Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity

[Laird]

Unfortunately, I found the thesis of this essay to be incoherent. It seems to me that, in context, there are two possibilities (for the continuation of consciousness after death):

1. There are a bunch of individual subjects of experience (consciousnesses), and when your biological body dies, your own individual subjective experience (consciousness) continues in a new biological body at birth or conception, or whatever, without personally experiencing a lapse of time in between.
   
2. There is only one single subject of experience (consciousness) which manifests as a bunch of apparently individuated subjects of experience (consciousnesses), and when "your" experience continues in a newly birthed (or conceived) physical form, it is simply this singular consciousness expressing (experiencing) Itself in a new form.
   

The author, however, seems to deny both possibilities.

He denies the second thus (emphasis mine): "I might be construed as saying, to borrow the language of a different tradition, that an eternal Subject exists, ever-present in all contexts of experience. I wouldn't endorse such a construal".

He denies the first by implication, for example by stipulating (in his point #3) that (emphasis mine) "the transformed person who wakes up is not me", and, for example, after denying the second possibility of a singular conscious subject, by trying to maintain anyhow some "generic" subjectivity which would seem to preclude a continuation of an individual's subjective experience (see his point #4).

Personally, I think that the author is confused about what it is that ultimately constitutes personal identity, and that this confusion is impossible to resolve whilst maintaining physicalist/naturalist presuppositions.

He writes, for example, that "the self is nothing more than a contingent collection of fairly stable personality traits, memories, and physical characteristics", but as Sci asks (my paraphrasing/adaptation): under a naturalistic/physicalist outlook, how could this "collection" be maintained in the absence of a biological/physical form, or, in other words, upon what is this "collection" dependent/contingent if not one's physical (biological) form? It seems obvious to me that by this definition, the "self" is extinguished at biological death - which is another way in which by implication the author denies the first possibility of the continuation of the individual subject after death.

I did like anyway this essay's attempt to grapple with subjectivity and personal identity. In this grappling from a naturalistic perspective, it interestingly suggests a counter to an argument sometimes raised for physicalism: that argument being that the period of unconsciousness which characterises surgical anaesthesia suggests that consciousness is dependent on, and reducible to, biology; to a physical substrate. The counter suggested by this essay is that this supposed period of unconsciousness is merely apparent from an external perspective: from the internal perspective of the subject, experience is simply continuous, from the moment at which the anaesthetic overpowers him/her to the next moment in which s/he struggles back into wakefulness after the anaesthetic wears off (admittedly, sometimes with a feeling or sense of something missing in between).

Of course, this interpretation assumes a physicalist perspective, whereas from a dualistic perspective in which the soul/mind/consciousness persists objectively during the period of "unconsciousness" the argument might be seen not to be countered after all on this basis (there are of course other ways to counter it).

But that's the thing - dreams are all I can think of for a reference point, and I don't forget who I am in my dreams, no matter how divorced from everyday life they are. I've had several dreams where I'm not even in them (that is to say, "I" am only a spectator to the action playing out), and I don't lose a sense of being me. On that example, it doesn't follow that I wouldn't remember right now, in this life, that I'm that larger incorporeal entity.

Seems like the take away is reincarnation isn't like dreaming where the identity of this life is always an observer?

I can't say whether you're part of a larger incorporeal entity, or what the experience of such an entity would be like.

Although if we are following the example of your dream as the standard wouldn't it mean you as this person (Will) shall always be around witnessing the passage of time? After all no one can imagine the nothingness of themselves in the future without being a witness to that imagining.

So if your current state of waking/dream is an argument against reincarnation, isn't also an argument for personal survival?

Unfortunately, I found the thesis of this essay to be incoherent.
The author, however, seems to deny both possibilities.

He denies the second thus (emphasis mine): "I might be construed as saying, to borrow the language of a different tradition, that an eternal Subject exists, ever-present in all contexts of experience. I wouldn't endorse such a construal".

