A Cognitive Computation Fallacy? Cognition, Computations and Panpsychism

A Cognitive Computation Fallacy? Cognition, Computations and Panpsychism

John Mark Bishop

The journal of Cognitive Computation is defined in part by the notion that biologically inspired computational accounts are at the heart of cognitive processes in both natural and artificial systems. Many studies of various important aspects of cognition (memory, observational learning, decision making, reward prediction learning, attention control, etc.) have been made by modelling the various experimental results using ever-more sophisticated computer programs. In this manner progressive inroads have been made into gaining a better understanding of the many components of cognition. Concomitantly in both science and science fiction the hope is periodically re-ignited that a man-made system can be engineered to be fully cognitive and conscious purely in virtue of its execution of an appropriate computer program. However, whilst the usefulness of the computational metaphor in many areas of psychology and neuroscience is clear, it has not gone unchallenged and in this article I will review a group of philosophical arguments that suggest either such unequivocal optimism in computationalism is misplaced—computation is neither necessary nor sufficient for cognition—or panpsychism (the belief that the physical universe is fundamentally composed of elements each of which is conscious) is true. I conclude by highlighting an alternative metaphor for cognitive processes based on communication and interaction.

A Cognitive Computation Fallacy? Cognition, Computations and Panpsychism

John Mark Bishop

From the paper:

"I conclude by answering the question What is cognition if not computation? by tentatively highlighting an alternative metaphor, defined by physically grounded processes of communication and interaction, which is less vulnerable to the three classical criticisms of computationalism described herein.
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I conclude these arguments offer serious a priori reasons to question the computational hegemony incognitive science. Conversely, an alternative metaphor grounded on communication has recently been suggested by Nasuto. In this preliminary study we claim that treating neurons as communicating—rather than computing—with each other more accurately captures their complex, and to us fundamental, capability of modifying their behaviour depending on context."

Nothing really paradigm-breaking here. The author remains a staunch scientistic materialist, just rejecting a simplistic computational model of consciousness, and substituting a (more sophisticated?) system/subsystem intra/intercommunication model. Still, the mind and consciousness are what neural nets, neurons and synapses, the brain, does. 

The author uses an elaborate argument to reject one particular nonphysical theory of consciousness, panpsychism, but ignores all the others as if they were too preposterous to even consider.

This thinking remains fundamentally flawed, in particular since there is very abundant empirical evidence from parapsychology that the mind and consciousness are ultimately independent of the physical brain, especially from veridical NDE  and reincarnation data.

From the paper:



Nothing really paradigm-breaking here. The author remains a staunch scientistic materialist, just rejecting a simplistic computational model of consciousness, and substituting a (more sophisticated?) system/subsystem intra/intercommunication model. Still, the mind and consciousness are what neural nets, neurons and synapses, the brain, does. 

The author uses an elaborate argument to reject one particular nonphysical theory of consciousness, panpsychism, but ignores all the others as if they were too preposterous to even consider.

This thinking remains fundamentally flawed, in particular since there is very abundant empirical evidence from parapsychology that the mind and consciousness are ultimately independent of the physical brain, especially from veridical NDE  and reincarnation data.

Roger Penrose came in for a lot of criticism years ago for insisting that consciousness is not computational and he too is a materialist, though I have to say, a very thoughtful and open-minded materialist. His colleague in presenting the alternative theories of consciousness, Stuart Hameroff, is not a materialist judging by this comment in one of his published articles:

These ideas are based on logic and evidence, but are admittedly speculative. However mainstream approaches from materialist science, brain mappers, AI/Singularity advocates (the ‘still-naked Emperor’) and militant atheists offer no evidence that consciousness emerges strictly from the brain-as-neuronal-computer. Based on synaptic connectivity they can’t simulate behavior of a simple worm. And the AI/Singularity view necessitates consciousness being an epiphenomenal illusion, with no real role to play. Accordingly, we are merely ‘helpless spectators’, as Thomas Huxley bleakly summarized.

"Accordingly, we are merely ‘helpless spectators’, as Thomas Huxley bleakly summarized."

Who/what is the spectator?

Those types of 'explanations' don't actually seek to explain, only to ignore.

