Neuroscience and free will

But the explanation space you are talking about is regarding parts of a system that isn't at the level of causality. And we don't have causal explanations regarding the "why" of events, just the relations - this is the wrong kind of explanatory space for free will which has to concern causation at the fundamental level.

I think we have causal explanation for the "why" of high-level events. We can explain pretty well why billiard balls bounce around the way they do. We just can't say, for example, why two identical fermions cannot occupy the same quantum state (Pauli). I'm fine if the "theory of free will" has lowest-level existants and attributes that cannot be explained further.

The explanatory level of physical phenomenon can't be correct for explaining freedom as  physics begins with the patterns of change/stability already observed. Any explanation at the level of relations, already assuming that events are determined/random at the level of relata, is not going to be an adequate explanation.
But I don't even think it's about high-level vs low-level, because for there to be free will you would have to a non-reducible aspect of an agent that themselves has to be non-reducible. Thus the lowest level of reduction would have to be "macro-scopic".

But then why can't you give a macroscopic description of how the agent makes the decision?

But "how it works" is how it fits into a metaphysical picture at the level of causation. The "how it works" level you are talking about isn't even really explaining the "how" of anything because it comes after causation after the questions of electricity flowing, stability of matter, and so on are presumed. If we take a single electron involved with a circuit, what is the "how" that explains its path?

We have laws that describe its path. I agree that we don't know what makes things happen consistently so that we can derive laws that work. But I'm not asking for an explanation of free will down at that level.

The causal picture we give to that single electron can include a space for free will, say by reference to Final Cause or arguing that all causation needs Consciousness as its Carrier, but the freedom itself has to be one of the axiomatic parts of reality. Why I mentioned one has to look at Aristotle's conception of Four Causes, Potentiality/Actuality, etc. That's the level of reality where free will would have to enter the picture, before we talk about physics we have to talk about change in itself.

I'm perfectly happy if free will is axiomatic or built up out of lower-level axiomatic entities. Quarks are axiomatic (at least so far). But we can still describe how they operate.

If we start with a brick going through a window we can then suss out potential causal pictures for all reality where freedom of the will doesn't seem to be a special problem. For example if there is a God who grants final causes to all things, and we prove its necessity as the Ground of Being, it seems simple enough for such a deity to gift humans the ability to determine their own final cause in a more limited fashion.

Wait, but how does God make free decisions?

I'm eliding some text here, so that the posts don't get so long that no one can respond to them.

Can you provide one or two of these explanations?

Here is some discussion of the emergence of determinism:

https://link.springer.com/article/10.100...014-0008-4

How would one prove the Laws of Nature are immutable/universal? How would one distinguish between events that are random vs. events that are free by outside observation?

And it still seems illogical to me to have things happen without sufficient reason, which seems to be the case for everything in your outlook?

You could certainly postulate that all the random events we see are actually free events produced by some Master Agent. But why would we postulate that without some evidence of the agent? What difference does it make if we postulate the agent?

I don't have any trouble with uncaused events, but perhaps that's because I haven't thought about it enough to get disturbed by the idea.

~~ Paul

I think we have causal explanation for the "why" of high-level events. We can explain pretty well why billiard balls bounce around the way they do. We just can't say, for example, why two identical fermions cannot occupy the same quantum state (Pauli). I'm fine if the "theory of free will" has lowest-level existants and attributes that cannot be explained further.

Why doesn't a billiard ball sometimes leap upward into outer space or change into a butterfly when struck by another billiard ball?

But then why can't you give a macroscopic description of how the agent makes the decision?

If has a description composing of parts it would mean either only the parts are free or the explanation fails to show freedom, and thus the presumed individual is not free.

Thus I still don't understand what you are looking for in the "how", as a mathematical/physics-based description isn't going to be possible since mathematics can only describe things as having some random variable(s) with probability distribution or a deterministic algorithm where the probability of the subsequent event is 1.

I mentioned Tallis' essays in my last post, if that is the kind of "how" that you are looking for given he discusses causal/possibility space within the context of human consciousness? It seems to me he addressed what is happening in consciousness when it interacts with the world, and how its aspect of intentionality allows the free willed individual a space to act in choosing alternatives...that seems like a "how" explanation at a macro-level?

We have laws that describe its path. I agree that we don't know what makes things happen consistently so that we can derive laws that work. But I'm not asking for an explanation of free will down at that level.

Why don't the laws change? As for levels, the level of causality is the correct level of explanation - the level of explaining how a circuit works where causation is assumed but unexplained is the wrong explanatory space. 

