Dualism without hard distinction?

Review of Meixner: The Two Sides of Being – A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism (Part 1)

A defense of psycho-physical dualism — especially one as comprehensive, rigorous, passionate, and well written as The Two Sides of Being — is bound to be hugely unpopular with large parts of the contemporary philosophical community. The author of this important philosophical work is Uwe Meixner, who teaches philosophy at the University of Regensburg. There are two thrusts to his defense of dualism....

Review of Meixner: The Two Sides of Being – A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism (Part 2)

Psycho-physical dualism may not be the last word in ontology, but if there is a last word, the surest route to it is likely to pass through a dualistic theory of consciousness. One needs to discover both the ultimate subject and the ultimate object — the former by deep introspection and/or mystical experience, the latter by following the physical evidence — before one is in a position to recognize their original identity and arrive at a genuine (i.e., non-reductive) monism.

In my estimation, Uwe Meixner’s theory of consciousness is not only the most convincing dualistic theory of consciousness to date. The Two Sides of Being is also one of the most important works coming out of academic philosophy for quite some time.

Review of Meixner: The Two Sides of Being – A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism (Part 1)



Review of Meixner: The Two Sides of Being – A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism (Part 2)

These two links don't work. I found what may be another different review of Meixner's book, at https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-two-sides-o...l-dualism/ .

Meixner has many fascinating and creative ideas. Some interesting quotes from this review:

From chapter 7, refuting scientistic claims that dualism is anti-scientific: 

"Once one accepts that psychology, for example, is a science, then one can see that “metaphysical dualism cannot be detrimental for science, that it cannot be anti-scientific, since methodological dualism is a necessary prerequisite for there being a science of consciousness in the world at all.”"

Meixner has a theory of interactional dualist parallelism, where mental nonphysical entities and physical entities like the brain are noncausally parallel, a concept I find difficult. He recognizes the massive number of correlations between conscious events and brain events, but considers this relation to be noncausal parallelism. Some sort of law of nature determines it.

On Chapter 8, on his main theory of interactional dualist parallelism:

"With the central principles of his interactionist parallelism in place, Meixner is prepared to take on another challenge: Why would such a bizarre setup ever have evolved? The short answer is this: to make her children truly successful Mother Nature must make them into genuine decision makers. (314) A genuine decision maker is one who can deliberate on the basis of nondeterminative information. (316) Now how do you build a genuine decision maker who can deliberate on the basis of nondeterminative information? First, you make sure that the information has a format that the decision maker can understand. That is done by attaching qualia to the information carrying events. For the qualia “define the conscious event as the natural meaning it is.” (324) Second, you must make sure that these natural meanings are going to be appreciated by the decision maker—they must become something to the decision maker, they must be something for the decision maker. This is done by imbuing the information with forness. The information “has, as it were, an address written on it.” (317) This explains the evolution of the two extra properties of conscious events: qualia and forness. But there is more: What sort of a thing can appreciate this sort of information, these natural meanings, and can use them in deliberation? Only a nonphysical entity!

Thus it is indeed the case that Nature herself put the ghosts in the machines, those marvelous caretakers and guardians who actually love the thing they are put in charge of and who will see it through many dangers, toils, and snares, relinquishing it only with the utmost reluctance. (321)

And this is why there are nonphysical souls and why certain physical events in the brain are nomologically linked to corresponding conscious events that come furnished with qualia and an inbuilt direction toward the deliberating soul."

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On Chapter 10, concerning the self and the soul and their evolution:

"Selves are nonphysical substances “which are subjects both of consciousness and of agency. (391) Persons are “rational selves”. (391) And a “soul, qua soul, is a (substantial, nonphysical) self that belongs to an organism.”

How did souls “enter” the world? They evolved along with their organism. And the connection between souls is effected by natural laws. Here is how one might think of the evolution of the soul:

The nomological structure of the world is such that the emergence of organisms with selves is nomologically possible and under certain circumstances nomologically necessary. And then the right accidents happened, making the relevant laws, which had been dormant so far, operative. And—pop—there it was: the first organism with a self, i.e., with a subject of consciousness and agency, which, being the organism’s self, is centered on the organism, but which is a nonphysical enduring individual nonetheless. (400)"

These ideas about the incredible powers of Darwinist evolutionary processes are not tenable for the many reasons gone into in great detail in another subforum, but there still probably are big grains of truth in here.

Needless to say, Meixner's ideas presented in 2004 were extremely unpopular and politically incorrect in Academia, and it looks like they have sunk without much of a trace.

These two links don't work. I found what may be another different review of Meixner's book, at https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-two-sides-o...l-dualism/ .

Meixner has many fascinating and creative ideas. Some interesting quotes from this review:

Ah sorry had to put in the new AntiMatters links, should work now.

I do agree that coincidentally perfect parallelism is too hard a pill to swallow. The idea that Nature makes use of this parallelism is fascinating - the necessity of touching some non-physical realm - but also bizarre, though I suppose this action at a distance parallels that of entanglement between particles?

