The Solution to the Problem of the Freedom of the Will

Evidently we can not conclude "Non determinism" from asking the question: "Do you trust experiments?"

Evidently we can not conclude "Non determinism" from asking the question: "Do you trust experiments?"

Sorry I don't understand what you mean?

Sorry I don't understand what you mean?

I'm trying to make any sense of that article. As far as I can see, the writer here, Marko Vojinovic, is a materialist. That is, he is missing out of all things that does not exist in his world-view. Some estimates or guesses say that we don't know about 90 % of everything. So he is dealing with a fraction of reality, if not materialism is true.

He is also extremely theoretical; his definition of determinism is wrong, even within the scope of materialism; There is no place for any calculations; There is no initial state of anything here, and so on.

If we understand that he is dealing with limited data, then we might possibly have some hope for understanding his flowchart diagram, that is there to give us a visual view of his thinking.

The diagram has two outcomes: "Non determnism" and "Cognitive instability", and this he manages to derive from the question; "Do you trust experiments?"
So who is "you" here? Is there supposed to be one outcome from each and every person? And what has their trust in anything to do with determinism?

We can ignore the "Yes" path of the diagram, as that lead to "Non determinism" no matter what. But the "No" path might be more interesting. It leads to something called "Superdeterminism". So what is that? We have to look it up. (Do not trust Marko to tell us). It appears to indicate that there are causes coming from "outside space and time" , so that is definitely going in the right direktion. But, unfortunately, he deems superdeterminism, possibly together with his odd question, to be cognitive instable. Not because it is, but because he is a materialist, and he thinks so.

http://www.informationphilosopher.com/fr...inism.html

I've written about 3 responses to this and get distracted in the middle. When I come back to it I just decide not to post it because I need to think about it more...

It seems to me the subject question is really about the incompleteness of the metaphor of solidity. A solid, rigid, changeless, static object is a fundamental mental concept. Perhaps it is a result of the grammar of language: a noun needing a verb.

Does any such thing actually exist "objectively" or is everything in flux - a spectrum of relative rates of change resulting in the appearance of some things as static "objects".

The notion of a static object is at the root of determinism. Any n-dimensional "object" is static by definition. We then apply an n+1 dimension to allow it to change in some way. Change in this n+1 dimension is by definition a line. After establishing the line, the question naturally arises: are other lines possible? Or in other words: is there also an n+2 dimension? Since our whole analogy is based on the concept of a static object we refer back to the static object and see that yes in fact there are many (infinite) possible lines or paths that can be taken to traverse the object.

We then take the n-dimensional object and integrate its path to arrive at a new n+1 dimensional "object".

So we envision all of 3-D space as a static object. Time becomes analogized as a line and then integrated into the object and this is the block universe of determinism.

The solution is add another dimension... why not? All the dimensions are mental metaphors originating with the notion of the mythical static "object".

...
The notion of a static object is at the root of determinism. Any n-dimensional "object" is static by definition. We then apply an n+1 dimension to allow it to change in some way.
...

Now if we look at it from the opposite perspective, there is always change, and we have to remove one dimension to achieve the static state.

Change is constant and natural. A static universe is an abstract we have created in our minds.

In that case, removing one more dimension gives us less of reality, adding one dimension brings us back to where we started, and adding yet another one is untested.

The idea of a static universe might come from the thought that there is no future; And the only possible way of telling the future is to calculate it from the present. I can argue that there exist indeed a future, we can not calculate it correctly, but we can get to it directly, as to the past. This of course beggars belief. It has been done and it can be done.

I'm trying to make any sense of that article. As far as I can see, the writer here, Marko Vojinovic, is a materialist. That is, he is missing out of all things that does not exist in his world-view. Some estimates or guesses say that we don't know about 90 % of everything. So he is dealing with a fraction of reality, if not materialism is true.

He is also extremely theoretical; his definition of determinism is wrong, even within the scope of materialism; There is no place for any calculations; There is no initial state of anything here, and so on.

If we understand that he is dealing with limited data, then we might possibly have some hope for understanding his flowchart diagram, that is there to give us a visual view of his thinking.

