Analytical argument against physicalism

We agree on what you're saying about the will and the way most people would use that word.

However, I don't agree with what you're saying about the brain rewiring itself. In fact, this is one of the main tenets of physicalism, and we can't just assume that it is false, because it clashes with our intuition. Physicalists sincerely believe that anything cognitive is purely determined by neurological computation. They consider the effect of meditation etc. simply as the effect of some higher order of consciousness, which would still remain fully embodied and brain based (and therefore unaffected by consciousness). A classic in this area is mentioned in Exit Epiphenomenalism, namely Consciousness and the Computational Mind by Ray Jackendoff. Jackendoff accepts the reality and efficacy of any kind of higher order of cognition, but consciousness would never participate in cognition. It would be a non-efficacious, passive receiver of the results of non-conscious computation.

Could you explain this? It seems to me that you mean "the effect of some higher order of unconscious neural processing".

In fact, this is not the intuitive argument, but rather an empirical argument akin to that of the existence of psi. The evidence for the impact of meditation upon the brain would even be a case of intrasomatic psychokinesis. However, extrasomatic psychokinesis is even more important because it can't be explained away as something ultimately brain based. 

The epiphenomenalist would simply state that the impact of meditation on the brain equals the impact of specific non-conscious computational processes in the brain. The influence of non-conscious aspects of cognition, including beliefs, cognitive "introspection" (in the sense of monitoring one's own cognition, rather than of one's subjective consciousness), is in principle fully compatible with epiphenomenalism. Cognition would be able to rewire the brain, consciousness would not. 

This can't refute the argument of extrasomatic psychokinesis though, because the brain can't possibly possess such powers outside itself. Therefore it must be related to the non-physical mind or consciousness rather than to the brain.

I agree, this is actually an extension of the empirical argument.

To slightly expand on my earlier remarks, the meditation example would require that the brain processing change itself in just the right ways so as to generate epiphenomenal conscious acts of will that are directly correlated to the subsequent physical brain changes observed, like in the case of the continuance of meditation in the face of boredom, fatigue, etc.. Why should it do this, why would it bother when the conscious will itself is just an epiphenomenon with no causal efficacy in the world? Why generate epiphenomenal consciousness in the first place, since the added necessary brain neural complexity and processing would have an energy and other costs with no physical advantage in survival, etc.?

[Laird]

Titus, would you agree that, strictly speaking, reductionism and epiphenomenalism are distinct philosophies of mind, and, if so, would you be interested in discussing the nature of, and arguments against, reductionism as a theory of mind in a new thread dedicated to the topic (potentially starting the thread with a link to anything existing that you've written on the topic)? If you disagree, then why/how do you see them as equivalent?

We agree on what you're saying about the will and the way most people would use that word.

However, I don't agree with what you're saying about the brain rewiring itself. In fact, this is one of the main tenets of physicalism, and we can't just assume that it is false, because it clashes with our intuition. Physicalists sincerely believe that anything cognitive is purely determined by neurological computation. They consider the effect of meditation etc. simply as the effect of some higher order of consciousness, which would still remain fully embodied and brain based (and therefore unaffected by consciousness). A classic in this area is mentioned in Exit Epiphenomenalism, namely Consciousness and the Computational Mind by Ray Jackendoff. Jackendoff accepts the reality and efficacy of any kind of higher order of cognition, but consciousness would never participate in cognition. It would be a non-efficacious, passive receiver of the results of non-conscious computation.

My response to Laird on this issue in #21 seems also to be relevant to Jackendoff's epiphenomenalist belief system about consciousness.  In the meditation and neural plasticity in stroke recovery examples and many others the brain neural processing would have to change itself in just the right ways so as to generate epiphenomenal totally ineffectual conscious acts of will that are directly correlated to the subsequent physical brain changes observed. That this would repeatedly happen just by chance seems exceedingly unlikely, and it couldn't have arisen through some form of Darwinistic random mutation plus natural selection mechanism because epiphenomenal consciousness can have no effect on fitness.  

Why should it do this, why would it bother when the conscious will itself is just an epiphenomenon with no causal efficacy in the world? Why generate epiphenomenal consciousness in the first place, especially since the added necessary brain neural complexity and processing would have energy and other costs with no physical advantage for survival, etc.? 

I know this is just an extension of the empirical evidence argument (like the PSI argument), but it isn't based on evidence that the academic epiphenomenalist (being a good materialist) would automatically reject. I personally find it fairly compelling, but then maybe that is because I am not a philosopher.

Could you explain this? It seems to me that you mean "the effect of some higher order of unconscious neural processing".

Right! Sorry, this was just a typo on my part. It should have been "higher order of cognition", rather than "higher order of consciousness".

