Henry Stapp - Is Consciousness Entirely Physical?

Consciousness is not a "completely separate realm" if there are very clear interactions between mind and matter. The physical world is governed by physical laws, but is not deterministic because of the influences of consciousness, making it very indeterministic ~ consciousness interferes, as it were, in this otherwise neat system of predictability, by acting from beyond the observed behaviours of physics.

The realm of consciousness is not "reminiscent" of any kind of "paradise". You need to go back to roots of Cartesian Dualism to understand what is actually being stated:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Res_extensa

For Descartes, only humans had res cogitans, considering it something only humans had, connecting it to language and thought. Thus, only humans had souls. Descartes is not describing any sort of "paradise" here.


"Realism" has nothing to do with physical laws, nor whether or not they have any causal power. Nor does it have anything to do with Idealism. Nor does Idealism have anything to do with there being no physical laws... lots of confusion here on your part. These are separate concepts that have overlap, but are not affected by one another.

Physical laws exist for every observer, irrespective of their ontological and metaphysical beliefs. They clearly have causal power in relation to material objects and physical forces, for every observer. No-one denies it. Thus, for Idealism, material objects, physical forces and physical laws clearly exist, as they observed within experience. For the Idealist, physicality is simply a particular form of mental phenomena. So, no conflict exists.

Neutral Monism isn't "in-between" so much it seeks a less uncertain base substance than matter or mind, neither of which are considered to clearly be able to give rise to the other. For Neutral Monists, neither mind nor matter are base substances, but can both be the result of some higher base substance that is able to result in both, perhaps even having the qualities of both.

1)
It must have passed over your head that we on the forum frequently discuss a slightly different version of dualism more in line with traditional spiritual beliefs:

I think we should all settle on a minimalist philosophy in which there are either one or two realms, one of which is mainly physical, and the other is overwhelmingly mental, or does not exist at all. That would cater for your position (sometimes) and everyone else's.

https://psiencequest.net/forums/thread-p...3#pid58853

2)
I can’t make sense of your incoherent rambling. As usual, you’ve jumped into the middle of a conversation, cherry-picking something random to nitpick without any regard for the actual topic, which in this case is whether physical laws are causative or not. Under idealism, physical laws might appear real, but they aren’t causative.

I will debate you on the topic of realism when you can show you have adequately understood Bells theorem and not before.

@sbu - i think your post is nothing but a quote of Valmar's? Did your reply get deleted?

Physical laws exist for every observer, irrespective of their ontological and metaphysical beliefs. They clearly have causal power in relation to material objects and physical forces, for every observer. No-one denies it.

I think I'd deny it until I got a clear answer as to what "physical laws" is referring to.

Are they just descriptors for our expectations, without actually existing? 

Or do the laws exist in some way, causally accessing at least the entirety of this universe to ensure the movements of the universe have some order to them?

1)
It must have passed over your head that we on the forum frequently discuss a slightly different version of dualism more in line with traditional spiritual beliefs:

David001 Wrote: I think we should all settle on a minimalist philosophy in which there are either one or two realms, one of which is mainly physical, and the other is overwhelmingly mental, or does not exist at all. That would cater for your position (sometimes) and everyone else's.

It didn't "pass over my head" at all ~ I was just pointing out the basis of Cartesian Dualism.

David's definition is not the definition.

2)
I can’t make sense of your incoherent rambling. As usual, you’ve jumped into the middle of a conversation, cherry-picking something random to nitpick without any regard for the actual topic, which in this case is whether physical laws are causative or not. Under idealism, physical laws might appear real, but they aren’t causative.

Under Idealism, as under any other ontology, physical laws are just observations, models, of the behaviour of matter and related physical forces. Science is the source of these models, and doesn't rely on any ontology to assert them. This is what you are fundamentally not understanding here.

You almost seem to presume that science == Physicalism with the way you word things...

I will debate you on the topic of realism when you can show you have adequately understoof Bells theorem and not before.

