Interview with Dr. Henry Bauer - Part 1

[Laird]

I assure you that I am very familiar with the JayTee experiments

I see. So, perhaps, you're capitalising the T in "Jaytee" out of over-familiarity? Let me repeat: Rupert Sheldrake tested the hypothesis that as time went on, Jaytee went to the door more and more frequently. He found that this hypothesis should be rejected. Thus, your own claim in an earlier post (your emphasis) that "Had Sheldrake also chosen points unrelated to Pam's return in order to form before and after groups, he would have obtained the same result" is bogus and should be seen for the pseudo-skeptical deception that it is (all you have to do is look at the charts/graphs to see that it's bogus). But enough of this. I told you that I will not argue this case with you and so I will not: the facts are there for all to see in the link I provided in an earlier post to Rupert's page taking apart Richard Wiseman's farcical "debunking". The original research paper, A Dog That Seems To Know When His Owner is Coming Home: Videotaped Experiments and Observations, is also available on Rupert's website.

The alternative and null hypotheses would be "JayTee does not give a signal during a 'no-return' period" and "JayTee gives a signal during a 'no-return' period at least some of the time".

Perhaps, then, you could explain what quantitative statistical test you would apply to determine when/whether the null hypothesis should be rejected in this experiment.

I see. So, perhaps, you're capitalising the T in "Jaytee" out of over-familiarity?

Haha, I didn't even notice that.  

Let me repeat: Rupert Sheldrake tested the hypothesis that as time went on, Jaytee went to the door more and more frequently. He found that this hypothesis should be rejected.

I agreed that Sheldrake tested a hypothesis which he rejected. However, the hypothesis he tested did not consist of "choosing points unrelated to Pam's return in order to form before and after groups". Regardless of whether or not you think that's relevant, I don't think there can be any disagreement there.

Thus, your own claim in an earlier post (your emphasis) that "Had Sheldrake also chosen points unrelated to Pam's return in order to form before and after groups, he would have obtained the same result" is bogus and should be seen for the pseudo-skeptical deception that it is (all you have to do is look at the charts/graphs to see that it's bogus).

The graphs in figure 4, which show the time Jaytee spent at the window in 10 minute increments, show that time spent at the window increases from one 10 minute period to the next well before Pam starts her return. This means that choosing any of those points to form before and after groups would show the same pattern which Sheldrake looked at with respect to her return point. If my claim was bogus, then you would see graphs which were mostly flat, until the last black dot on those graphs.

But enough of this. I told you that I will not argue this case with you and so I will not: the facts are there for all to see in the link I provided in an earlier post to Rupert's page taking apart Richard Wiseman's farcical "debunking". The original research paper, A Dog That Seems To Know When His Owner is Coming Home: Videotaped Experiments and Observations, is also available on Rupert's website.

Yes, I hope that people look at them. Please.

Perhaps, then, you could explain what quantitative statistical test you would apply to determine when/whether the null hypothesis should be rejected in this experiment.

I see that you did not offer up a way in which this disconfirming hypothesis could be restated as a confirming hypothesis. Does that mean you understand that there is a difference between them?

Wiseman would reject the null if he found no signal in his experiments. He could calculate confidence intervals for the estimate that the event rate is zero to find the upper limit of the rate at which the event might be experienced.

https://www-users.york.ac.uk/~mb55/bsi_s..._event.pdf

Linda

[Laird]

I see that you did not offer up a way in which this disconfirming hypothesis could be restated as a confirming hypothesis. Does that mean you understand that there is a difference between them?

Read what I wrote in a previous post and then tell me what you think:

So, I make two suggestions: firstly, that "disconfirming" tests (by your (Linda's) definition) which cannot be reframed as functionally equivalent "confirming" tests are difficult to construct, and - based on the only "definitive" example you've given - apparently can't even provide conclusive results

[Edit: once again, Linda confused hypotheses with tests, and I too again fell prey to this confusion. In terms of hypotheses, a "disconfirming" hypothesis can always be reframed as a "confirming" hypothesis just by switching a few words around. In terms of tests, the distinction is a bit more complicated, and is summed up best in the second paper which Linda shared in her initial response to me: that of +Htests, -Htests, +Ttests and -Ttests. Any one of these, depending on circumstances, might result in either a "falsification" or an "ambiguous verification" of the hypothesis, and so the distinction Linda tried to make between "confirming" and "disconfirming" tests is not meaningful.]