A Simple Proof of Mind-Body Dualism

Marcus Arvan

This paper provides an elegant proof of mind-body dualism. I show, first, that all properties known to humankind, aside from qualitative properties of consciousness (and perhaps numerical properties), are fundamentally relational in nature. I then show that relational properties are, at least in principle, always fully describable in language. Finally, I point out that qualitative properties of consciousness are clearly not fully describable in ordinary language. Thus, qualitative properties of consciousness are fundamentally different than all other properties known to humankind: they are fundamentally intrinsic properties that stand outside of the realm of scientific inquiry.

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Quantum Interactive Dualism: An Alternative to Materialism

Henry Stapp

René Descartes proposed an interactive dualism that posits an interaction between the mind of a human being and some of the matter located in his or her brain. Isaac Newton subsequently formulated a physical theory based exclusively on the material/physical part of Descartes’ ontology. Newton’s theory enforced the principle of the causal closure of the physical, and the classical physics that grew out of it enforces this same principle. This classical theory purports to give, in principle, a complete deterministic account of the physically described properties of nature, expressed exclusively in terms of these physically described properties themselves. Orthodox contemporary physical theory violates this principle in two separate ways. First, it injects random elements into the dynamics. Second, it allows, and also requires, abrupt probing actions that disrupt the mechanistically described evolution of the physically described systems. These probing actions are called Process 1 interventions by von Neumann. They are psycho-physical events. Neither the content nor the timing of these events is determined either by any known law, or by the afore-mentioned random elements. Orthodox quantum mechanics considers these events to be instigated by choices made by conscious agents. In von Neumann’s formulation of quantum theory each such intervention acts upon the state of the brain of some conscious agent. Thus orthodox von Neumann contemporary physics posits an interactive dualism similar to that of Descartes. But in this quantum version the effects of the conscious choices upon our brains are controlled, in part, by the known basic rules of quantum physics. This theoretically specified mind-brain connection allows many basic psychological and neuropsychological findings associated with the apparent physical effectiveness of our conscious volitional efforts to be explained in a causal and practically useful way. The intent of this paper is to give an updated account of the author’s developing theory that is clearer than before, focused on the positive, and suitable for non-specialist readers.

Quantum Interactive Dualism: The Libet and Einstein-PodolskyRosen Causal Anomalies

Henry Stapp

Abstract: Replacing faulty nineteenth century physics by its orthodox quantum successor converts the earlier materialist conception of nature to a structure that does not enforce the principle of the causal closure of the physical. The quantum laws possess causal gaps, and these gaps are filled in actual scientific practice by inputs from our streams of consciousness. The form of the quantum laws permits and suggests the existence of an underlying reality that is built not on substances, but on psychophysical events, and on objective tendencies for these events to occur. These events constitute intrinsic mind-brain connections. They are fundamental links between brain processes described in physical terms and events in our streams of consciousness. This quantum ontology confers upon our conscious intentions the causal efficacy assigned to them in actual scientific practice, and creates a substancefree interactive dualism. This putative quantum ontology has previously been shown to have impressive explanatory power in both psychology and neuroscience. Here it is used to reconcile the existence of physically efficacious conscious free will with causal anomalies of both the Libet and Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky types.

A Simple Proof of Mind-Body Dualism


Quantum Interactive Dualism: An Alternative to Materialism


Quantum Interactive Dualism: The Libet and Einstein-PodolskyRosen Causal Anomalies

These seem to be mostly excellent arguments. I would wonder why they aren't used more. Perhaps there are some easy refutations, or it's just that materialists ignore them and refuse to engage.


A Simple Proof of Mind-Body Dualism

Marcus Arvan

"Thus, qualitative properties of consciousness are fundamentally different than all other properties known to humankind: they are fundamentally intrinsic properties that stand outside of the realm of scientific inquiry."

This seems to directly follow from the Hard Problem or perhaps could be considered a restatement of the Hard Problem. But I don't think Chalmers is a Dualist (?) Why isn't he?

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Quantum Interactive Dualism: An Alternative to Materialism

Henry Stapp

"These probing actions are called Process 1 interventions by von Neumann. They are psycho-physical events. Neither the content nor the timing of these events is determined either by any known law, or by the afore-mentioned random elements. Orthodox quantum mechanics considers these events to be instigated by choices made by conscious agents. In von Neumann’s formulation of quantum theory each such intervention acts upon the state of the brain of some conscious agent. Thus orthodox von Neumann contemporary physics posits an interactive dualism similar to that of Descartes."

This seems to show that according to the leading interpretation of quantum mechanics free will (that is, truly free choices made by conscious agents) is real and exists apart from both determinism and randomness. Quantum mechanics itself can't be validly challenged. So why haven't free will advocates extensively used this argument against no-free-will materialists? Also, the interactive dualism argument above should have been much used. Why not?

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Quantum Interactive Dualism: The Libet and Einstein-PodolskyRosen Causal Anomalies

Henry Stapp

"The form of the quantum laws permits and suggests the existence of an underlying reality that is built not on substances, but on psychophysical events, and on objective tendencies for these events to occur. These events constitute intrinsic mind-brain connections. They are fundamental links between brain processes described in physical terms and events in our streams of consciousness."