That's an entirely arbitrary bar that feels entirely meaningless to the discussion. I'm not talking about local realism or its relation to physicality.

What seems to have gone over *your* head is that you mention "Realism", and then proceed to not explain how it relates to physical laws ~ you just presume that everyone know what you mean. Because as you state it, it's very far from obvious how Realism results in physical laws being causative.

How about just admitting that you just don't want to engage in the debate around it, instead of seemingly attempting to obfuscate that instead of just being blunt about it?

I think I'd deny it until I got a clear answer as to what "physical laws" is referring to.

Are they just descriptors for our expectations, without actually existing? 

Or do the laws exist in some way, causally accessing at least the entirety of this universe to ensure the movements of the universe have some order to them?

They exist I think ~ matter and the physical forces that affect matter clearly have patterns and habits to them. On that note, Rupert Sheldrake mentioned in one of his speeches that we say "laws of physics", but it's a holdover from older times, and that the clear wording should be "habits".

So none of it is literal, so much as an attempt to describe what we observe. We've never actually observed the underlying mechanisms or causes of why the habits of physics are the way they are ~ but the effects are undeniable to any observer. Punching a wall hurts, and might break your hand. Scraping your knee will bruise, and maybe break the skin, causing it to bleed. Stroking a cat's back results in feeling fluffy fur. Physical stuff, irrespective of our ontological views.

They exist I think ~ matter and the physical forces that affect matter clearly have patterns and habits to them. On that note, Rupert Sheldrake mentioned in one of his speeches that we say "laws of physics", but it's a holdover from older times, and that the clear wording should be "habits".

So none of it is literal, so much as an attempt to describe what we observe. We've never actually observed the underlying mechanisms or causes of why the habits of physics are the way they are ~ but the effects are undeniable to any observer. Punching a wall hurts, and might break your hand. Scraping your knee will bruise, and maybe break the skin, causing it to bleed. Stroking a cat's back results in feeling fluffy fur. Physical stuff, irrespective of our ontological views.

Oh I think that our induction is for the most part sound on these matters. Though I am digging into David Bentley Hart who suggests the universe is intelligible and amenable to our rationality because the universe reflects the rationality of what he calls God but we could just as easily call the One or the Ur-Mind. [Though a thorough reading of Hart could arguably bring us back to the word "God" as the best matching signifier.]

So the Laws are not just mental to us in our conception but even in whatever causal "oomph" they posses. Of course this would be an Idealist reading, which I'm not totally opposed to but I still hesitate to say Mind is all there is. I feel like consciousness is fundamental but not solely what exists at the level of Reality's Ground...

Though I think even a variety of Neutral Monisms could accommodate the idea that Laws of Nature are supported by some Mind(s) while still allowing for something of the corporeal. I feel like a lot of creation myths that involve creating from the body of a god or primordial monster hint at this...

One metaphysics I don't think can accommodate the reality of Natural Law having causal power is Physicalism. Where are the Laws and how do they Interact with matter? If this is accepted under Physicalism I don't see the problem for Dualism...

1)
It must have passed over your head that we on the forum frequently discuss a slightly different version of dualism more in line with traditional spiritual beliefs:


https://psiencequest.net/forums/thread-p...3#pid58853

2)
I can’t make sense of your incoherent rambling. As usual, you’ve jumped into the middle of a conversation, cherry-picking something random to nitpick without any regard for the actual topic, which in this case is whether physical laws are causative or not. Under idealism, physical laws might appear real, but they aren’t causative.

I will debate you on the topic of realism when you can show you have adequately understood Bells theorem and not before.

I'm fairly confused who you are accusing of 'incoherent rambling' - maybe even me. Quoting several people in one post is fairly hard to follow.

The problem is that all relevant metaphysical systems contain flaws.

Physicalism/materialism doesn't have an answer to the hard problem.