Moving on:

Wiseman would reject the null if he found no signal in his experiments. He could calculate confidence intervals for the estimate that the event rate is zero to find the upper limit of the rate at which the event might be experienced.

So, basically, any time Jaytee went to the window, for any reason at all, it would count as "a signal" contributing to the acceptance of the null hypothesis. The analysis would provide no estimate/sense of signal "strength", merely whether or not "a signal" was present at all, and, more importantly, it would provide no comparison with the period in which Pam was returning - and even if it did, there would be little point, because it doesn't quantify the signal strength.

That's not exactly a test that can  definitively "disconfirm" or "falsify" the psi hypothesis in this case, let alone to even help us to meaningfully understand what's going on, is it?

Again, all you've shown (in the example you've given at least) is that these "disconfirming" tests, which you seem to think is what Steve meant by "legitimate" scientists trying to "falsify" theories rather than - as "pop" parapsychologists do - "prove" them, are not very useful at all.

And I get it, you were under no obligation to defend Steve's claim in the first place - but that doesn't change the fact that you provided a way of interpreting it, and that, under that interpretation, it seems to itself have been "disconfirmed" or "falsified".

So, I think I'm done in this exchange: unless you say anything that particularly seems to deserve a response, I more than likely won't respond in turn. Cheers.

Read what I wrote in a previous post and then tell me what you think:

"So, I make two suggestions: firstly, that "disconfirming" tests (by your (Linda's) definition) which cannot be reframed as functionally equivalent "confirming" tests are difficult to construct, and - based on the only "definitive" example you've given - apparently can't even provide conclusive results"

And I replied that you offered no justification for this (the only situation where you reframed a question involved a test which included both confirmation and disconfirmation in the first place, and your reframing merely switched from emphasizing one over the other, not changing one into the other), and invited you to try to attempt to reframe the example I gave of Wiseman's disconfirming test as a confirming test. And I offered you a conclusive result from a rejection of the null hypothesis for that test. Rather than repeating yourself, it would make more sense for you to address those points.

[Edit: once again, Linda confused hypotheses with tests, and I too again fell prey to this confusion. In terms of hypotheses, a "disconfirming" hypothesis can always be reframed as a "confirming" hypothesis just by switching a few words around. In terms of tests, the distinction is a bit more complicated, and is summed up best in the second paper which Linda shared in her initial response to me: that of +Htests, -Htests, +Ttests and -Ttests. Any one of these, depending on circumstances, might result in either a "falsification" or an "ambiguous verification" of the hypothesis, and so the distinction Linda tried to make between "confirming" and "disconfirming" tests is not meaningful.]

There is no confusion between hypotheses and tests - the paper you refer to is talking about tests of hypotheses or hypothesis tests. It also specifically distinguishes "confirming" and "disconfirming" hypothesis tests - that is, "confirming" or positive hypothesis tests (+Htests) involve looking for the target property when you expect it to be present and "disconfirming" or negative hypothesis tests (-Htests) involve looking for the target property when you don't expect it to be present. You cannot change or "reframe" one into the other, since the situation is not symmetrical or functionally equivalent. Nor can you claim that the authors don't offer a meaningful distinction between the two.

So, basically, any time Jaytee went to the window, for any reason at all, it would count as "a signal" contributing to the acceptance of the null hypothesis.

No. Did you read Wiseman's paper? He specifically distinguished between whether there was a reason for Jaytee to go to the window and whether there was no apparent reason. He focussed on the "no apparent reason" visits as potential signals, since nobody think visiting the window because the fishmonger has come to the house is 'psi'. 

