality?

I'm not sure why you're asking this, because I'm not proposing that it does. I'm proposing that God is the actual who in turn actualises potential.

And the moment the Void has "potentiality" it seems to me it is an infinite "stuff" what can be used to fill the Real with all the varied spirit worlds.

Hmm. So, you're saying that "potentiality" is "stuff"? That doesn't make sense to me. Only actuality can be "stuff". Potentiality is only... well, the potential for "stuff".

Extant entities have potential, I don't see how there is "potential" just floating by itself?

Huh. For the purposes of argument, I'm not sure it matters either way. That is to say: in the context of our debate (over whether a God who creates souls and their relationship with matter is more plausible than some sort of idealism lacking a true divinity of the intelligently creative sort) does it really matter whether potentiality is "attached" to an entity or rather is free?

I think this just makes "potentiality" a kind of "actuality", since as you say "potentiality" is different from "Nothing".

Hmm. This seems to me to be a sort of semantic distraction. Yes, for potential to be - well, potential - it has to be an "actual" potential. That doesn't mean that there is no meaningful distinction between potentiality and actuality though.

Why would these qualities be necessary? Once you include an instance of fiat power then it seems difficult to claim matter can't produce minds using a different variation of fiat power that doesn't need those qualities.

I'm arguing from conceivability. I don't think it's remotely conceivable that a substance lacking those qualities could create one that has them. I suspect that you don't either, but that you're playing Devil's Advocate.

All observable cases use creativity/free will/intelligence to make "stuff" out of existing "stuff".

Are you sure that that is so? Or is it just your assumption? Why could it not be that our experiences, thoughts, and ideas are truly novel, arising not from preexisting "stuff" but rather "conjured up independently" by our creative, intelligent, freely willing minds?

To me an argument against epiphenomenalism is tied to the impossibility of Something from Nothing or more specifically A can only be the cause of B if there is already something within A that can produce B. If one can have consciousness arise by fiat in matter, then how is it that it can be definite that it is not bound by this same matter?

Remember that even the physicalist Dennet rejects epiphenomanlism while maintaining that the physical with its attendant deterministic "laws" is all there is. Once we give God fiat powers it is all too easy to give fiat powers to the physical.

Hmm? This doesn't make sense to me. I pointed you to Titus's argument, but you simply ignored that argument and went off on another tack. No, the argument is not tied to the impossibility of Something from Nothing: it is tied to the impossibility of matter forming conceptions of a mind which is causally inaccessible to it.

To recapitulate: even if matter had fiat power to create mind, this would not anyway affect my view, since the only logically coherent view of mind-matter duality is interactive dualism. Thus, even if matter created mind (which I hold to be a ridiculous notion), it would anyway end up in the interactive dualism for which I already advocate.

You don't think that it's miraculous that there might have been Nothing but instead there is Something? I find that to be the most awesome mystery of existence. Just saying, "Well, there just so happens to be Something, and, you know, that's the end of it" seems to me to utterly belittle the mystery.

It might be a mystery, but it's not a metaphysical problem that needs an answer. It's possible I was never born but here I am.

    Granted, and fair play. "Out of time" explanations are also problematic. I understand that this is one of Kant's antinomies. However, "eternal" existence, it seems to me, more plausibly is taken to be "existence from outside of time which affects time" than "existence whose past is infinite", given that the latter juts up against the problem of an actual infinity.

I guess that all of that is to say that the former makes more sense to me (even though I'm not entirely comfortable with it).

This seems like a new Interaction Problem between that which is Eternal (Timeless?) and that which is in Time.

   

Yes. Again, though, I understand that this (infinity versus finitism) is one of Kant's antinomies, so it might point to a deeper resolution.

So God can't create an infinite number of souls?

    I'm not sure why you're asking this, because I'm not proposing that it does. I'm proposing that God is the actual who in turn actualises potential.

Actualizes the potential of what? A pool of "stuff" (energy? ectoplasm?) or the potential of His/Her/Its own body to be the stuff of Creation?

    Hmm. So, you're saying that "potentiality" is "stuff"? That doesn't make sense to me. Only actuality can be "stuff". Potentiality is only... well, the potential for "stuff".

I'm saying that only "stuff" can have potential. As you yourself note, Nothing can't have potentiality so Something cannot come from it.