Panpsychism has a problem if it is asserted that fundamental particles (electrons, protons, etc) can't sensibly be said to hold anything related to consciousness because they have to be interchangeable for QM to produce the results it does. I don't know if there is a sane solution to this - people rarely seem to want to discuss it.

Idealism seems to me to suffer from the fault that it could be used to explain anything and everything. If matter is simply a conscious construction, then a conscious entity could presumably change its own rules arbitrarily.

Dualism has a problem in that the two realms can't be totally separate.

I don't suppose that Descartes was unaware of the obvious problem with Dualism, any more than physicists feel an urgent need to reject QM and/or GR because they are mutually inconsistent.

Given all this, it doesn't seem reasonable that most scientists reject Dualism because of the above reason.

Scientific theories have value almost regardless of whether they are true or not. They allow masses of data to be catalogued so that it is less easy to ignore data because it is inconvenient. There would be a huge amount of results that could be explained in terms of Dualism, but not in materialistic/physicalistic terms.

I would really like to read your response to this, realising that everyone comes here with something to offer. If I am barking up the wrong tree, I'd like to know!

David

I'm fairly confused who you are accusing of 'incoherent rambling' - maybe even me. Quoting several people in one post is fairly hard to follow.

I'm the one being accused here... and I don't understand the accusation, either.

Panpsychism has a problem if it is asserted that fundamental particles (electrons, protons, etc) can't sensibly be said to hold anything related to consciousness because they have to be interchangeable for QM to produce the results it does. I don't know if there is a sane solution to this - people rarely seem to want to discuss it.

The only out that Panpsychism has is the quantum. Consciousness can just defined as a quantum field and boom. Physicalism has no such luxury, wedded firmly to its ideological roots in Materialism as it is. Panpsychism feels like an attempt to escape from the rigidity of Materialism's flaws.

Idealism seems to me to suffer from the fault that it could be used to explain anything and everything. If matter is simply a conscious construction, then a conscious entity could presumably change its own rules arbitrarily.

Objective Idealism doesn't have this problem. Matter is considered to be a construction of a much higher consciousness than ours ~ call it "God" ~ which explains why we cannot just do whatever we want, as our minds are firmed enveloped in the physical, limiting them strongly. Even disincarnate minds seem to have trouble influencing the physical ~ there are clearly rules, limits, of some sort in place that restrict what can and cannot happen, and to what degree.

Dualism has a problem in that the two realms can't be totally separate.

I don't suppose that Descartes was unaware of the obvious problem with Dualism, any more than physicists feel an urgent need to reject QM and/or GR because they are mutually inconsistent.

Given all this, it doesn't seem reasonable that most scientists reject Dualism because of the above reason.

There is also Neutral Monism ~ mind and matter are distinct, but not... separate, as it were. The neutral substance can be of a nature that is not consciousness as we understand it. Maybe call it... "Spirit", "Source", "God", something not resembling "consciousness" with all its unfortunate connotations.

Scientific theories have value almost regardless of whether they are true or not. They allow masses of data to be catalogued so that it is less easy to ignore data because it is inconvenient. There would be a huge amount of results that could be explained in terms of Dualism, but not in materialistic/physicalistic terms.

Indeed ~ we live in a world where we have our minds, and the physical world that lies in sensory experience. There is a clear distinction that cannot be denied except through, well, denial that there is one, for one reason or another. The Physicalist denying their own existence as just an epiphenomenon of their brain "talking to itself" or whatever other, frankly magical crap they invent to avoid the simpler answer.

There is also Neutral Monism ~ mind and matter are distinct, but not... separate, as it were. The neutral substance can be of a nature that is not consciousness as we understand it. Maybe call it... "Spirit", "Source", "God", something not resembling "consciousness" with all its unfortunate connotations.

Right I did forget that (and an infinity of tweaked versions of these ideas)! I suppose my problem with that is that it doesn't seem to serve any purpose at all except to confuse the issue!