The analysis would provide no estimate/sense of signal "strength", merely whether or not "a signal" was present at all,

It would be a type of variable known as a dichotomous variable - present or absent. These types of variables are in common use in all fields of science, including parapsychology.

and, more importantly, it would provide no comparison with the period in which Pam was returning - and even if it did, there would be little point, because it doesn't quantify the signal strength.

It is useful for telling you whether or not, after a small number trials, it would be worthwhile to pursue the idea with a larger study including comparisons between the 'psi' and 'no psi' conditions. If you reject the null, then it justifies further study to your grant agency. If you do not reject the null, especially when any signal turns out to be mistaken on every trial, it suggests that further study will be fruitless.

That's not exactly a test that can  definitively "disconfirm" or "falsify" the psi hypothesis in this case, let alone to even help us to meaningfully understand what's going on, is it?

It's much more meaningful than a confirming study in a setting where confirmation is easy. Sheldrake did far more trials than Wiseman, yet rejection of the null still didn't tell us whether Jaytee was reacting to Pam's return in a psi-like way, given that apparently unbeknownst to everyone, he reacted in the same way when she wasn't returning. 

Again, all you've shown (in the example you've given at least) is that these "disconfirming" tests, which you seem to think is what Steve meant by "legitimate" scientists trying to "falsify" theories rather than - as "pop" parapsychologists do - "prove" them, are not very useful at all.

And I get it, you were under no obligation to defend Steve's claim in the first place - but that doesn't change the fact that you provided a way of interpreting it, and that, under that interpretation, it seems to itself have been "disconfirmed" or "falsified".

This isn't an idea that Steve or I came up with. This is something that scientists do because they have discovered it to be more useful, as described in the links I gave in my first post on this subject. I got the strong impression that you weren't clear on the difference between accepting a disconfirming hypothesis and rejecting the 'chance' null of a confirming hypothesis. So I jumped in with more information in order to be helpful. I'm not sure why you are affronted by this.

Your claim that the usefulness of falsification has been itself "falsified" seems to be based on (still) failing to understand what is meant by falsification, in this case.

Linda

[Laird]

And I replied that you offered no justification for this

I don't think you read carefully enough. Hint: if you had, you would have realised that the quote provided an affirmative answer to your question, "Does that mean you understand that there is a difference between them?"

I don't think you read carefully enough. Hint: if you had, you would have realised that the quote provided an affirmative answer to your question, "Does that mean you understand that there is a difference between them?"

Okay, I tried again. If it is meant to be an affirmative answer, then I think this is what you would be saying:

Disconfirming tests and confirming tests are two different kinds of statements.

A disconfirming test cannot be reframed as a confirming test, and a confirming test cannot be reframed as a disconfirming test.

A test can be constructed which includes both a disconfirming test and a confirming test, such that rejection of the null rejects the null in both the disconfirming test and the confirming test (noting that "rejecting the null" in a disconfirming test supports 'psi').

In that case, when describing the test, it can be described in terms of the disconfirming test, or it can be reframed and described in terms of the confirming test.

Of the three kinds of tests (confirming only, disconfirming only, both confirming and disconfirming), "disconfirming only" tests are difficult to construct. (Or alternatively, "disconfirming only" tests are relatively more difficult to construct, which I agree with.) 

"Disconfirming only" tests can't provide conclusive results. (Or alternatively, "disconfirming only" tests tend to provide less conclusive results than "both confirming and disconfirming tests", which I also agree with.)

Please correct anything in there which you feel is inaccurate. I made this explicit so that it could be clear where we disagree.

I disagreed with the last two statements. I gave several examples of "disconfirming only" tests which I found easy to construct. And I offered examples of results which I felt would be conclusive, for those tests. And unmentioned by you was that the "confirming only" hypothesis tests performed by parapsychologists would, by that criteria, also be offering tests which can't provide conclusive results. And it was demonstrated in the link I provided in my first post on this subject, that "confirming only" tests were the least likely to offer conclusive results, while "disconfirming tests" were more likely to do so. Of the three kinds of tests, those which included disconfirming tests ("disconfirming only", "both confirming and disconfirming") were more conclusive than those which did not ("confirming only"). This is why a field which tends to perform proving/confirming tests is regarded as weaker than fields which tend to perform falsification/disconfirming tests.

