Free will re-redux

We found they weren't truly random when we found the half-lives for the associated materials. Just as when we find a process/event is deterministic we just mean that we attribute 100% probability to a single outcome.

If the instances of decay were truly random there'd be no half-lives attributable to different materials - there'd be no discernible pattern at all.

One reason why the materialist Thomas Nail says Matter moves in ways that are neither random nor determined.

We found that the decay of a large number of particles is not uniformly random.  But I don't see what that has to do with the apparent fact that it is impossible to predict which particle will decay next.

~~ Paul

We found that the decay of a large number of particles is not uniformly random.  But I don't see what that has to do with the apparent fact that it is impossible to predict which particle will decay next.

~~ Paul

If something is not "uniformly random" it means, as Stephen says above, that a relation is maintained between the context prior to the event and the event itself.

As the materialist Thomas Nail notes ->

The very idea of a purely random motion presupposes that it was not affected by or related to anything else previously, which presupposes that it was the first thing and before it was nothing, which is a version of the internally contradictory hypothesis of ex nihilo creation: something from nothing. The ontology of random motion claims that from pure disorder of discrete nonrelational particles comes high-level composite order. Given the high level of order and complexity in our present age, randomness is demonstrably not the case.

Pedetic motion, on the other hand, is not random at all, but instead emerges from and is influenced by other motions, just not in a completely determined way. Unlike randomness, pedetic motion is not unpredictable because it is not influenced by any other motions; rather, motion is pedetic precisely because it occurs in relation to other motions. It is the interrelation and mutual influence of matter with itself that gives it its unpredictable character. Over a long period of time, the pedetic motion of matter combines and stabilizes into certain patterns, synchronies, and relations, giving the appearance of stability and solidity, only to become turbulent again and enter into new conjoined relations.

Nail, Thomas. Being and Motion (pp. 73-74). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

If something is not "uniformly random" it means, as Stephen says above, that a relation is maintained between the context prior to the event and the event itself.

As the materialist Thomas Nail notes ->

The very idea of a purely random motion presupposes that it was not affected by or related to anything else previously, which presupposes that it was the first thing and before it was nothing, which is a version of the internally contradictory hypothesis of ex nihilo creation: something from nothing. The ontology of random motion claims that from pure disorder of discrete nonrelational particles comes high-level composite order. Given the high level of order and complexity in our present age, randomness is demonstrably not the case.

Pedetic motion, on the other hand, is not random at all, but instead emerges from and is influenced by other motions, just not in a completely determined way. Unlike randomness, pedetic motion is not unpredictable because it is not influenced by any other motions; rather, motion is pedetic precisely because it occurs in relation to other motions. It is the interrelation and mutual influence of matter with itself that gives it its unpredictable character. Over a long period of time, the pedetic motion of matter combines and stabilizes into certain patterns, synchronies, and relations, giving the appearance of stability and solidity, only to become turbulent again and enter into new conjoined relations.

Nail, Thomas. Being and Motion (pp. 73-74). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

I still don't understand what this has to do with the decay of individual particles. Are you saying that there is a causal factor that determines which particle decays next that physicists haven't uncovered?

As far as I can determine, "pedetic motion" is Brownian motion. A particle's movement on a liquid would be predictable if we could know the positions and velocities of every particle involved, but I don't believe we can.

~~ Paul

I still don't understand what this has to do with the decay of individual particles. Are you saying that there is a causal factor that determines which particle decays next that physicists haven't uncovered?

As far as I can determine, "pedetic motion" is Brownian motion. A particle's movement on a liquid would be predictable if we could know the positions and velocities of every particle involved, but I don't believe we can.

~~ Paul

Pedetic means material motion that is neither determined nor random. [If you feel Brownian motion is the same thing - as Nail does - that's fine.]

I'm saying that given that the macro/classical level is just an averaged out "smear" of the QM level, and that the QM level is pedetic, that Nature - even when just looking at the physical - is neither random nor determined.

To quote the materialist Thomas Nail again from his book On Being & Motion on another facet of indeterminism beyond the stochastic ->

"The less precise the position of a field, the more it looks like a wave, and the more we know about its momentum through its diffraction pattern or waveform. In other words, Heisenberg teaches us that motion cannot be reduced to position without destroying its motion, and the trajectory of a position cannot be predicted without the fundamental uncertainty of motion. This fundamental uncertainty about the motion of matter is not just an epistemological effect of observation. It has been experimentally shown that this unpredictable or pedetic effect is inherent in the motion of the matter waves of all quantum objects. The uncertainty principle and indeterminacy are fundamental properties of all quantum systems. Indeterminacy, however, is not random or even probabilistic, because position only occurs in continuous relation to momentum.