I suppose in a way it resembles Idealism in that it may approximate the ultimate truth, but I don't think we are anywhere near an ultimate truth.

Sorry for retelling this tale, but I think it makes my point.

Three prehistoric philosophers sat down and started to contemplate the nature of fire:

UG1: I think fire is best understood as a process in which the burning object releases its spirit!

UG2: Perhaps we should just assert this as the truth - after all we are supposed to come up with answers, otherwise we might get redeployed preparing the hunt for cooking.

UG3: I have been doing some experiments with fires. I discovered that you can extinguish a fire just by covering it with a large earthenware jar - surely there must still be some spirit in a part-burned fire. The fire takes a minute or two to go out, but if you then transfer the jar quickly over another fire, it goes out at once.

UG1: Philosophical truth can't be derived from experiments!

David

Right I did forget that (and an infinity of tweaked versions of these ideas)! I suppose my problem with that is that it doesn't seem to serve any purpose at all except to confuse the issue!

There's no "confusion" ~ just an attempt to point to something beyond our comprehension. Objective Idealism and Neutral Monism both attempt to do this, to point to something that the mystical sides of religion have also attempted to grapple with for thousands of years, to varying degrees of success. It's why I find philosophical Taoism, the Jewish Kabbalah and mystical Hinduism all fascinating, as they are all attempts to point to the same thing that defies any and all attempts at proper description.

I suppose in a way it resembles Idealism in that it may approximate the ultimate truth, but I don't think we are anywhere near an ultimate truth.

You need to keep in mind that none of our ontologies or metaphysics are anywhere near an ultimate truth ~ we lack the language to concisely express ideas, along with the majority lacking experiences to have any meaningful way to properly express transcendent concepts. After all, you can see the struggle mystics have with trying to properly describe their transcendent mystical experiences. "Infinity" might be somewhat accurate, but it's extremely difficult to even properly conceptualize in the imagination.

Sorry for retelling this tale, but I think it makes my point.

Three prehistoric philosophers sat down and started to contemplate the nature of fire:

UG1:  I think fire is best understood as a process in which the burning object releases its spirit!

UG2:  Perhaps we should just assert this as the truth - after all we are supposed to come up with answers, otherwise we might get redeployed preparing the hunt for cooking.

UG3:  I have been doing some experiments with fires. I discovered that you can extinguish a fire just by covering it with a large earthenware jar - surely there must still be some spirit in a part-burned fire. The fire takes a minute or two to go out, but if you then transfer the jar quickly over another fire, it goes out at once.

UG1:  Philosophical truth can't be derived from experiments!

David

This doesn't seem to relate at all to what I am attempting to say.

In a simpler sense... Dualism only works a practical examination of this reality where physicality exists within sensory experience, stable distinct from our subjective, purely mental aspects. But even Dualism is a very kludgy in that it's not clear that the physical qualia we sense are really separable from our experiences of them.

Yes, we can agree on language and descriptions, but that the fact remains that we only know about the physical through our senses, which are themselves mental in nature... even NDErs have qualia of a physical reality, yet they cannot interact with it outside of their body.

It makes little sense to have multiple base substances, because it's less simple to explain where each come from... and if we posit "God" or what-have-you, we're right back to Monism, with "God" as the base substance ~ so we're always going to end up with a singular base substance of an unknown nature.

Just because we do not understand the nature of the base substance, doesn't mean we cannot attempt to reason and intuit our way to something that can logically be responsible for everything within our totality of experiences. That is the purpose of good metaphysical and ontological philosophy, after all...

This doesn't seem to relate at all to what I am attempting to say.

Sorry, maybe I was being a bit cryptic!

My point is that only UG3 was making a helpful suggestion, UG2 and UG1 were too concerned with grandiose schemes or with the possibility that they might be redeployed in more menial tasks!

I feel that UG3 represents the kind of science we need. It should explore a theory of consciousness that takes its clues from the body of parapsychological and related evidence, and not from extreme abstraction.

David