The Good Place

Is an entity made of any particular substance merely it's relation to other entities such as atoms and virtual particles, or going up to other chemicals/other cells/other organisms? Does it have some inner essence, some properties that allow it to exist in causal relations with other entities?

You could organize around a different set of concerns that usually done in philosophy and potentially have certain materialists and idealists closer to each other than others of their general metaphysical "ism"...or so it seems at first glance?

I think that most of us use these isms as a convenience rather than some accurate pinpointing of a metaphysical position. I agree that the philosophical boundaries are blurred and believe that what people mean comes down to their particular bias. For example, you get materialists arguing about whether so-called quantum weirdness exists and/or whether consciousness plays any role whatsoever. Some refuse to allow a role for consciousness - well, if you follow Dennett, consciousness is a mere illusion so it could hardly have any real-world effect, could it? This is echoed by physicists such as the late Victor Stenger.

The standard model is based on the notion that the universe is composed of material particles and nothing more. Classical physics still had ethereal fields. Since its inception, the standard model has agreed with all physics data and was crowned in 2012 with the observation of the long-predicted Higgs boson. As for the role of consciousness in quantum mechanics—this is not supported by a scintilla of empirical evidence.

So I return to the point I made earlier: people like Dennett, Stenger and others such as Krauss, while being prominent in their own fields of philosophy and physics, are/were above all crusading atheists. Dennett is one of the notorious "four horsemen" and Stenger was often referred to as the fifth horseman. 

The atheist community is mourning the death of Victor Stenger, a prominent physicist who championed rooting out religion from the public sphere and was best-known for quipping: “Science flies you to the moon. Religion flies you into buildings.”

Stenger, who also graced a very short list of authors who hit the New York Times best-seller list writing about atheism, died Aug. 25 in Hawaii. He was 79.

To add to my comments above, I'd like to be clear about my position on atheism and atheist campaigners. To do so, first a little personal history.

Back in my twenties and thirties I tended to be outspoken against religion - especially organised and most especially fundamentalist religion. My son might disagree but my angry rants of those days must surely have influenced his outlook on the subject. He is now a confirmed and enthusiastic atheist and will tell you so with the minimum of encouragement. Fast-forward to more recent times and I don't think that my views on religion have changed that much. Some of the criticisms you might expect to hear from Harris or Dawkins are still in line with my own thoughts on religion. However, being critical of religion does not automatically confirm you as an atheist. I might not believe in the God of Abraham but, as I have mentioned above, something like the Hindu concept of Brahman is very close to my own thinking on the nature of 'god'. 

To take the point a step further, I think it is wrong to weaponise science in the atheist war on religion. By restricting the scope of science to that which is deemed 'natural' scientists have elected to exclude the supernatural but this does not prove that the supernatural is false. If you can't measure something, does that mean that it doesn't exist? Can you measure empathy or the pleasure someone gets from the smell of fresh-baked bread? Can you tabulate the devotion a dog may feel for his human companion? Whenever you hear prominent atheists pontificating, they will inevitably tell you that they are on the side of science or that science is proof of their argument. No it isn't. It might be a good argument against Young Earth (Biblical) Creationism but it does not demolish any and every concept of god. Science is not meant to prove or disprove god and the supernatural - disproof of these things is, by definition, beyond the scope of science but central to the mission of atheists.

It might be appropriate here to quote a scientist. 

In January of 1936, a school girl named Phyllis wrote to Einstein to ask whether you could believe in science and religion. He was quick to reply.


Dear Phyllis, 

I will attempt to reply to your question as simply as I can. Here is my answer:

Scientists believe that every occurrence, including the affairs of human beings, is due to the laws of nature. Therefore a scientist cannot be inclined to believe that the course of events can be influenced by prayer, that is, by a supernaturally manifested wish.

However, we must concede that our actual knowledge of these forces is imperfect, so that in the end the belief in the existence of a final, ultimate spirit rests on a kind of faith. Such belief remains widespread even with the current achievements in science. 

But also, everyone who is seriously involved in the pursuit of science becomes convinced that some spirit is manifest in the laws of the universe, one that is vastly superior to that of man. In this way the pursuit of science leads to a religious feeling of a special sort, which is surely quite different from the religiosity of someone more naive. 

