What doe the Philosopher Fear?

[Laird]

I assume you mean 1st person PoVs logically, rather than temporally, precede consciousness? 

Yep.

I don't think this is any different than saying thoughts are in consciousness but are not themselves conscious.

OK, but then we run into the other related conceptual problem that I've mentioned to you privately already: some of these thought analogues in MAL are conscious, and thus have thought analogues of their own. Cashing out the analogy for Analytic Idealism, the analogue of these "thoughts" is "experience", given that, on Analytic Idealism, everything is experience ("mind in motion"). Therefore, we end up with "experiences experiencing". Is this problem fatal? Perhaps or perhaps not, but it is certainly strange.

OK, but then we run into the other related conceptual problem that I've mentioned to you privately already: some of these thought analogues in MAL are conscious, and thus have thought analogues of their own. Cashing out the analogy for Analytic Idealism, the analogue of these "thoughts" is "experience", given that, on Analytic Idealism, everything is experience ("mind in motion"). Therefore, we end up with "experiences experiencing". Is this problem fatal? Perhaps or perhaps not, but it is certainly strange.

I don't [think] the analogue for thoughts is experience, and I'd say rather than "experiences experiencing" one has entities that have thoughts and experiences.

I believe BK refers to these entities as split personalities (dissociated alters) of "Mind at Large", though I might be messing up the terminology a bit here.

To use more common language:

A) There's a Dreamer who dreamed up Everything. So Everything is in the mind of the Dreamer. Then there are split-personalities that experience the Dream-that's-Everything.

B) Where Analytic Idealism takes it further is to then posit the idea that there is only a single Subject, the Dreamer, and everyone else's experiences are illusory.

So yes B) I think is a problem, but I would say A) is what a good chunk of Idealists - or really anyone who believes in the One <=> Many relationship - accepts in some fashion. B) is more specific to a certain branch of Idealists - and Cosmo-Panpsychists.

C) Then there's the "Subjective Idealists" who seem to be out of fashion - IIRC these fellows believe there are just Many Minds who together determine the experience of reality. Arguably these would be the Eternal Many I mentioned above.

[Laird]

I don't [think] the analogue for thoughts is experience

OK, then what is the analogue?

and I'd say rather than "experiences experiencing" one has entities that have thoughts and experiences.

And of what are those entities comprised if not "experience" (aka "mind in motion")? Recall that the express claim of Analytic Idealism is that "everything is experience".

I believe BK refers to these entities as split personalities (dissociated alters) of "Mind at Large", though I might be messing up the terminology a bit here.

He seems to use various terms including "psyche" and "alter", maybe even "personal consciousness" - I can't quite remember.

To use more common language:

A) There's a Dreamer who dreamed up Everything. So Everything is in the mind of the Dreamer. Then there are split-personalities that experience the Dream-that's-Everything.

B) Where Analytic Idealism takes it further is to then posit the idea that there is only a single Subject, the Dreamer, and everyone else's experiences are illusory.

So yes B) I think is a problem, but I would say A) is what a good chunk of Idealists - or really anyone who believes in the One <=> Many relationship - accepts in some fashion. B) is more specific to a certain branch of Idealists - and Cosmo-Panpsychists.

C) Then there's the "Subjective Idealists" who seem to be out of fashion - IIRC these fellows believe there are just Many Minds who together determine the experience of reality. Arguably these would be the Eternal Many I mentioned above.

Nicely put.

OK, then what is the analogue?

Does there need to be one?

And of what are those entities comprised if not "experience" (aka "mind in motion")? Recall that the express claim of Analytic Idealism is that "everything is experience".

You'll have to point me to the "everything is experience" line.

Ultimately though I don't Idealism of any kind being wrong makes Dualism better, though I'm somewhat sympathetic to the issue that the Interaction Problem assumes two distinct Substances even though any "Substance" arguably is known by causal interaction.

[Laird]

Does there need to be one?

It seems so, in that you seemed to imply that there was one when you wrote:

I don't think this is any different than saying thoughts are in consciousness but are not themselves conscious.

To say that it's not any different implies some sort of analogy, so it seems reasonable to ask what the analogy for thought is in the case of MAL.

You'll have to point me to the "everything is experience" line.

See page 152 of the Kindle edition of "Why Materialism Is Baloney" (emphasis in the original): "The main thrust of this book has been the claim that only experience exists".

Following that are a few paragraphs of a clarification, but that clarification is not relevant in the context of our current exchange.

Ultimately though I don't Idealism of any kind being wrong makes Dualism better, though I'm somewhat sympathetic to the issue that the Interaction Problem assumes two distinct Substances even though any "Substance" arguably is known by causal interaction.

I'm finding it difficult to parse that sentence (the bit about the Interaction Problem in particular) - can you please rephrase it?