He denies the first by implication, for example by stipulating (in his point #3) that (emphasis mine) "the transformed person who wakes up is not me", and, for example, after denying the second possibility of a singular conscious subject, by trying to maintain anyhow some "generic" subjectivity which would seem to preclude a continuation of an individual's subjective experience (see his point #4).

Personally, I think that the author is confused about what it is that ultimately constitutes personal identity, and that this confusion is impossible to resolve whilst maintaining physicalist/naturalist presuppositions.

The essay seems like a marketing attempt more than a coherent argument to me? But yeah, materialism means you completely cease to exist.

But that's the thing - dreams are all I can think of for a reference point, and I don't forget who I am in my dreams, no matter how divorced from everyday life they are. I've had several dreams where I'm not even in them (that is to say, "I" am only a spectator to the action playing out), and I don't lose a sense of being me. On that example, it doesn't follow that I wouldn't remember right now, in this life, that I'm that larger incorporeal entity.

Perhaps this is what I feel in relation to reincarnation. We don't forget who we are. In any lifetime, we are always ourselves.

On the other hand, in relation to dreams, I very commonly lose all recall of this everyday world, all the concerns and worries, joys and activities are completely replaced by some other circumstance, sometimes joyful, often baffling, and occasionally terrifying. There are times when I wake up, and it may be a relief or disappointment to find myself back here again. I think perhaps we need to distinguish between the sense of being ourselves on the one hand, and all the circumstances and trappings of the environment and people or beings which are around us. Personally I very often, maybe always, find a dream world includes forgetting most or even all of the everyday reality.

I think it is likely that different people experience much the same characteristics in dreams, but perhaps conceptualise and understand them differently, and hence the way they are described may seem different. Having said that, there are always outliers, people whose dreaming takes them into different territory, for example some do dream vividly of real-world situations, which is for the most part not how I dream. When I say real-world situations, I mean those where the quirky discrepancies and peculiar distortions are absent, the dream just seems all too real. I can't say those are common for me, though other people do report them.

If we listen to many of those who have had an NDE, we get a sense of some common themes which are also common to material coming from mediums and channeling. One of these themes is the realisation, almost immediately, that the personality is part of something greater. Not only the sense of being One with everything but also, on a smaller scale, being part of a greater soul which includes what is often called the "Higher Self" and also past (and probably future) personalities.

So, in short, what I'm trying to say is that I see no reason to believe that either oblivion or dissolution awaits as I think we will still be able to self-identify albeit with a greater sense of being. Having said that, both oblivion and dissolution remain as my permanent irrational fears which I can't seem to shake off.

"Higher Self" is a religious concept invented by gullible New Agers.

The material coming from mediums suggests that the self survives death:

In his 42nd sitting, Cornillier asked Vettellini whether the individual consciousness becomes absorbed in a universal consciousness as spirits evolve or whether they retain their individuality.  “Monsieur Corniller, Vettellini affirms that individual consciousness can but grow greater and greater as evolution progresses,” Reine relayed.  “All that is gained and conquered by a being, defines and strengthens his individuality.  It is his, – and for himself.

A New ‘Number One’ Book on the Afterlife.

This is my favorite article on the topic of rebirth and personal identity:

In a sense, the theory of reincarnation would be remarkably similar to the materialist theory of extinction after death in that the person as such would really be irreversibly destroyed. The consolation offered by reincarnation for the eternal loss of a person would be very bleak indeed, adding a new bizarre dimension to life rather than taking away the apparent absurdity of death. However, this particular concept is not the only rationally conceivable perspective on reincarnation.

Rebirth and Personal identity: Is Reincarnation an Intrinsically Impersonal Concept?

"Higher Self" is a religious concept invented by gullible New Agers.

Eh, I don't really agree.

In general, I see it as referring to the Soul or Jung's Self, in the sense of it manifesting as an Other to the ego, which is dissociated from the Self.

I'll go ahead and say that I have no idea practically how this notion would work, and I wasn't persuaded by this piece that this is what happens; only that it was a reasonable possibility I hadn't thought of before, and one that caused a major relief in a bout of depression (a bit of a false spring on that score, as it turned out, but it was something.)