Heisenberg thus showed that even at the quantum level, matter in motion is both relational and uncertain, or pedetic. Pedesis may be irregular and unpredictable, but it is not random. What is interesting about movement is not simply that it is pedetic, but that it is through pedesis and turbulence that metastable formations and emergent orders are possible.

By contrast, the ontology of randomness is quite bleak. In a purely random ontology, all of matter would be moving randomly, and thus nonrelationally, at all times."

Pedetic means material motion that is neither determined nor random. [If you feel Brownian motion is the same thing - as Nail does - that's fine.]

I'm saying that given that the macro/classical level is just an averaged out "smear" of the QM level, and that the QM level is pedetic, that Nature - even when just looking at the physical - is neither random nor determined.

To quote the materialist Thomas Nail again from his book On Being & Motion on another facet of indeterminism beyond the stochastic ->

"The less precise the position of a field, the more it looks like a wave, and the more we know about its momentum through its diffraction pattern or waveform. In other words, Heisenberg teaches us that motion cannot be reduced to position without destroying its motion, and the trajectory of a position cannot be predicted without the fundamental uncertainty of motion. This fundamental uncertainty about the motion of matter is not just an epistemological effect of observation. It has been experimentally shown that this unpredictable or pedetic effect is inherent in the motion of the matter waves of all quantum objects. The uncertainty principle and indeterminacy are fundamental properties of all quantum systems. Indeterminacy, however, is not random or even probabilistic, because position only occurs in continuous relation to momentum.

Heisenberg thus showed that even at the quantum level, matter in motion is both relational and uncertain, or pedetic. Pedesis may be irregular and unpredictable, but it is not random. What is interesting about movement is not simply that it is pedetic, but that it is through pedesis and turbulence that metastable formations and emergent orders are possible.

By contrast, the ontology of randomness is quite bleak. In a purely random ontology, all of matter would be moving randomly, and thus nonrelationally, at all times."

What point is it that you're taking from this? Indeed, particle decay is not purely random, since we have half-lives. But the decay time of a particular particle is unpredictable and, I believe, independent of the other particles. What does this do for free will?

~~ Paul

What point is it that you're taking from this? Indeed, particle decay is not purely random, since we have half-lives. But the decay time of a particular particle is unpredictable and, I believe, independent of the other particles. What does this do for free will?

~~ Paul

Well earlier in the thread you said your problem with free will resembles the same as your problem with pedesis.

As to why it matters that it's now been shown in this thread that matter moves in pedetic way - > Because a behavior is only "stochastic" as in that term describes how we measure it. We can see this in that even the supposedly deterministic macro-behaviors can be described with statistics.

However, once we know the true nature of physical motion is pedetic we can look deeper ->

"Unlike randomness, pedesis is not defined strictly by disorder. Turbulence is a disordered motion, but it is a disordered motion that is capable of producing order because it responds to itself and others. Nonrandom disordered motion—alternately called pedesis, Brownian, or stochastic motion—is capable of producing emergent metastable states precisely because it is responsive to and continuous with what came immediately before it, but not determined by it or its longer history.

In other words, pedesis is neither random, determinate, nor probabilistic but strictly indeterminate and relational."


Nail, Thomas. Being and Motion (p. 74). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

If the physical is "strictly indeterminate and relational", a class of causal types that would include free will, then even before leaving Physicalism we can see free will is in accordance with empirically observed - and philosophically considered - causation.

All to say, given that my argument as been for the coherency of free will, I think it's QED at this point from my perspective?

edit, as a bonus you said in that linked to post ->

Let me put it this way: If you could prove that there are nonrandom indeterministic processes, I would still ask for a description of how they lead to free decisions. What happens between the final moment of indecision and the first moment of decision?

As to how non-random indeterministic processes lead to a free decision, mental causation would be a type of such process. So it isn't "how" sub-processes lead to a free decision in a reductionist sense - this would mean the decision isn't free after all - but rather the "how" of the way in which free will - or more specifically the possibility selection of the conscious agent - fits into some general metaphysical picture.

My list of papers does that.

Well earlier in the thread you said your problem with free will resembles the same as your problem with pedesis.

As to why it matters that it's now been shown in this thread that matter moves in pedetic way - > Because a behavior is only "stochastic" as in that term describes how we measure it. We can see this in that even the supposedly deterministic macro-behaviors can be described with statistics.

However, once we know the true nature of physical motion is pedetic we can look deeper ->

"Unlike randomness, pedesis is not defined strictly by disorder. Turbulence is a disordered motion, but it is a disordered motion that is capable of producing order because it responds to itself and others. Nonrandom disordered motion—alternately called pedesis, Brownian, or stochastic motion—is capable of producing emergent metastable states precisely because it is responsive to and continuous with what came immediately before it, but not determined by it or its longer history.