However, that being said, I would reiterate that this doesn't put parapsychology on one side of a line and more traditional scientific fields on the other. There are mixtures of tests performed in all fields. And performing confirming tests is still "scientific", and valid conclusions can be produced from confirming tests.

Linda

An example of using confirming tests would be the Global Consciousness Project. The alternative and null hypotheses would be that the eggs will or will not show anomalous deviations associated with global event.

http://noosphere.princeton.edu/results.html

It seems to me that there's a lot of confusion in what fls  is writing between different concepts - in particular between hypotheses and tests of hypotheses. We were talking originally about the concept of falsifiability as used by Popper, which relates to a statement or a hypothesis, and just means that it's capable in principle of being disproved. 

Originally fls intervened to say "Falsification is about whether your hypothesis reflects what you would see if your idea is true or whether it reflects what you would see if your hypothesis is false. This is different than the distinction between an alternative and a null hypothesis." From the rest of her post, she seems to be talking about confirming and disconfirming tests:
http://psiencequest.net/forums/thread-49...ml#pid9475

But obviously the question of whether a particular test is capable of disconfirming a hypothesis is quite different from the question of whether the hypothesis is falsifiable - because if the particular test isn't capable of disconfirming it, others may be.

I really don't think there's anything complicated or confusing about any of this, so long as we're clear about what hypothesis is being tested. As I said before, a lot of the time parapsychologists adopt the strategy of trying to falsify a null hypothesis (though I think that reflects the state of knowledge about and acceptance of psi phenomena, rather than necessarily being intrinsic to parapsychology; and I don't think such a strategy is any less scientific than trying to falsify a psi hypothesis).

I haven't read all the material about the Jaytee controversy, but I think the essential difference between the approaches is that Sheldrake was trying to falsify the null hypothesis, while Wiseman was trying to falsify a particular psi hypothesis (not that one was using a confirming test while the other was using a disconfirming test). And obviously because both those hypotheses could be false, it's quite possible that both Sheldrake and Wiseman were right.

Similarly, in the Global Consciousness Project, the usual approach in analysing the data has been to falsify a null hypothesis - the hypothesis of no difference between the chosen global events and either theoretical chance results or results obtained from the rest of the dataset.

[Laird]

It seems to me that there's a lot of confusion in what fls  is writing between different concepts - in particular between hypotheses and tests of hypotheses.

Exactly this, Chris. I have been offline for a bit but had been planning to respond to Linda when I returned, and that was the main point I was going to make. Once again, you have beaten me to it.

Linda, in your first reply to me you seemed confused as to whether this "confirming"/"disconfirming" distinction you've been trying to make applied to hypotheses themselves, or to tests of hypotheses.

First you applied it to hypotheses:

Falsification is about whether your hypothesis reflects what you would see if your idea is true or whether it reflects what you would see if your hypothesis is false.

But as I pointed out, this is purely a semantic distinction - any positive hypothesis can (I think) be reframed as a negative hypothesis, and vice versa, without any change to the way the experiment is conducted. For example, the positively-framed hypothesis "That when psi is present, a statistically significant effect will be observed" can be reworked into the negatively-framed hypothesis "That when psi is present, a statistically significant effect will not be observed". Nothing about the experiment would change.

You seem to agree with me about this. So, let's move on to whether the distinction can apply to hypothesis testing. Of this, in your initial response to me, you wrote, of trying to test whether "p implies q" as per the paper you referenced:

You are attempting to confirm the idea when you choose to look at "p". Your result may be "q" (alternative hypothesis confirmed) or "not q" (null hypothesis confirmed). 

You are attempting to falsify the idea when you choose to look at "not q". Your result may be "not p" (alternative hypothesis confirmed) or "p" (null hypothesis confirmed).

