AI megathread

Can a computer, without human aid, even glean what the Halting Problem is?

Your argument that humans transcend Turing machines because humans can "think" is circular. The structure is: humans transcend computation because thinking transcends computation because humans think. it’s not an argument it’s a restatement of the conclusion dressed as a premise.

To actually establish that human cognition lies outside Turing-equivalence, you need to identify a specific mechanism by which it does so. Roger Penrose tried to do this and failed to convince anyone.

Your argument that humans transcend Turing machines because humans can "think" is circular. The structure is: humans transcend computation because thinking transcends computation because humans think. it’s not an argument it’s a restatement of the conclusion dressed as a premise.

Hang on ~ you can't just assume that humans are akin to Turing machines. You first need to demonstrate that consciousness, thinking, and such, is "computational" to begin with. It is not a default worldview. The very concepts of "computation" and "Turing machines" are something only exist abstractly in consciousness, and are not something physical or tangible outside of it.

To actually establish that human cognition lies outside Turing-equivalence, you need to identify a specific mechanism by which it does so. Roger Penrose tried to do this and failed to convince anyone.

Human cognition being "Turing-equivalent" is what needs establishing here. There is no known "mechanism" either ~ nor should a mechanism be assumed.

Penrose was not assuming Physicalism, either ~ he's a Panpsychist, as far as I am aware. So his idea of a mechanism is different to yours.

Your argument that humans transcend Turing machines because humans can "think" is circular. The structure is: humans transcend computation because thinking transcends computation because humans think. it’s not an argument it’s a restatement of the conclusion dressed as a premise.

To actually establish that human cognition lies outside Turing-equivalence, you need to identify a specific mechanism by which it does so. Roger Penrose tried to do this and failed to convince anyone.

To my knowledge I simply asked a question to which I didn't get an answer ->

Can a computer, without human [aid], even glean what the Halting Problem is?

And Penrose convinced Hammeroff at the very least, not to mention Lucas had similar thoughts which is why it's called the Penrose-Lucas argument.

I also think it's a bit odd to insist that Penrose didn't convince "anyone". 

It's on the claimant to prove that human thinking is merely a form of computation.

Edit: Ah it seems you might be referring to:

I think it is very easy to see humans aren't Turing Machines, since a Turing Machine is an abstraction we've no reason to believe has thoughts unless we grant thoughts to its components.

A "computer" is something we project onto matter, just as an abacus has no knowledge of numbers.

Whether a mind is Turing-Equivalent, in the sense that Penrose argued against, I would accept is something possibly different. But it is on those making such a claim to prove it, not the other way around.

Penrose was not assuming Physicalism, either ~ he's a Panpsychist, as far as I am aware. So his idea of a mechanism is different to yours.

I think we can safely say he's a Platonist of sorts, but beyond that it's unclear if he has a fixed position. He's talked about "decisions" in the sense of quantum superposition IIRC, though he wasn't sure if "conscious decision" applied.

He seems open to Panpsychism, perhaps even more open to discuss such things after winning the Nobel Prize in physics and the varied evidence that suggests at least parts of Orch-OR could be correct.

I think we can safely say he's a Platonist of sorts, but beyond that it's unclear if he has a fixed position. He's talked about "decisions" in the sense of quantum superposition IIRC, though he wasn't sure if "conscious decision" applied.

Does he consider that consciousness can influence quantum superpositions as one possible "mechanism" for a collapse? Actually, I'm not sure... but in a debate with Faggin and Kastrup, I think he said that he thought that the superposition wasn't real? I don't know if that means that he believes in the many-worlds claim, but I don't think so. I'm not sure what he believes ~ or if he has a position he's settled on, as you said.

He seems open to Panpsychism, perhaps even more open to discuss such things after winning the Nobel Prize in physics and the varied evidence that suggests at least parts of Orch-OR could be correct.

I agree that it may in part be correct, insofar as it may be a sort of... "mechanism" by which consciousness manipulates the brain to do things. I don't think that microtubules are the "source", but may present a "control knob" or something.