In other words, pedesis is neither random, determinate, nor probabilistic but strictly indeterminate and relational."


Nail, Thomas. Being and Motion (p. 74). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

If the physical is "strictly indeterminate and relational", a class of causal types that would include free will, then even before leaving Physicalism we can see free will is in accordance with empirically observed - and philosophically considered - causation.

All to say, given that my argument as been for the coherency of free will, I think it's QED at this point from my perspective?

edit, as a bonus you said in that linked to post ->


As to how non-random indeterministic processes lead to a free decision, mental causation would be a type of such process. So it isn't "how" sub-processes lead to a free decision in a reductionist sense - this would mean the decision isn't free after all - but rather the "how" of the way in which free will - or more specifically the possibility selection of the conscious agent - fits into some general metaphysical picture.

My list of papers does that.

As far as I know, there is no relation between the individual particles in a large group that has anything to do with particle decay.




What does being "strictly indeterminate and relational" do for free will? Is free will like Brownian motion?






"... is capable of producing emergent metastable states precisely because it is responsive to and continuous with what came immediately before it, but not determined by it or its longer history."






Nevertheless, the individual particle motions are unpredictable, since we cannot know the position and velocity of all the particles prior to the movement of a particular particle. So we seem to have a pre-decision that is based on the previous state of affairs, but then the final decision is random, yet within the framework or ballpark of that pre-decision. Is that the idea?






~~ Paul

Nevertheless, the individual particle motions are unpredictable, since we cannot know the position and velocity of all the particles prior to the movement of a particular particle. So we seem to have a pre-decision that is based on the previous state of affairs, but then the final decision is random, yet within the framework or ballpark of that pre-decision. Is that the idea?

It's not random for the reasons already given (see here).

Randomness cannot exist, and yet we find there is indeterminism. Thus all nature is neither random nor determined, but rather relational but indeterminate which is exactly the kind of causation that includes free willed decisions. ("Freedom is what you do with what is done to you." - Sartre)

Or to put it another way, causation in nature is novel but this novelty is still related to prior states of reality. We see this in the varied indeterminate events at the QM level, for example the position of the electron is related to the position of the nucleus.

But in fact agents do have memories and anticipate the immediate future.  These two factors are where free will is active and informed selection is objectively measured.

Thanks for correcting me, with a little searching, the term I probably meant is Piecewise Markov Chains, where random jumps are separated from the determined elements.

Check out the Thomas Nail quote I put in my reply to Paul - I think your argument about measurement is meeting up with arguments drawn from Nail's On Being & Motion.

It really seems to me the *coherency* of free will as a possibility has been shown from multiple directions at this point - philosophically, mathematically, empirically both at the bottom level of QM and top level of Psi.

Not sure what is preventing the QED stamp for that...

[Laird]

I'm not sure where I suggested that you said that physical laws don't happen.

You seem very confused. You had written "Physical laws don't happen", implying that I'd written that they do - which I hadn't. Instead, I'd written that (your position could be summarised as) "The application of 'necessitating' [...] physical laws just happens" (bold emphasis added).

You want to have it both ways. On the one hand, your argument against free will depends on physical laws "forcing" the decisions made by agents (the laws "being applied" by something; who knows what), such that those decisions are not truly free. On the other, recognising that the lack, on your apparently physicalist metaphysic, of anything that could meaningfully be the "enforcer" of those laws, you affirm that they are merely descriptive rather than prescriptive. Once you remove prescriptiveness, though, then there is no longer anything "forcing" agents to make decisions; the possibility is open for them then to make genuinely free choices which can merely be - as for physical laws - "described rather than prescribed".

So, you want at the same time to deny free will choices (based on their being prescribed) while affirming a proposition that supports them (that they can merely be described). Oh boy. What a contradictory mess.

Why is it unreasonable to ask about laws for free decision-making? They are just descriptions of how free decisions happen.

Oh dear. We've been through this so many times in so many threads already that it's unbelievable that you don't get it by now. "Trolling" very likely is an accurate way to describe your engagement on this forum. In any case, see the above: if, indeed, "laws" are merely descriptive and not prescriptive, then, fine, pick any decision anybody has ever made, describe it, and - presto - there's your "law", albeit that that law might apply solely to that individual decision. This is not an argument against free will; rather, it supports free will.

I don't understand it. I understand that the decision was not deterministically produced by the past/current state of affairs, but was influenced by them. But exactly what do you mean by it being "contingent" on them?

[Definition from online Merriam Webster dictionary supplied]

I mean that the decision was - in part - predicated upon them, but not necessitated by them. See senses #1:

1 : dependent on or conditioned by something else

...and #5:

5 : not necessitated : determined by free choice