From the paper:

Nothing really paradigm-breaking here. The author remains a staunch scientistic materialist, just rejecting a simplistic computational model of consciousness, and substituting a (more sophisticated?) system/subsystem intra/intercommunication model. Still, the mind and consciousness are what neural nets, neurons and synapses, the brain, does. 

The author uses an elaborate argument to reject one particular nonphysical theory of consciousness, panpsychism, but ignores all the others as if they were too preposterous to even consider.

This thinking remains fundamentally flawed, in particular since there is very abundant empirical evidence from parapsychology that the mind and consciousness are ultimately independent of the physical brain, especially from veridical NDE  and reincarnation data.

Regarding whether the paper is paradigm-breaking, I think it would depend on the vantage point one had. Computationalism is, or at least was, very popular in academic circles and still is in much of the tech world.

I think some people only move by gradation, rather than by leaps.

Nothing really paradigm-breaking here. The author remains a staunch scientistic materialist, just rejecting a simplistic computational model of consciousness, and substituting a (more sophisticated?) system/subsystem intra/intercommunication model. Still, the mind and consciousness are what neural nets, neurons and synapses, the brain, does. 

The author uses an elaborate argument to reject one particular nonphysical theory of consciousness, panpsychism, but ignores all the others as if they were too preposterous to even consider.

This thinking remains fundamentally flawed, in particular since there is very abundant empirical evidence from parapsychology that the mind and consciousness are ultimately independent of the physical brain, especially from veridical NDE  and reincarnation data.

I had to reread the article, carefully a second time.  I would be biased toward his outlook and see Bishop's position on CMT as correct.  That he is most likely a Physicalist - is in line with current cultural memes.  I would see the CTM, as presented by D. Dennett and in another direction; the Digital beliefs of Zuse and Fredkin as wrong.  Both of these views present outcomes for life that are deterministic and without the obvious character of living things.

In a recent updated paper, Bishop uses a quote by Luciano Floridi to reapply the DwP argument - to be against Digital Ontology.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication...l_Ontology

In my perspective, in the list of stances for an immaterial basis of reality, an informational view stands as the most data supported.  Both Kenneth Sayre and Luciano Floridi have published immaterial stances.  I see that as pretty courageous.

I had to reread the article, carefully a second time.  I would be biased toward his outlook and see Bishop's position on CMT as correct.  That he is most likely a Physicalist - is in line with current cultural memes.  I would see the CTM, as presented by D. Dennett and in another direction; the Digital beliefs of Zuse and Fredkin as wrong.  Both of these views present outcomes for life that are deterministic and without the obvious character of living things.

In a recent updated paper, Bishop uses a quote by Luciano Floridi to reapply the DwP argument - to be against Digital Ontology.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication...l_Ontology

In my perspective, in the list of stances for an immaterial basis of reality, an informational view stands as the most data supported.  Both Kenneth Sayre and Luciano Floridi have published immaterial stances.  I see that as pretty courageous.

The two bolded quotes seem to be somewhat contradictory. Bishop's position on consciousness does indeed seem to be basically materialistic and reductionistic, whereas your position seems to be that there is "an immaterial basis for reality" (in particular for consciousness), so how could you be biased toward his outlook? Could you explain?

The two bolded quotes seem to be somewhat contradictory. Bishop's position on consciousness does indeed seem to be basically materialistic and reductionistic, whereas your position seems to be that there is "an immaterial basis for reality" (in particular for consciousness), so how could you be biased toward his outlook? Could you explain?

Thanks for asking.  My view of the author is influenced by several factors.  That is not to say there are sharp distinctions between his viewpoints and mine.

1. He is an Information Science professional, doing active research.  I am a fan of Information Science.
   
2. His version of the evolution of the ideas around the subject of the CMT was clearly written and reflects how I understand it happened.
   
3. I reject Panpsychism, (while still taking A. N. Whitehead's ideas seriously.)
   
4. Bishop starts a paper with a "nod" to Floridi, whose ideas I think are cutting edge (ISR) Informational Structural Realism.
   

I think, as science practice becomes more prolific, the more natural the feelings from the reality of information will become.  Things really happen at a subconscious level and in stages.