God can't actualize the potential of Nothing.

    Huh. For the purposes of argument, I'm not sure it matters either way. That is to say: in the context of our debate (over whether a God who creates souls and their relationship with matter is more plausible than some sort of idealism lacking a true divinity of the intelligently creative sort) does it really matter whether potentiality is "attached" to an entity or rather is free?

My point is only tangentially related to Idealism, rather it's a question of Pandeism/Pantheism/Panentheism over a God who makes Creation from Nothing.

    Hmm. This seems to me to be a sort of semantic distraction. Yes, for potential to be - well, potential - it has to be an "actual" potential. That doesn't mean that there is no meaningful distinction between potentiality and actuality though.

Actual potentials can only be found in actualized (aka extant) entities.

    I'm arguing from conceivability. I don't think it's remotely conceivable that a substance lacking those qualities could create one that has them. I suspect that you don't either, but that you're playing Devil's Advocate.

Well I don't think its conceivable specifically because Something cannot from Nothing, and not even God can get around this logical limit.

    Are you sure that that is so? Or is it just your assumption? Why could it not be that our experiences, thoughts, and ideas are truly novel, arising not from preexisting "stuff" but rather "conjured up independently" by our creative, intelligent, freely willing minds?

Novelty is from the causal direction, not from creation from Nothing?

    Hmm? This doesn't make sense to me. I pointed you to Titus's argument, but you simply ignored that argument and went off on another tack. No, the argument is not tied to the impossibility of Something from Nothing: it is tied to the impossibility of matter forming conceptions of a mind which is causally inaccessible to it.

I reread the whole paper. Have you read it recently?

    To recapitulate: even if matter had fiat power to create mind, this would not anyway affect my view, since the only logically coherent view of mind-matter duality is interactive dualism. Thus, even if matter created mind (which I hold to be a ridiculous notion), it would anyway end up in the interactive dualism for which I already advocate.

I don't think the paper works once you introduce the ability of matter to generate a mind by fiat, as in that case it would conceivably be the "laws" that limit the physical limiting the mental as well.

But yes, it is inconceivable for matter to create mind, just as it is impossible for any entity to create the Real out of potential-less Nothing.

[Laird]

It might be a mystery, but it's not a metaphysical problem that needs an answer. It's possible I was never born but here I am.

Huh. We're starting to go around in circles here, but I think that that problem really does need an answer in this context: the acceptance of a proposition that stuff just exists and always has even though it might not have, with no explanation, seems to me to entail the acceptance of the proposition that stuff can be created from pure potential. YMMV, and apparently does...

This seems like a new Interaction Problem between that which is Eternal (Timeless?) and that which is in Time.

As I said, I'm not entirely comfortable with it. Somehow, it seems, we need to transcend time, but no means of transcendence that I've seen is entirely comfortable, albeit that the "from outside of time" paradigm is most comfortable. Oh well.

Actualizes the potential of what? A pool of "stuff" (energy? ectoplasm?) or the potential of His/Her/Its own body to be the stuff of Creation?

The potential for "stuff" to exist: an abstract potential not bound to any pre-existing stuff.

As you yourself note, Nothing can't have potentiality

But we've established that there is Something rather than Nothing. This particularly includes God as Actualiser.

Well I don't think its conceivable specifically because Something cannot from Nothing, and not even God can get around this logical limit.

God - the Actualiser - is not Nothing though, and nor is the abstract potential which God actualises.

Novelty is from the causal direction, not from creation from Nothing?

And actualising potential is causal. The Actualiser creatively causes it to occur.

I reread the whole paper. Have you read it recently?

No, but I remember its core argument, and...

I don't think the paper works once you introduce the ability of matter to generate a mind by fiat, as in that case it would conceivably be the "laws" that limit the physical limiting the mental as well.

...I don't recognise it in this.

The point of the paper as I remember it is that epiphenomenalism, no matter how it came to be, is incoherent. You seem to be asserting instead that depending on how it came to be (matter generating mind by fiat for example) epiphenomenalism might be coherent. Or am I misunderstanding you?

But yes, it is inconceivable for matter to create mind, just as it is impossible for any entity to create the Real out of potential-less Nothing.

Ah, but I'm not saying that anything's created without potential. The necessary potential is already present, both in God and in the abstract.