With cordial greetings, 

your A. Einstein

To take the point a step further, I think it is wrong to weaponise science in the atheist war on religion. By restricting the scope of science to that which is deemed 'natural' scientists have elected to exclude the supernatural but this does not prove that the supernatural is false. If you can't measure something, does that mean that it doesn't exist? Can you measure empathy or the pleasure someone gets from the smell of fresh-baked bread? Can you tabulate the devotion a dog may feel for his human companion? Whenever you hear prominent atheists pontificating, they will inevitably tell you that they are on the side of science or that science is proof of their argument. No it isn't. It might be a good argument against Young Earth (Biblical) Creationism but it does not demolish any and every concept of god. Science is not meant to prove or disprove god and the supernatural - disproof of these things is, by definition, beyond the scope of science but central to the mission of atheists.

I don't disagree with too much of this. However, you're next task to achieve global harmony is to stop the religious types making scientific claims.

I don't disagree with too much of this. However, you're next task to achieve global harmony is to stop the religious types making scientific claims.

Nothing too taxing then? Actually, I think that global harmony might be easier than stopping religious types saying or doing anything.

I think that most of us use these isms as a convenience rather than some accurate pinpointing of a metaphysical position. I agree that the philosophical boundaries are blurred and believe that what people mean comes down to their particular bias. For example, you get materialists arguing about whether so-called quantum weirdness exists and/or whether consciousness plays any role whatsoever.

Yeah I think what many are concerned with is whether there is a soul/God/afterlife and not the specifics of substance. Similarly, does the entity - whether of fleshy or spiritual substance - have some autonomy or is it bound by Laws...

Of course the very idea of these "Laws of Nature" leads to further questions...are Laws a kind of substance?

It is interesting that metaphysics seems so divided by the question of "What's it all made of at the bottom?" when most people likely would group things along other questions/concerns.

I don't disagree with too much of this. However, you're next task to achieve global harmony is to stop the religious types making scientific claims.

I believe that is incorrect Malf.  There are two, equally important next steps in my view:

1) Stop religious types from making scientific claims
2) Stop scientific types from making claims of anything beyond currently proven/tested science

I believe that the science community, in its battle against point 1, is/has creating/created a counter movement backlash by being disingenuous on point 2.

I believe that is incorrect Malf.  There are two, equally important next steps in my view:

1) Stop religious types from making scientific claims
2) Stop scientific types from making claims of anything beyond currently proven/tested science

I believe that the science community, in its battle against point 1, is/has creating/created a counter movement backlash by being disingenuous on point 2.

1) What if the religious type happens to be a scientist too?
2) What if the scientific type is a philosopher too?

I'm assuming malf was thinking specifically about evolutionary science which has been claimed by atheists as their dogma and Darwin as their prophet so the definition of a religious type might be open to question. Additionally, there seems to be a prevailing view that science deals with axioms and established "truths" but things might not be so clear-cut. That's why there is a field combining both science and philosophy:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_science

Distinguishing between science and non-science is referred to as the demarcation problem. For example, should psychoanalysis be considered science? How about so-called creation science, the inflationary multiverse hypothesis, or macroeconomics? Karl Popper called this the central question in the philosophy of science. However, no unified account of the problem has won acceptance among philosophers, and some regard the problem as unsolvable or uninteresting.

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Values intersect with science in different ways. There are epistemic values that mainly guide the scientific research. The scientific enterprise is embedded in particular culture and values through individual practitioners. Values emerge from science, both as product and process and can be distributed among several cultures in the society.

If it is unclear what counts as science, how the process of confirming theories works, and what the purpose of science is, there is considerable scope for values and other social influences to shape science. Indeed, values can play a role ranging from determining which research gets funded to influencing which theories achieve scientific consensus. For example, in the 19th century, cultural values held by scientists about race shaped research on evolution, and values concerning social class influenced debates on phrenology (considered scientific at the time).

1) What if the religious type happens to be a scientist too?
2) What if the scientific type is a philosopher too?