However, as both the paper and logic dictate, whilst, yes, starting by looking at the consequent "not q" can potentially falsify the hypothesis (in the case that the antecedent turns out to be "p"), starting by looking at the antecedent "p" can also potentially falsify the hypothesis (in the case that the consequent turns out to be "not q").

Both tests can potentially falsify the hypothesis.

In favour, though, of your labelling the first test "confirmatory" is that only this test can "confirm" the idea. In other words, if you turn up "q" as the consequent, then you have confirmed that "p implies q".

Unfortunately, this means that you are mistaken in implying that the second test can "confirm the alternative hypothesis": you cannot conclude from "not p implies not q" that "p implies q" (the hypothesis in question).

[Edit: the above two paragraphs are mistaken, as Chris pointed out later in the thread. Re the first paragraph: if you turn up "q" on a card whose reverse is "p", all you can conclude is "p and q", not "p implies q". This is, as the paper Linda referenced calls it, an "ambiguous verification" rather than a "confirmation". Re the second paragraph, I once again confused conjunction (logical and) with implication: you would not be starting from "not p implies not q" but rather from "not p and not q". Even though this does entail "p implies q", it is again more accurate to refer to it as an "ambiguous verification" than as a "confirmation".]

So, what I would say overall is that, as I initially wrote to Steve, generally, scientists (at least in parapsychology and related fields) form a falsifiable hypothesis, and then design a test which either does falsify that hypothesis, or confirms it - and this is fundamentally tied to whether or not the null hypothesis is rejected.

You are, though, correct that it is sometimes possible to design tests that are only capable of falsifying an hypothesis, and not of confirming it. We can (paraphrasing you and reframing in a way that makes most sense to me) take a massive caricature of the Jaytee hypothesis as follows:

When Pam is returning home {R}, Jaytee is always at the window {A}. Also, when Pam is not returning home {¬R}, Jaytee is never at the window {N}.

Now the hypothesis can be written as (where ∧ is the conjunction aka "and" operator, and → is the implication operator):

(R→A)∧(¬R→N)

So, yes, you could in this scenario choose to test only one of the conjuncts - and thus potentially falsify the entire hypothesis without being able to confirm it. Why might you do this? Maybe testing the other conjunct is extremely expensive, and if you can falsify the hypothesis via the other conjunct, then you save a bunch of money. Let's say though that instead of falsifying it, you confirm the conjunct in question - then you would probably want to test the other conjunct - expensive as it is - to see whether you can confirm it too, and thus confirm the entire hypothesis.

If all of that doesn't clarify my position for you, Linda, then please just ask.

As for that which you wrote in an earlier post: "I jumped in with more information in order to be helpful. I'm not sure why you are affronted by this". Maybe now you can see that I was irritated because you tried to make out that my simple and unobjectionable description of how hypothesis testing usually works was wrong, and you did this by sowing confusion in the process! It is a character flaw though that I expressed this irritation to the extent that I did, and I'm sorry for my antagonistic approach.

By the way, I read enough of the two papers that you referenced in your initial response to me to see if/how they applied, and came to the conclusion that they aren't particularly relevant. I could write at length on that, but this post is long and tedious enough as it is.

No hard feelings, Linda. Thanks for trying to be helpful.

[Laird]

I haven't read all the material about the Jaytee controversy, but [...] it's quite possible that both Sheldrake and Wiseman were right.

Ouch. No, Chris. Having read both the original paper as well as the exchanges between Rupert Sheldrake and Richard Wiseman (including head-to-head on Skeptiko), it is completely obvious that Wiseman is utterly wrong. I am very confident that you would come to the same conclusion if you did the same reading.

Ouch. No, Chris. Having read both the original paper as well as the exchanges between Rupert Sheldrake and Richard Wiseman (including head-to-head on Skeptiko), it is completely obvious that Wiseman is utterly wrong. I am very confident that you would come to the same conclusion if you did the same reading.

I only meant it was possible Wiseman was right to conclude that the particular psi hypothesis he was testing was false - not that he was right to conclude that there was nothing paranormal happening. (But maybe there's something wrong with his test of the hypothesis too.)