I am reminded of how very little we know about neurons, but that hasn't stopped the LLM marketeers from taking the term and creating a whole swath of new definitions of words to try and gaslight and manipulate for the sake of selling it to unwary and gullible investors.

Neurons are important... they're found not only in the brain, but the heart, the stomach, the lungs (maybe, not sure on this one?). But what they actually do, what their role is, how they relate to consciousness ~ we're stumbling in the dark with no information or context.

My frustration is that science has access to so little information about reality beyond this shallow physical surface, as it were, and yet many feel all too comfortable making wide-reaching claims that seem to have no merit to them. My insights from psychedelics seem to imply that we know almost nothing at all. There are other realities so close to home... and we can't detect them. The cumulative intersubjective knowledge presented from NDEs and OBEs and astral projection most strongly suggest and better support this too than my own subjective anecdotes ~ so many independent verifications of realities beyond this one that we simply can't detect with anything but our own minds in very particular states, including shared death experiences.

Also, ghosts, I suppose. And other strange paranormal phenomena that isn't detectable perhaps beyond minor disturbances in electrical equipment and sensors that cannot be made heads or tails of.

Sigh, I am rambling... midnight... but I guess my point is that we know so little that we should not be conferring consciousness or intelligence onto machines that clearly don't possess the oddly unique characteristics biology has ~ being, well, an animating force of soul, I suppose, which is the true intelligence behind biology's organization.

Does he consider that consciousness can influence quantum superpositions as one possible "mechanism" for a collapse? Actually, I'm not sure... but in a debate with Faggin and Kastrup, I think he said that he thought that the superposition wasn't real? I don't know if that means that he believes in the many-worlds claim, but I don't think so. I'm not sure what he believes ~ or if he has a position he's settled on, as you said.

There have been interviews and writings across the years where he's suggested different things but the Platonism in some form or another feels the most consistent.

I agree that it may in part be correct, insofar as it may be a sort of... "mechanism" by which consciousness manipulates the brain to do things. I don't think that microtubules are the "source", but may present a "control knob" or something.

Yeah I think the structure of the brain is of great importance, even while not being sure what metaphysics we should consider the "right one". 

I've actually said a few times on here that I do think humans will make some kind of synthetic life ("androids") it just won't have the structure of a Turing Machine.

I am reminded of how very little we know about neurons, but that hasn't stopped the LLM marketeers from taking the term and creating a whole swath of new definitions of words to try and gaslight and manipulate for the sake of selling it to unwary and gullible investors.

Yeah even admissions of guilt seem to turn into marketing opportunities -> "Hallucinations".

My frustration is that science has access to so little information about reality beyond this shallow physical surface, as it were, and yet many feel all too comfortable making wide-reaching claims that seem to have no merit to them. My insights from psychedelics seem to imply that we know almost nothing at all. There are other realities so close to home... and we can't detect them. The cumulative intersubjective knowledge presented from NDEs and OBEs and astral projection most strongly suggest and better support this too than my own subjective anecdotes ~ so many independent verifications of realities beyond this one that we simply can't detect with anything but our own minds in very particular states, including shared death experiences.

Also, ghosts, I suppose. And other strange paranormal phenomena that isn't detectable perhaps beyond minor disturbances in electrical equipment and sensors that cannot be made heads or tails of.

The challenge will be that paranormal evidence is either based on meta-analysis from the lab or collections of witness accounts. Personally I am convinced of Survival but I can understand why those who've never had any "weird" experiences might doubt.

I do agree that reality is deeper than what you call the "shallow physical surface".

Sigh, I am rambling... midnight... but I guess my point is that we know so little that we should not be conferring consciousness or intelligence onto machines that clearly don't possess the oddly unique characteristics biology has ~ being, well, an animating force of soul, I suppose, which is the true intelligence behind biology's organization.