I'm perfectly happy if free will is axiomatic or built up out of lower-level axiomatic entities. Quarks are axiomatic (at least so far). But we can still describe how they operate.

if we can't explain the causal trajectory of quarks, we aren't really describing how they operate?

Wait, but how does God make free decisions?

In this metaphysics God is shown to be the continuing author of causality, a necessity rather than one more being. This is not to say the metaphysics is correct, but rather to show an example where if one can start with a brick hitting a window and show it needs such a God we can talk about how free will fits into that metaphysics.

Here is some discussion of the emergence of determinism:

https://link.springer.com/article/10.100...014-0008-4

Thanks, I'll make a new thread to keep things from getting overly long here. Though from the outset the author mentions "determinsitic law" which makes me wonder what would stop such a law or set of laws from changing...

You could certainly postulate that all the random events we see are actually free events produced by some Master Agent. But why would we postulate that without some evidence of the agent? What difference does it make if we postulate the agent?

I don't have any trouble with uncaused events, but perhaps that's because I haven't thought about it enough to get disturbed by the idea.

~~ Paul

Well there's either a top-down Agent or the random entities are themselves agents (or some kind of animism or tutelary spirits in between)

As for the difference, if one cannot distinguish between randomness and free will from the outside it suggests that trying to have external "how" explanations isn't going to ever yield a satisfying answer. Rather one has to ask what metaphysical picture can explain the seemingly random and if this provides a space for free will.

Additionally, it provides an explanation for events - given determinism is just randomness of a special kind - that is in accord with the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Or, at the least, gets us closer to such accordance if we can suss out appropriate metaphysical pictures...

Why doesn't a billiard ball sometimes leap upward into outer space or change into a butterfly when struck by another billiard ball?

Because there isn't enough energy transfer to make it leap. And there are no forces acting on the ball to reorganize its atoms into a butterfly, not to mention it has the wrong kinds of atoms.

If has a description composing of parts it would mean either only the parts are free or the explanation fails to show freedom, and thus the presumed individual is not free.

Thus I still don't understand what you are looking for in the "how", as a mathematical/physics-based description isn't going to be possible since mathematics can only describe things as having some random variable(s) with probability distribution or a deterministic algorithm where the probability of the subsequent event is 1.

And a logical description isn't possible, either?

I mentioned Tallis' essays in my last post, if that is the kind of "how" that you are looking for given he discusses causal/possibility space within the context of human consciousness? It seems to me he addressed what is happening in consciousness when it interacts with the world, and how its aspect of intentionality allows the free willed individual a space to act in choosing alternatives...that seems like a "how" explanation at a macro-level?

I will have to spend some time with his essays.

Why don't the laws change? As for levels, the level of causality is the correct level of explanation - the level of explaining how a circuit works where causation is assumed but unexplained is the wrong explanatory space.

No idea why the behavior of physical things doesn't change over time.

Then there is no way to explain anything. If you think that causation remains entirely unexplained in physics, then I doubt we are going to get an explanation of free will at that level, either. In which case I'm still not sure why I should take the leap and assume free will exists.

As far as circuits are concerned: One important aspect is quantum tunneling, which occurs due to aspects of the quantum world described by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. Now, if you are going to ask the cause of a particle behaving according that principle, I agree we have no answer. It's not clear that there is any causal answer, but that doesn't stop us from describing the particle's behavior at a higher level.

if we can't explain the causal trajectory of quarks, we aren't really describing how they operate?

We are describing how they operate at a quite useful level. And that's what I'm asking for regarding free will. If you think there is nothing to explain except at the unexplainable level of causality, then I understand why no explanation is forthcoming.

In this metaphysics God is shown to be the continuing author of causality, a necessity rather than one more being. This is not to say the metaphysics is correct, but rather to show an example where if one can start with a brick hitting a window and show it needs such a God we can talk about how free will fits into that metaphysics.

I'd still ask this God how it makes free decisions about what to cause.

~~ Paul

Why doesn't a billiard ball sometimes leap upward into outer space or change into a butterfly when struck by another billiard ball?

“Oh yeah?! So why is reality like it is then?”

A retreat into this position really is the last line of pseudoprofound defence, and entirely unhelpful to your cause. Paul can correct me if I’m mistaken, but his position appears not to preclude a ”prime mover” or “simulation” (effectively the same things - law setters). His questions are still as pertinent.

“Oh yeah?! So why is reality like it is then?”

