A Simple Proof of Mind-Body Dualism

A Simple Proof of Mind-Body Dualism

Marcus Arvan

If qualitative properties of consciousness were similar in kind to other properties we have knowledge about (e.g., the property of positive electrical charge, the property of being a motorcycle, etc.) – if, that is, qualitative properties of consciousness were fundamentally relational properties – then even if there were special phenomenal concepts or a special kind of mental pointing to refer to those properties, we should nevertheless be capable of fully describing the very (relational) properties that those concepts or mental pointing are. That is, we should be able to fully describe what red looks like through a description of the nature of phenomenal concepts or mental pointing. But again, this is precisely what we can’t do. All the descriptions of phenomenal concept and acts of mental in the world will fail to describe what red or green look like.

Scientific descriptions of all other types of phenomena can be effectively translated into convincing ordinary language descriptions – at least at a high level of abstraction. Consider, for example, chemistry, molecular biology, and string theory in physics. String theory is, at bottom, a terribly complex class of mathematical propositions. Yet we have no problem translating the results of string theory into ordinary language descriptions. We say, “According to string theory, the world is fundamentally comprised of tiny, vibrating strings, etc.” These sorts of descriptions are entirely convincing. We do not have even the slightest feeling that there is something important that these sort of descriptions omit. Things are very different, however, with qualitative properties of conscious experience. The problem with the way the color green looks is not that it is complex but that it is simple. This is why it seems clear, in principle, that no fully complete description of green can be given. It is not the sort of thing that can be described in any way – not in ordinary language, or in the language of science.