I do think Michael Levin has made some interesting arguments about the Platonic Space and how different structures could instantiate a conscious agent...and how this *might* include LLMs...but I am still unconvinced. Biological structures seem to be directly about instantiating a conscious or at least living being whereas AFAICTell the structure on which the LLM runs could just as easily be running some other programs...

And there are good reasons to reject the Computationalist views of Consciousness.

Leiden Declaration on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics

Excerpts:

1. Current automated techniques can produce plausible but unreliable (or even incorrect) arguments which are difficult to distinguish from correct mathematical proofs. This applies not only to informal arguments, but also to formalizations, where the difficulty lies in the translation between computer-encoded and human presentations of concepts. These fast-moving developments put our present system of review under increasing pressure, jeopardizing our ability to implement traditional standards for the correctness, transparency, and independent verifiability of proof.

4. Proper evaluation is endangered if results are communicated through informal channels such as press releases or blog posts, often without any research paper or other disclosure of information necessary for scientific evaluation. This practice seeks publicity for new results on market timelines before the accepted processes of community evaluation in mathematics can take place. In many cases this leads to simplifications in reporting, such as overemphasizing the significance of automated tools and undervaluing the prior human contributions which have made those tools possible. Such oversimplification risks influencing public opinion in a way that not only damages perceptions of mathematics, but also misleadingly uses specific mathematical tasks as metrics for the general reasoning capacities of commercial products.

5. These developments put the autonomy of mathematics under threat. The increasing involvement of technology companies in mathematical research raises the risk that research questions may come to be prioritized because of their amenability to automated mathematics, rather than expert judgment of their deeper significance. Indeed, broader understanding of the field may be permanently lost in the process of automation. With university budgets under pressure, this reshaping also changes professional incentives in a manner which encourages the collaboration of researchers with technology companies on asymmetric terms. If left unchecked, these trends go beyond threatening researchers’ autonomy, affecting the scope and depth of mathematical research itself.

[Laird]

Why do you think LLMs would challenge my metaphysical beliefs?

You seem, in a way, to have answered your own question:

There may be aspects of how an LLM works that parallel how human intelligence works, but there's no solution here to the Hard Problems of Subjectivity, Intentionality, Rationality. (My guess is humans don't have the kind of "jagged intelligence" LLMs have so the parallels will be minimal.)

Physicalism remains as much a dead end faith as ever.

Setting aside Subjectivity, which everyone here seems to agree is lacking in LLMs: if LLMs were to be at least modelling/simulating if not instantiating Intentionality and Rationality, then...

We've also been over related issues previously in this thread:

It’s impressive as a piece of programming, but I don’t know why I would think this was a sign that AI was conscious?

That wasn't where I was going; I was alluding more to the doubts this sort of performance raise about the arguments some of us wield against epiphenomenalism (such as the epiphenomenalism David Chalmers advocates as property dualism): that thinking and understanding are intimately tied up with phenomenal experience, and therefore that the phenomenal experience of thought and understanding cannot be a mere epiphenomenon. This level of performance by AI raises the possibility that something akin to thinking and understanding could occur entirely prior to consciousness, with the phenomenal experience associated with that thinking and understanding a mere epiphenomenal tack-on.

@sbu reraised that same issue more recently:

What she doesn’t address is that AI weakens a traditional objection to epiphenomenalism by making it more plausible that complex linguistic and cognitive behaviour can arise without any subjective experience.

Then there are some of the points made in an article I've had queued up to share for a while:

How AI is quietly changing what we think the human mind is

Jun 06, 2026
Shai Tubali
Big Think

In academia, Seth says, the brain has long been imagined as a kind of computer. Now that AI systems seem smart and can talk to us, this old metaphor may seem far more concrete, galvanizing the idea that perhaps “that’s nothing more than we are.” You can also see this idea in responses to claims that large language models are “stochastic parrots” — systems that can generate human-like language by calculating statistical probabilities but without truly grasping the meaning. Seth notes that some people cleverly turned the critique back on humans: “Well, maybe that’s all we are: just stochastic parrots.”