I've corrected it now.

I agree, this is actually an extension of the empirical argument.

To slightly expand on my earlier remarks, the meditation example would require that the brain processing change itself in just the right ways so as to generate epiphenomenal conscious acts of will that are directly correlated to the subsequent physical brain changes observed, like in the case of the continuance of meditation in the face of boredom, fatigue, etc.. Why should it do this, why would it bother when the conscious will itself is just an epiphenomenon with no causal efficacy in the world? Why generate epiphenomenal consciousness in the first place, since the added necessary brain neural complexity and processing would have an energy and other costs with no physical advantage in survival, etc.?

You seem to assume that it takes something of an extra effort for the brain to produce conscious epiphenomena, but according to epiphenomenalism, conscious epiphenomena are the inevitable by-product of certain types of cerebral computational processes. So there is no goal whatsoever the brain wants to accomplish with generating consciousness. Certain cognitive processes simply can't help generating conscious epiphenomena. It's just a brute fact of nature. 


It is a weird theory, but physicalists will do anything to protect their world view. 

Titus, would you agree that, strictly speaking, reductionism and epiphenomenalism are distinct philosophies of mind, and, if so, would you be interested in discussing the nature of, and arguments against, reductionism as a theory of mind in a new thread dedicated to the topic (potentially starting the thread with a link to anything existing that you've written on the topic)? If you disagree, then why/how do you see them as equivalent?

Well, reductionism is one of the basic types of materialism, whereas epiphenomenalism is a physicalist type of (property) dualism.

Reductionism denies that there are real (rather than just apparent) qualia. You might say that reductionists (or reductive materialists) reduce the whole mind to brain processing, except for consciousness, which they consider non-existent.

Epiphenomenalism does recognize the existence of consciousness, so that is a very big difference. 

I think the refutation of reductionism is very straightforward and does not need to be discussed in a separate thread. How on earth would anyone want to deny the existence of his or her own subjective experiences? And if there is no consciousness, how is it that we have the "illusion" that we have subjective experiences, when that illusion can't be a subjective experience itself? 

Reductionism, for me, is the philosophical equivalent of insanity (just like eliminative materialism, which even claims we don't need "outdated" concepts like thoughts or feelings).

My response to Laird on this issue in #21 seems also to be relevant to Jackendoff's epiphenomenalist belief system about consciousness.  In the meditation and neural plasticity in stroke recovery examples and many others the brain neural processing would have to change itself in just the right ways so as to generate epiphenomenal totally ineffectual conscious acts of will that are directly correlated to the subsequent physical brain changes observed. That this would repeatedly happen just by chance seems exceedingly unlikely, and it couldn't have arisen through some form of Darwinistic random mutation plus natural selection mechanism because epiphenomenal consciousness can have no effect on fitness.  

Why should it do this, why would it bother when the conscious will itself is just an epiphenomenon with no causal efficacy in the world? Why generate epiphenomenal consciousness in the first place, especially since the added necessary brain neural complexity and processing would have energy and other costs with no physical advantage for survival, etc.? 

I know this is just an extension of the empirical evidence argument (like the PSI argument), but it isn't based on evidence that the academic epiphenomenalist (being a good materialist) would automatically reject. I personally find it fairly compelling, but then maybe that is because I am not a philosopher.

My answer is basically the same again. According to epiphenomenalism, consciousness did not arise because of any supposed survival value, but as an inevitable, natural by-product of certain types of computational processing in the brain. From a biological point of view, epiphenomenalists consider consciousness an utterly useless, brute fact of nature. Computational processes of a particular level of complexity simply generate subjective experiences and that is all there is to it... 

This is also why strong AI-proponents may believe that if they know the supposed magic code that inevitably generates consciousness in the brain, they might simulate it in a computer and thereby give that computer qualia. It's in the code and it can't be otherwise, in the epiphenomenalist's world.

My answer is basically the same again. According to epiphenomenalism, consciousness did not arise because of any supposed survival value, but as an inevitable, natural by-product of certain types of computational processing in the brain. From a biological point of view, epiphenomenalists consider consciousness an utterly useless, brute fact of nature. Computational processes of a particular level of complexity simply generate subjective experiences and that is all there is to it... 

This is also why strong AI-proponents may believe that if they know the magic code that inevitably generates consciousness in the brain, they might similate it in a computer and thereby give  that computer qualia. It's in the code and it can't be otherwise.

It looks as if the epiphenomenalists are not invoking some sort of mechanism, but some sort of magic. Nature just happens to magically generate an entire additional continuum of existence for absolutely nothing, since no new complexity is added to the neural processing necessary for "cogitation". I would think that they would have the prevailing attitude of the intelligentsia that magical thinking is irrational and unscientific.