A retreat into this position really is the last line of pseudoprofound defence, and entirely unhelpful to your cause. Paul can correct me if I’m mistaken, but his position appears not to preclude a ”prime mover” or “simulation” (effectively the same things - law setters). His questions are still as pertinent.

But my point is not that we are ignorant of why reality is like it is? If that were my argument I wouldn't say that we should start with a brick hitting a window and work our way toward possible metaphysical pictures?

Rather, my point was that the explanatory level of observing billiard balls is the wrong level to look for an explanation of free will.

We can actually work intellectually to explain why reality is like it is, specifically why the billiard balls behave the way they do, but as Feser notes this takes us beyond the bounds of physicalism as is usually expressed:

For once it is conceded that the world is at least in itself completely intelligible, it is hard to see how this could be so unless the most fundamental level of reality is something absolutely necessary – something that is not a mixture of potentiality and actuality but rather pure actuality (as the Aristotelian would say), something which is in no way whatsoever composite but absolutely metaphysically simple (as the Neo-Platonist would say), something which is not a compound of essence and existence but rather subsistent being itself (as the Thomist would say).  However one elaborates on the nature of this ultimate reality, it is not going to be identifiable with any “fundamental laws of nature” (which are contingent, and the operation of which involves the transition from potentiality to actuality within a universe of things that are in various ways composite).  One might still at this point dispute whether the ultimate reality is best described in terms of the theology of classical theism or instead in terms of some pantheistic theology.  But one will definitely be in the realm of theology – rational theology, natural theology – rather than empirical science.

Or if you want a non-theistic argument, see Gregg Rosenberg's The Theory of Causal Significance which serves (sort of, given it's the halfway point of his book) as an introduction to his version of naturalism where all causation requires consciousness as a carrier.

This chapter is an introduction to the Theory of Causal Significance that is intended to motivate the general approach the theory represents and to introduce and explain the basic concepts. This chapter:

• Defines the problem of causation, explaining why a theory is needed and important.
  
• Explains why physics is not a theory of causation.
  
• Gives a taxonomy of traditional approaches to causation and explains why the Theory of Causal Significance must fall outside of the traditional taxonomy.
  
• Abstracts a very general essence of causation that the Theory of Causal Significance can represent and shows how to modify the traditional taxonomy to create a place for the Theory of Causal Significance.
  
• Emphasizes that causal significance is not necessarily the production relation of cause and effect.
  
• Introduces the ideas of effective and receptive properties, arguing that they are conceptually and empirically distinct aspects of causation. Together, these properties are said to provide the nomic content of an individual.
  
• Defends a proposal to treat receptivity as a connective property.
  
• Analyzes the causal nexus, defining key terms, giving examples, and laying down the fundamental principles of a theory of the causal nexus.
  
• Explains what a natural individual is and discusses how and why natural individuals might emerge at many levels of nature.
  

I don't think anything about determinism needs to be predictable and prescriptive. I realize that it tends to be thought of in terms of physics and laws. But at it's heart, all that it says is that a description of how events unfold will always hold for that set of conditions, which includes the thoughts of agents. The description of throwing a brick at a window will never include a description of it turning into butterflies. Arguments over why it doesn't are immaterial, whether you favor the Prime Mover or the Laws of Physics. 

To say that something isn't deterministic is to say that the description of how events unfold can differ for that set of conditions. In order to suggest that mental events are "free", the suggestion is made that different thoughts can manifest, as events unfold.

How do we know that this is the case? Do we have a way to compare descriptions of how events unfold for identical sets of conditions?

Assuming a positive answer to the above question, how do we know that the differences are not random?

Linda

Or if you want a non-theistic argument, see Gregg Rosenberg's The Theory of Causal Significance which serves (sort of, given it's the halfway point of his book) as an introduction to his version of naturalism where all causation requires consciousness as a carrier.

Does he venture any description of how a free decision is made?

~~ Paul

[Laird]

Paul, I'm going to try to take things step-by-step, and to get your agreement at each step. I'm hoping that that will be a more fruitful approach.

[Edit: In fairness, I should define my goal for this step-by-step process, so that you can better decide whether you even want to participate. My goal is to reach a common understanding of the meaning of words like "determinism" and "law", of the implications of those meanings, of the concepts related to them and to free will in general, and of those of our basic presuppositions which are shared (or at least of your presuppositions), and, having done so, to then (hopefully) suggest why/how free will is plausible/likely given those meanings, implications, concepts, and presuppositions.]

Your laws [pertaining to free will choices] were simply repetitions of the events.