This concept seems kind of hazy. He describes "intrinsic" mind-brain connections, but for these connections or interactions to occur, presumably events in the stream of consciousness would have to have causal efficacy in the physical. The theory seems not to define and identify either the inner nature of thought or consciousness, or how the interaction of thought/consciousness and brain matter occurs. The most essential questions don't seem answered except to say the interactions are "intrinsic". Is this almost like some sort of law-like parallelism?

One of the interesting questions that comes up is what one means by "immateriality".

Aquinas, for example, follows a long tradition that is taken up in some sense by Descartes when he notes mentality has an intrinsic character to thought. Thoughts are about something in way that avoids a gap of representation - for example thinking about a proof such as Pythagoras' Theorem is contemplating a mathematical truth that could be expressed in a variety of potential symbols.

Thus there's a good reason we broadcast mathematical truths when we search for aliens, and why people call logical and mathematical truths the Universals.

Material things, as noted by Aquinas but also James Ross in modern times, don't have this intrinsic aboutness. At the very least any material object can stand for a great number of things. So they are devoid of the truth character a mind has when contemplating the logical and mathematical Universals.

This leaves us with a challenge in that intellect would then be nonspatial yet somehow tied to the spatial. [Idealists maybe don't have as much to worry about since even the spatial is ultimately mental?]

However the upside is if something is immaterial - not just in the sense of being made of "soul stuff" but differentiated from any substance at all - it would be like other immaterial [entities] such as the Universals which do not decay, break down, etc.

Some more on Dualism, this time of intrinsic and extrinsic divisions:

We don't know what a rock really is, or an atom, or an electron. We can only observe how they interact with other things and thereby describe their relational properties.

Perhaps everything has external and internal aspects. The external properties are those that science can capture and describe - through interactions, in terms of relationships. The internal aspect is the intrinsic essence, it is the reality that is not expressible in the language of interactions and relations.

-L. Smolin, Time Reborn

Marcus Arvan, of the Peer to Peer Simulation Hypothesis, offers similar thinking in his review of Gregg Rosenberg's A Place for Consciousness:

Rosenberg's book painted the first picture of reality to me that made dualism seem more plausible than physicalism. This was in large part because -- and here's the real thing that gripped me about his book -- Rosenberg shows (pretty convincingly in my view) that it is not just consciousness that science has trouble accounting for; science cannot account for causation either. And it can't account for it for the same simple reason: science deals with structure, whereas consciousness and causation -- properly understood -- both seem utterly simple and intrinsic. (note: it was really the second half of Rosenberg's book -- the part on causation, not the first part (on consciousness) -- that "got" me)

Indeed, Rosenberg got me to fundamentally "see the world in a different way" -- a way in which the idea of there being intrinsic qualities (such as primitive consciousness and causation) just have to be a part of any remotely plausible metaphysical picture of reality. For here, essentially, is what the book got me to see. First, every substance or property (note: I think there is no coherent distinction between substances and properties) we would ordinarily call physical -- mass, charge, the weak and strong nuclear forces, books, motorcyles, whatever -- are all fundamentally relational, or structural, in nature. An electon just is defined in terms of a particular function. So is mass. So is charge. Etc. But -- and this is the second thing that Rosenberg's book got me to see -- you can't have relations without relata. There have to be intrinsic properties "behind" the relations we observe (as physical things) for there to be those relations in the first place.

So, anyway, it wasn't the detailed arguments of Rosenberg's book that got me. I suspect some (or even much) of his own theory of causation, and how consciousness emerges from large-scale causal nexus in the brain, is false. Be that as it may, Rosenberg got me to thinking, for the very first time -- on broadly Kantian grounds, but also simply focusing on the phenomena of consciousness, causation, and structure -- that any world at all (let alone ours) just has to be dualistic in nature: at least in the sense of there being (A) "physical"/structural properties that can be measured by science, and (B) intrinsic/non-structural properties which cannot. (Readers might also note that these are ideas I explore and put to use in the new metaphysical model of the world and quantum mechanics that I developed in my recent Phil Forum paper "A New Theory of Free Will". Among other things, I argue that *any* world whatsoever must be constructed on a hardware/software duality that maps onto precisely the structural/intrinsic distinction that motivates mind-body dualism).

That, in a nutshell, is why I am a dualist today...

From Feser's Mind-body problems round-up ->

Much of what contemporary materialist philosophers have to say in criticism of dualism rests on egregious distortions and/or ignorance of what dualist philosophers have actually said.  A good example of this tendency is provided by the work of Paul Churchland, as I have demonstrated at length in a series of posts:

“Churchland on dualism, Part I”

“Churchland on dualism, Part II”

“Churchland on dualism, Part III”

“Churchland on dualism, Part IV”

Churchland on dualism, Part V

I discuss a number of arguments in favor of dualism in another series of posts:

“Some brief arguments for dualism, Part I”

“Some brief arguments for dualism, Part II”

“Some brief arguments for dualism, Part III”

“Some brief arguments for dualism, Part IV”

“Some brief arguments for dualism, Part V”