Neuroscience and free will

Thanks, will check out the paper!

So if I understand you correctly determinism [another kind of projected probability expectation] would be completely correlated information/expectation? (I assume the idea of informational entropy as expectation of "surprise" fits in somewhere...Huffman Encoding anyone?....anyone....??Buelerrrr??)

I my humble semantics, completely correlated = isomorphic data; or in math a mapping of all elements in set 1 to set 2.

P=1 would mean that its a 100% probability for the predicted output.  That is how I think of "determined".

Would love to read your comments on Logical Independence paper.

Why would he assume that physical relations are unrelated to semantic relations? It's almost as if he believes that semantic relations are necessarily nonphysical, which rather begs the entire question.

~~ Paul

There is no math equations that connect them.  So again, maybe you are referring to some metaphysical principle, of which I am unaware.

Are meanings physical?  I surely think meanings are measured and parsed in linguistics and not physics!

 Semantic relationships are the associations that there exist between the meanings of words (semantic relationships at word level), between the meanings of phrases, or between the meanings of sentences (semantic relationships at phrase or sentence level).

If something is physical - it should be able to measured by one or more of the Standard International units of measurement.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internatio...m_of_Units

That follows from step 1:

"Materialism holds that thinking consists of nothing more than the transition from one material process in the brain to another in accordance with causal laws (whether these transitions are conceived of in terms of the processing of symbols according to the rules of an algorithm à la computationalism, or on some other model)."

Whether I think something is rationally justified (regardless if true) depends on the bottom level constituents of matter interacting. One can make a longer argument (Ross's paper Immaterial Aspects of Thought) but it seems the very definition of materialism means mental concepts like syllogisms have no bearing on the causal sequences at the true level of what is happening in the world?

I see no way in which the assumption that meaning must be immaterial follows from that statement. It is an unstated premise that begs the question.

We've had threads on meaning and never reached an agreement, so we probably won't here, either.

~~ Paul

Actual data now proves that genetic mutations and the rates they appear, are not random to fitness.

Who ever said that mutations are entirely random with respect to fitness?

~~ Paul

There is no math equations that connect them.  So again, maybe you are referring to some metaphysical principle, of which I am unaware.

Are meanings physical?  I surely think meanings are measured and parsed in linguistics and not physics!
If something is physical - it should be able to measured by one or more of the Standard International units of measurement.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internatio...m_of_Units

What are the SI units of tree branches and snails? How about cancer? You've oversimplified physicalism to the point of absurdity.

Why does meaning have to be anything more than a stunningly complex network of relationships? But, again, if someone has evidence of an immaterial oracle of meaning, I wait with bated breath.

~~ Paul

What are the SI units of tree branches and snails? How about cancer? You've oversimplified physicalism to the point of absurdity.

Why does meaning have to be anything more than a stunningly complex network of relationships? But, again, if someone has evidence of an immaterial oracle of meaning, I wait with bated breath.

~~ Paul

I've waited with baited breath on many such ideas probably as long as yourself.  For a time there I forgot how to breath, then I remembered. Don't forget how to breath Paul.

I see no way in which the assumption that meaning must be immaterial follows from that statement. It is an unstated premise that begs the question.

We've had threads on meaning and never reached an agreement, so we probably won't here, either.

~~ Paul

Hmmm, but the statement I quoted isn't saying meaning is immaterial?

It's just saying that if you think mind comes from atoms, then the thoughts of the mind follow from the course of the atoms. Isn't that the basic premise of physicalism?

[From there the point is how does one achieve rational justification if the atoms are unconcerned with rationality.]

Why does meaning have to be anything more than a stunningly complex network of relationships? But, again, if someone has evidence of an immaterial oracle of meaning, I wait with bated breath.

~~ Paul

We might be getting far afield here, but the question of mental causation turns on the way we have thoughts about things in the world...so I think the best argument on why meaning is more than "complex networks of relationships" is from the eliminative materialist camp. For example Alex Rosenberg in Atheist's Guide to Reality:

How can one clump of stuff anywhere in the universe be about some other clump of stuff anywhere else in the universe—right next to it or 100 million light-years away?