But so were the example "laws" of physics that I gave. The take-away from the examples I gave was supposed to be that the "laws" of physics are (or can be taken to be) conditional descriptions of events, and I deliberately framed my example "laws" such that they were conditional descriptions of events.

So, for this first step: my contention is that any given "law" of physics is or can be (re)framed as a conditional description of an event. Do you agree with that contention?

A couple of clarifications/caveats to help you to decide whether or not you agree:

1. The description, as for the examples in my post, is typically at a high degree of abstraction/generality: it typically omits many specific, individuating features/characteristics of the event. The corollary of this is that the description typically describes not just one given event in reality but many.
   
2. For our purposes, events subsume states. Take, for example, a potential "law" of physics which stipulates that the charge on some fundamental particle is a constant. We might conventionally consider this to be a state (of the particle), but we can for our purposes formulate it in terms of (an) event(s) like this: "When something happens involving a fundamental particle P, the charge on that particle [is / becomes / remains at] C". Here, the "something" which describes a given event is understood to mean "anything", i.e., it describes all given events involving all given particles P, including those "events" for which we might more conventionally say that "nothing happens". This is admittedly a slightly unwieldy formulation, but I think it is logically consistent and viable. If you don't like its unwieldiness then perhaps we can work states into the primary contention, but this distinction is not really material to my point - anyhow, let me know what you think.
   

Furthermore, there was no hint of a free decision method in your laws. All those decisions could just as well have been made determinstically or randomly. In particular, a free will law ought to state multiple possible outcomes; if there is only one, it's really a deterministic law.

Now, if there are really no general laws of free will, but just a series of disjoint free choices, so be it.

These are important comments which deserve a response, but as I'm trying to take a stepwise approach, I'll defer any potential response until later in the process. Fair enough?

[Laird]

I don't think anything about determinism needs to be [...] prescriptive.

That's a possible understanding of determinism, although there seem to be prescriptive understandings too (Paul's understanding seems more prescriptive than descriptive to me, but we'll hopefully clarify that as the discussion progresses).

[A]t it's heart, all that it says is that a description of how events unfold will always hold for that set of conditions

This might be interpreted as a prescriptive framing though, don't you think? I say that because "will" implies a before and an after, so it might be understood that "beforehand" there is a prescription as to how events "must" unfold, and that when the time then comes for their unfolding, they "necessarily" follow that prescription.

Perhaps a less prescriptive framing is one like this:

"Determinism means that events unfold in a particular way under a particular set of conditions".

Here, there is (intended to be) no implication that events "must" unfold in a particular way under a particular set of conditions, simply that they "do".

To say that something isn't deterministic is to say that the description of how events unfold can differ for that set of conditions.

But if determinism isn't prescriptive, then even under determinism, events "can" unfold differently, it is just that they "don't"...

...which means that the second suggestion below holds even under determinism (when conceived of in non-prescriptive, descriptive terms):

In order to suggest that mental events are "free", the suggestion is made that different thoughts can manifest, as events unfold.

That's a possible understanding of determinism, although there seem to be prescriptive understandings too (Paul's understanding seems more prescriptive than descriptive to me, but we'll hopefully clarify that as the discussion progresses).


This might be interpreted as a prescriptive framing though, don't you think? I say that because "will" implies a before and an after, so it might be understood that "beforehand" there is a prescription as to how events "must" unfold, and that when the time then comes for their unfolding, they "necessarily" follow that prescription.

Perhaps a less prescriptive framing is one like this:

"Determinism means that events unfold in a particular way under a particular set of conditions".

Here, there is (intended to be) no implication that events "must" unfold in a particular way under a particular set of conditions, simply that they "do".


But if determinism isn't prescriptive, then even under determinism, events "can" unfold differently, it is just that they "don't"...

...which means that the second suggestion below holds even under determinism (when conceived of in non-prescriptive, descriptive terms):

It's the difference between solving a binomial problem by working examples until you hit on the solution or solving it through proof (using the Binomial Theorem). Both cases offer you a solution. So discussion can focus on the solution, rather than how you got there (to avoid the problem where every discussion turns into anti-materialism).

You can build up millions of observations under identical conditions without attempting any sort of idea about cause. Yes, scientists take it further and build proof (as in scientific evidence) for regularities and laws (which Paul can refer to show you what the solution will look like, were you to build up a million observations). But if you don't like that, you can just consider the millions of observations instead.

Determinism is a sorting term for whether the millions of observations are identical or whether they differ. 

If you find they are not identical, what does a description of the point(s) of departure look like? Does it look like something other than a change in conditions (determinism) or random/indeterminate?

Linda