The diagram has two outcomes: "Non determnism" and "Cognitive instability", and this he manages to derive from the question; "Do you trust experiments?"
So who is "you" here? Is there supposed to be one outcome from each and every person? And what has their trust in anything to do with determinism?

We can ignore the "Yes" path of the diagram, as that lead to "Non determinism" no matter what. But the "No" path might be more interesting. It leads to something called "Superdeterminism". So what is that? We have to look it up. (Do not trust Marko to tell us). It appears to indicate that there are causes coming from "outside space and time" , so that is definitely going in the right direktion. But, unfortunately, he deems superdeterminism, possibly together with his odd question, to be cognitive instable. Not because it is, but because he is a materialist, and he thinks so.

http://www.informationphilosopher.com/fr...inism.html

He specifically notes the problems with superdeterminism in the article?

I don't see what it would have to necessarily do with him being a materialist or not?

Beyond that, summing up causes is not an explanation for why the effect in particular happens consistently. This is what I believe Dupre's point was meant to be - that causation describes a dispositional relationship rather than one of necessity.

He specifically notes the problems with superdeterminism in the article?

I don't see what it would have to necessarily do with him being a materialist or not?

Beyond that, summing up causes is not an explanation for why the effect in particular happens consistently. This is what I believe Dupre's point was meant to be - that causation describes a dispositional relationship rather than one of necessity.

Possibly he comes from a theoretical standpoint only. While as others have empirical knowledge of effects from outside the limits of physical aspects of time and space. He might well believe there are problems with both super- and determinism if it goes beyond his horizon.

From The Solution to the Problem of the Freedom of the Will:

Between two views that I have rejected, that we are random action generators and that we are machines, can be found the view that makes sense of human autonomy. Many parts of humans have just the characteristics of machines that I have emphasized in the preceding discussion, namely complex constraints that insure the predictable exercise of somecapacity of an organ or physiological system. But humans are fundamentally different from machines in that they have no controls. Self-control, in the sense of the absence of external controls, is of course nothing but the autonomy, or free will, that was the original topic of this paper. I have not attempted to refute the idea that sense organs might sometimes function as controls, in the sense that the input to sense organs might determine, via a complex intermediate causal chain, the behavior of the whole organism. This is presumably roughly true of simple organisms. But it does not appear to be true of ourselves, except perhaps in purely reflexive actions, such as ducking to avoid a flying object. The reason we are so liable to think of ourselves in this machine-like way is because we are tempted by determinism. If the world is deterministic then my behavior is causally necessary given the stimuli that impinge on me; and presumably the most important stimuli are sensory ones. The point of all the complex machine-like parts of me would then have to be just to make sure that the causally elicited behavior was appropriate to the circumstances disclosed by my sense organs. But the rejection of causal completeness allows a more natural view of things. My complexity of structure gives me a vast array of causal powers, a range of powers that would be inconceivable without that intricate machine-like internal structure. But the exercise of those powers, though obviously influenced by the circumstances I perceive myself to be in, ultimately depends on an autonomous decision-making process. Once we see causal order as something special rather than something universal, there is no obstacle to seeing the human will as an autonomous source of such order.

I think this kind of reasoning ignores the crux of the matter, which is whether mind-brain materialism itself is truth or is not the truth. If, as many members of this forum believe, the human consciousness and mind are something other than one and the same as brain neurons and/or their activities (in particular, substance or interactionist dualism), then freedom of the will becomes actually freedom of the spirit or soul that interacts with the physical world through the brain. We know little or nothing of the true nature of spirit or soul, so we know little or nothing of whether the determinism versus indeterminism conundrum even applies to the inherent nature of spirit. Freedom of the will may be an inherent property of it, and fundamentally incomprehensible to humans.

From The Solution to the Problem of the Freedom of the Will:



... Freedom of the will may be an inherent property of it, and fundamentally incomprehensible to humans.

Would it matter who has the will, in regard to it being "free"?
If the spirit's will is free then would not also the human's will be free, as they are effectively one and the same.

For something to be free or indetermined it specifies that it is not caused by anything, other than the abstract "random" or "freedom".

Surely a spirit's will is based on things around it as anything else.