Panpsychism and AI Consciousness
Marcus Arvan & Corey J. Maley
Marcus Arvan & Corey J. Maley
Quote:This article argues that if panpsychism is true, then there are grounds for thinking
that digitally-based artificial intelligence (AI) may be incapable of having coherent
macrophenomenal conscious experiences. Section 1 briefly surveys research indicating that
neural function and phenomenal consciousness may be both analog in nature. We show that
physical and phenomenal magnitudes—such as rates of neural firing and the phenomenally
experienced loudness of sounds—appear to covary monotonically with the physical stimuli
they represent, forming the basis for an analog relationship between the three. Section 2 then
argues that if this is true and micropsychism—the panpsychist view that phenomenal
consciousness or its precursors exist at a microphysical level of reality—is also true, then
human brains must somehow manipulate fundamental microphysical-phenomenal
magnitudes in an analog manner that renders them phenomenally coherent at a macro level.
However, Section 3 argues that because digital computation abstracts away from
microphysical-phenomenal magnitudes—representing cognitive functions non-monotonically
in terms of digits (such as ones and zeros)—digital computation may be inherently incapable
of realizing coherent macroconscious experience. Thus, if panpsychism is true, digital AI
may be incapable of achieving phenomenal coherence. Finally, Section 4 briefly examines
our argument’s implications for Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory (IIT) theory of
consciousness, which we contend may need to be supplanted by a theory of
macroconsciousness as analog microphysical-phenomenal information integration.
'Historically, we may regard materialism as a system of dogma set up to combat orthodox dogma...Accordingly we find that, as ancient orthodoxies disintegrate, materialism more and more gives way to scepticism.'
- Bertrand Russell
- Bertrand Russell