[Laird]

It seems so, in that you seemed to imply that there was one when you wrote:

Or maybe you're saying there's no analogy because the situations are identical, and that it is the thoughts of MAL which are either non-conscious or conscious.

To say that it's not any different implies some sort of analogy, so it seems reasonable to ask what the analogy for thought is in the case of MAL.

Hmmm, you've lost me sorry. I was saying that BK's assertion is that the Real consists of elements in consciousness and entities that are conscious all within Mind @ Large.

My point about thoughts not having thoughts of their own was in reference to those parts of the Real that are "in consciousness" but are not conscious themselves.

Maybe that makes things clearer? Regardless, my main point was just to show that there doesn't seem to be a way to know whether the "stuff" of the Real is suffused throughout with some kind of consciousness. For example when we see an apparition acting willfully - is its entire body conscious or does it have some kind of "ghost brain"?

See page 152 of the Kindle edition of "Why Materialism Is Baloney" (emphasis in the original): "The main thrust of this book has been the claim that only experience exists".

Following that are a few paragraphs of a clarification, but that clarification is not relevant in the context of our current exchange.

It's been years since I've looked at this text, but looking at the glossary:

Experience: a particular movement of mind. The qualities of an experience are determined by the pattern of this movement. In this book, we have metaphorically visualized the movements of mind as undulations, ripples and vibrations.

So movements of mind (alters) having other movements of mind (their own thoughts) doesn't seem like a big problem? It does seem like the problem occurs when there is supposedly only a Single Subject having all the disparate private thoughts of the ultimately illusory alters as Its own experiences though.

I'm finding it difficult to parse that sentence (the bit about the Interaction Problem in particular) - can you please rephrase it?

I just meant that when we try to figure out a "substance" and demarcate it from other "substances" we use observation of causality. Or, to look at it from another angle, it isn't easy to see how entities of the same substance interact so it isn't clear what the problem is with distinct substances interacting.

[Laird]

Hmmm, you've lost me sorry.

My guess is that you missed my follow-up post (#16). If it's not accurate, then please say.

So movements of mind (alters) having other movements of mind (their own thoughts) doesn't seem like a big problem?

In my view, the crucial part of what you've written there is the second parenthetical, in which you acknowledge that "movements of mind" is a synonym for "thoughts". Thus, in allowing that "movements of mind" can have "other movements of mind", you implicitly acknowledge that (Analytic Idealism entails that) "thoughts" can have "thoughts of their own", and thus that "thoughts can think". This is the very problem I've been pointing out, albeit that rather than framing it in terms of "thoughts", I've been framing it in terms of "experience", as in, "experiences can experience".

Why is "experience" a better frame than "thoughts"? Because (1) on Analytic Idealism, experience rather than thought is stressed as fundamental, and (2) in my opinion, experience is fundamental anyway, in that every thought is an experience, but not every experience is a thought.

it isn't easy to see how entities of the same substance interact so it isn't clear what the problem is with distinct substances interacting.

Super. Thanks for the rephrasing. That which I've quoted in particular worked for my understanding, and I agree.

My guess is that you missed my follow-up post (#16). If it's not accurate, then please say.

I wasn't really trying to say anything as deep as the thoughts of MAL being conscious or non-conscious, I was just giving two examples (BK & Whitehead) of how things might shake out in terms of whether the Fundamental Stuff is suffused with consciousness.

In my view, the crucial part of what you've written there is the second parenthetical, in which you acknowledge that "movements of mind" is a synonym for "thoughts". Thus, in allowing that "movements of mind" can have "other movements of mind", you implicitly acknowledge that (Analytic Idealism entails that) "thoughts" can have "thoughts of their own", and thus that "thoughts can think". This is the very problem I've been pointing out, albeit that rather than framing it in terms of "thoughts", I've been framing it in terms of "experience", as in, "experiences can experience"..

I still don't see how Analytic Idealism implies there are thoughts that can think? I don't doubt that WMiB had some flaws in wording, but BK even acknowledged the words he used (thought, experience, etc) could be replaced with other words that might be better referents to what he wished to describe.

Even if BK's Idealism is flawed, does that mean some kind of Idealism can't be true? To me that seems the more important question.

[Laird]

I still don't see how Analytic Idealism implies there are thoughts that can think?

Well, what is an alter other than "a (dissociated set of) thought(s) in the universal mind"? And since an alter has thoughts of its own, the conclusion that thoughts can think seems inevitable.

Seriously, what is an alter other than that? What is its fundamental nature?

I don't doubt that WMiB had some flaws in wording, but BK even acknowledged the words he used (thought, experience, etc) could be replaced with other words that might be better referents to what he wished to describe.

Sure, granted.

Even if BK's Idealism is flawed, does that mean some kind of Idealism can't be true?

Nope. I think that there are possible versions of idealism, and I like the approach in the article in the OP which essentially asked, "Where is a real God in all of this?! Why is God missing? Why should we accept an idealism lacking in true divinity?"