Language shows why this search has become urgent. It once seemed like humanity’s uncontested territory. Machines could defeat grandmasters at chess and Go, but those were never universal human benchmarks. Most people do not play championship chess. Nearly everyone learns to speak. That made language, as Seth puts it, “a very clear demarcation” between human beings, non-human animals, and technologies. Now, language models speak fluently. We do not know whether they possess the full subtlety of human language, but “they speak” — and that basic fact is destabilizing. Meanwhile, AI is helping decode the utterances of dolphins and other species, revealing animal communication much richer than many had imagined. The old border is being pressed from both sides: machines seem less mute, and animals seem less silent.

We may even need to reconsider the idea of what it means to understand things. Few people argue that current AI systems are conscious, but many say they understand. “Is it possible to understand something unconsciously?” Seth asks. “I think it is.”

Moving on:

None of us are going to give the personal information necessary to verify claims like this.

Which claims are you referring to? That's a genuine question - I really don't know what you mean. Perhaps that will make clear in turn what sort of personal information you're referring to and why it would be required - again, I really don't know what you're talking about here.

I think everyone agrees there are leaps in what these LLMs can do.

The contention is whether the difference is in degree, or has there been a difference in kind.

It seems to me the difference remains one of degree, especially since I am doubtful there's intelligence without consciousness.

It's in degree: this tech is advancing rapidly. It is far more capable than previously.

There was no need for a difference in kind, because it has been demonstrating human-like intelligence from the start.

It's odd to me that professors who you and I post are apparently not equal to customers, article writers who need clicks, AI companies own hype machines about their unreleased models

You do understand that there are also professors who take the opposite view, right? - professors like Geoffrey Hinton, who pioneered the techniques that led to this technology.

The extreme "anti-hype" position is simply the inverse of the extreme "hype" position; you have simply chosen that side and assumed a high ground without basis, particularly given that your actual engagement with this tech seems limited.

It is often said in the context of psi that you only need to see a single black swan to know that not all swans are white; similarly, you only need one experience with this tech in which it obviously demonstrates an at least simulation of high human-like intelligence to know that it has that capability.

I have seen many such black swans.

Have you seen any at all?

[Laird]

An addendum in response to this:

I am doubtful there's intelligence without consciousness.

I am too, which is why I voiced the suspicion that I voiced in at the end of a recent previous post.

You seem, in a way, to have answered your own question:


Setting aside Subjectivity, which everyone here seems to agree is lacking in LLMs: if LLMs were to be at least modelling/simulating if not instantiating Intentionality and Rationality, then...

We've also been over related issues previously in this thread:


@sbu reraised that same issue more recently:


Then there are some of the points made in an article I've had queued up to share for a while:

How AI is quietly changing what we think the human mind is

Jun 06, 2026
Shai Tubali
Big Think



Moving on:


Which claims are you referring to? That's a genuine question - I really don't know what you mean. Perhaps that will make clear in turn what sort of personal information you're referring to and why it would be required - again, I really don't know what you're talking about here.


It's in degree: this tech is advancing rapidly. It is far more capable than previously.

There was no need for a difference in kind, because it has been demonstrating human-like intelligence from the start.


You do understand that there are also professors who take the opposite view, right? - professors like Geoffrey Hinton, who pioneered the techniques that led to this technology.

The extreme "anti-hype" position is simply the inverse of the extreme "hype" position; you have simply chosen that side and assumed a high ground without basis, particularly given that your actual engagement with this tech seems limited.

It is often said in the context of psi that you only need to see a single black swan to know that not all swans are white; similarly, you only need one experience with this tech in which it obviously demonstrates an at least simulation of high human-like intelligence to know that it has that capability.

I have seen many such black swans.

Have you seen any at all?

The issue isn't that there's no one on the other side, it's that it doesn't seem to matter what we post.

To see, directly, a "black swan" with regards to Psi is to have a personal experience. Quite different than using a tool one finds impressive.

Epiphenomenalism is about decision making. LLMs don't make decisions.