I'll go ahead and say that I have no idea practically how this notion would work, and I wasn't persuaded by this piece that this is what happens; only that it was a reasonable possibility I hadn't thought of before, and one that caused a major relief in a bout of depression (a bit of a false spring on that score, as it turned out, but it was something.)

Are you depressed by materialism's views on the afterlife?

Are you depressed by materialism's views on the afterlife?

Well, to make a long story short, family circumstances mean death and its possibilities have been on my mind for the past few weeks, and the subject in general has led to depression. The possibility of eternal oblivion is terrifying and depressing, yes, but my standard line on this subject is that my greatest fear is death, while my second-greatest fear is gaining immortality and finding out it sucks. To paraphrase something Montague Keene once said, I enjoy being here as me, I can't really envisage anything else that I would prefer, and since thanataphobia isn't a fear that can be safely faced by exposure therapy, I have no means to find out what comes next or confirm any given possibility. 

But if one accepts the inevitability of death (and discounts the possibility of the transhumanists and Aubrey de Greys of the world meeting their projected dates for enabling indefinite lifespans, which I admit I hold out hope for), this idea of a generic subjective continuity is, if not exactly pleasant, one of the more palatable possibilities to my line of thinking.

Well, to make a long story short, family circumstances mean death and its possibilities have been on my mind for the past few weeks, and the subject in general has led to depression. The possibility of eternal oblivion is terrifying and depressing, yes, but my standard line on this subject is that my greatest fear is death, while my second-greatest fear is gaining immortality and finding out it sucks. To paraphrase something Montague Keene once said, I enjoy being here as me, I can't really envisage anything else that I would prefer, and since thanataphobia isn't a fear that can be safely faced by exposure therapy, I have no means to find out what comes next or confirm any given possibility. 

But if one accepts the inevitability of death (and discounts the possibility of the transhumanists and Aubrey de Greys of the world meeting their projected dates for enabling indefinite lifespans, which I admit I hold out hope for), this idea of a generic subjective continuity is, if not exactly pleasant, one of the more palatable possibilities to my line of thinking.

Oh boy, Will, I can relate to so much of that. I have had that fear of death since childhood when I would lay in bed and terrify myself trying to imagine the moment of death and the onset of oblivion. Then I would terrify myself further by trying to imagine living forever and the thought of eternity really is terrifying. I was depressed as a child which was, unfortunately, a foretaste of much of the rest of my life.

Having said all that, those very fears took me on this journey of discovery in which I have learned about the things we discuss here. Many would say that this is proof of wishful thinking but, as you will no doubt confirm, the last thing I want would be to sit back in the false comfort of wish-fulfilment. I want solid, undeniable evidence - the more solid the evidence, the better I feel but I am under no illusions that I have found certainty. There is always doubt. That's why I read and respond to posts here.

What I can say about those fears is that they are somewhat irrational because they still keep me awake, as they did in childhood, even after all the research I have read, after personal experiences and after finding perfectly rational philosophical arguments to support the notions of mind and spirit as being more than the materialists would have us believe. So I look upon those fears as just another aspect of my depressive illness and I have developed defences and strategies to cope with depression without resorting to medication (other than in the most intense episodes). 

Finally, I don't yearn for science to provide some form of life-extension. The part of me that believes in both an afterlife and a cycle of incarnations is somewhat excited to see what comes next.  So my goal is acceptance but whether I'll overcome the fears in order to attain that acceptance is the big question.

Having said all that, those very fears took me on this journey of discovery in which I have learned about the things we discuss here. Many would say that this is proof of wishful thinking but, as you will no doubt confirm, the last thing I want would be to sit back in the false comfort of wish-fulfilment. I want solid, undeniable evidence - the more solid the evidence, the better I feel but I am under no illusions that I have found certainty. There is always doubt. That's why I read and respond to posts here.

Bingo. Couple that in my case with a personality type that picks away at every last detail of troubling prospects until I grow mentally exhausted and have no choice but to move on with life. I haven't had any personal experiences, however.