...Let’s suppose that the Paris neurons are about Paris the same way red octagons are about stopping. This is the first step down a slippery slope, a regress into total confusion. If the Paris neurons are about Paris the same way a red octagon is about stopping, then there has to be something in the brain that interprets the Paris neurons as being about Paris. After all, that’s how the stop sign is about stopping. It gets interpreted by us in a certain way. The difference is that in the case of the Paris neurons, the interpreter can only be another part of the brain...

What we need to get off the regress is some set of neurons that is about some stuff outside the brain without being interpreted—by anyone or anything else (including any other part of the brain)—as being about that stuff outside the brain. What we need is a clump of matter, in this case the Paris neurons, that by the very arrangement of its synapses points at, indicates, singles out, picks out, identifies (and here we just start piling up more and more synonyms for “being about”) another clump of matter outside the brain. But there is no such physical stuff.

Physics has ruled out the existence of clumps of matter of the required sort...

…What you absolutely cannot be wrong about is that your conscious thought was about something. Even having a wildly wrong thought about something requires that the thought be about something.

It’s this last notion that introspection conveys that science has to deny. Thinking about things can’t happen at all...When consciousness convinces you that you, or your mind, or your brain has thoughts about things, it is wrong.

Hmmm, but the statement I quoted isn't saying meaning is immaterial?

It's just saying that if you think mind comes from atoms, then the thoughts of the mind follow from the course of the atoms. Isn't that the basic premise of physicalism?

[From there the point is how does one achieve rational justification if the atoms are unconcerned with rationality.]

1. Materialism holds that thinking consists of nothing more than the transition from one material process in the brain to another in accordance with causal laws (whether these transitions are conceived of in terms of the processing of symbols according to the rules of an algorithm à la computationalism, or on some other model).

4. So if materialism is true, then there is nothing about our thought processes that can make one thought a rational justification of another; for their physical and causal relations alone, and not their semantic and logical relations, determine which thought follows which.

(1) ignores randomness, but let's not worry about that.

(4) States without justification that physical and causal relations are not related to semantics and logic.

Again, there seems to be some sort of suggestion of an external meaning oracle.

~~ Paul

We might be getting far afield here, but the question of mental causation turns on the way we have thoughts about things in the world...so I think the best argument on why meaning is more than "complex networks of relationships" is from the eliminative materialist camp. For example Alex Rosenberg in Atheist's Guide to Reality:

"How can one clump of stuff anywhere in the universe be about some other clump of stuff anywhere else in the universe—right next to it or 100 million light-years away?

...Let’s suppose that the Paris neurons are about Paris the same way red octagons are about stopping. This is the first step down a slippery slope, a regress into total confusion. If the Paris neurons are about Paris the same way a red octagon is about stopping, then there has to be something in the brain that interprets the Paris neurons as being about Paris. After all, that’s how the stop sign is about stopping. It gets interpreted by us in a certain way. The difference is that in the case of the Paris neurons, the interpreter can only be another part of the brain...

What we need to get off the regress is some set of neurons that is about some stuff outside the brain without being interpreted—by anyone or anything else (including any other part of the brain)—as being about that stuff outside the brain. What we need is a clump of matter, in this case the Paris neurons, that by the very arrangement of its synapses points at, indicates, singles out, picks out, identifies (and here we just start piling up more and more synonyms for “being about”) another clump of matter outside the brain. But there is no such physical stuff.

Physics has ruled out the existence of clumps of matter of the required sort...

…What you absolutely cannot be wrong about is that your conscious thought was about something. Even having a wildly wrong thought about something requires that the thought be about something.

It’s this last notion that introspection conveys that science has to deny. Thinking about things can’t happen at all...When consciousness convinces you that you, or your mind, or your brain has thoughts about things, it is wrong."

Why is he saying that there is no physical stuff relevant to Paris?

He must have a conniption when he contemplates a dictionary. Other than some photos, it refers to nothing outside itself.

~~ Paul