I'm assuming malf was thinking specifically about evolutionary science which has been claimed by atheists as their dogma and Darwin as their prophet so the definition of a religious type might be open to question. Additionally, there seems to be a prevailing view that science deals with axioms and established "truths" but things might not be so clear-cut. That's why there is a field combining both science and philosophy:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_science

Yeah, even the atheist Nagel noted that there wasn't anything unscientific about seeking the Divine in evolution a la Intelligent Design though he did, IIRC, feel a lot of their arguments could be answered by non-theistic teleological principles.

I thought the essay was public, but right now I can only find the abstract for free:

The 2005 decision by Judge John E. Jones in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District was celebrated by all red-blooded American liberals as a victory over the forces of darkness. The result was probably inevitable, in view of the reckless expression by some members of the Dover School Board of their desire to put religion into the classroom, and the clumsiness of their prescribed statement in trying to dissimulate that aim.1 But the conflicts aired in this trial—over the status of evolutionary theory, the arguments for intelligent design, and the nature of science—reveal an intellectually unhealthy situation. The political urge to defend science education against the threats of religious orthodoxy, understandable though it is, has resulted in a counterorthodoxy, supported by bad arguments, and a tendency to overstate the legitimate scientific claims of evolutionary theory.

Can you give me an example of where you see the difference? Can you give an example of two identical physical states (that is, they would have the identical description if we confine ourselves to Physicalism) which would be described as two different states under Information?

Linda

This is a perfect question.  In the methodological state of physicalism/materialism - where testing is confined to "here and now" measurements - the theory says that outside forces will interact in identical ways to our two objects.  What is incorrect is to think that only physical causes are variables.  This framework, ironically, implies ideal physical states to understand the claim.  An example is the ideal gas law.  It is an idealist framework where the numbers work.  Real life gasses exhibit random influences.

Granting that the physical states of two blocks of material are isomorphic in all ways of measuring with the SI units of physics - they are identical with reactive responses from identical physical contacts, in this idealized state.

**** for context: the logical assumption is then asserted that two objects cannot occupy the same space/time coordinates.

In the methodology that complements a materialistic state, an informational analysis makes clear the answer.  We now have our two blocks with both a continuum of past and future connected.  We easily see that the two blocks generate different vectors of interaction because they have different space/time coordinates.

But it goes much deeper.  The two blocks with their real-world descriptions, have differing vectors for future interaction with their environment's unknown - but probabilistic real - futures events.  They will be afforded different future states, as to the outside probabilities for interaction with their environments.  While identical on the "inside" they must differ as to how the random and intentional events around them evolve.

If I had offered identical twins as the thought-experiment - then it would be easy to common sense understand that they are different because of differing mental attributes.

This is a perfect question.  In the methodological state of physicalism/materialism - where testing is confined to "here and now" measurements - the theory says that outside forces will interact in identical ways to our two objects.  What is incorrect is to think that only physical causes are variables.  This framework, ironically, implies ideal physical states to understand the claim.  An example is the ideal gas law.  It is an idealist framework where the numbers work.  Real life gasses exhibit random influences.

Granting that the physical states of two blocks of material are isomorphic in all ways of measuring with the SI units of physics - they are identical with reactive responses from identical physical contacts, in this idealized state.

**** for context: the logical assumption is then asserted that two objects cannot occupy the same space/time coordinates.

In the methodology that complements a materialistic state, an informational analysis makes clear the answer.  We now have our two blocks with both a continuum of past and future connected.  We easily see that the two blocks generate different vectors of interaction because they have different space/time coordinates.

But it goes much deeper.  The two blocks with their real-world descriptions, have differing vectors for future interaction with their environment's unknown - but probabilistic real - futures events.  They will be afforded different future states, as to the outside probabilities for interaction with their environments.  While identical on the "inside" they must differ as to how the random and intentional events around them evolve.

If I had offered identical twins as the thought-experiment - then it would be easy to common sense understand that they are different because of differing mental attributes.

I'm sorry, but I still don't understand. A physical description of two identical blocks doesn't consist of just their "inside", but also their environment, unless they are isolated. Yes, two non-identical physical states will evolve differently. How is that relevant to what I asked? And you didn't answer the second (and most important) part of my question.

What would Information say about how those two non-identical states evolve, or how two identical isolated states evolve, which is different from what Physicalism would say (given that Physicalism also has something to say about random influences (e.g. Brownian motion)). 

Linda