What doe the Philosopher Fear?

What doe the Philosopher Fear?

Psychedral

...There is something of a horror series in contemporary philosophy of the mind: explanatory gaps are slain then resurrected, slain then resurrected… The combination problem’s had more sequels than Friday the 13th...

Attempting to ground our conscious perspectives in a single cosmic subject’s perspective runs into “epistemic” problems of explaining how a subject’s finite perspective, for example, the fear of dying, could be shared by the cosmic subject “in the know”—it seems a subject’s finite nature generates extra mental content that could not survive subsumption. Cosmopsychism must also explain how different, unique perspectives could be subsumed into a single perspective—if I can only see blue and you can only see red, how can a single subject only see red and only see blue? They may see red and blue, or perhaps purple, but the original perspectives are lost.

Philip Goff’s new approach—which he calls “hybrid cosmopsychism”—accepts the inevitability of explanatory gaps given the limits of our current understanding, he postulates yet-to-be-discovered fundamental physical laws of the universe ensuring that, in certain conditions, certain parts of the universe become conscious subjects. Subjects inherit “thinned-out” versions of phenomenal properties belonging to the universe-subject. This gives us a less detailed version of the universe’s mess of experience, from which we abstract experiences that make sense to us.

Must we live with Jason?

I do not think so...

The one thing that seems odd in all these examples is why first person PoVs have to come from some prior state.

That, and all the explanations for how they arise aren't very good, ranging from the impossible (Physicalism) to the implausible (Cosmopsychism).

[Laird]

The one thing that seems odd in all these examples is why first person PoVs have to come from some prior state.

I think I agree that this is odd, but it would be helpful (at least to me) if you were to elaborate a little as to what you mean.

That, and all the explanations for how they arise aren't very good, ranging from the impossible (Physicalism) to the implausible (Cosmopsychism).

Hence, dualism.

I think I agree that this is odd, but it would be helpful (at least to me) if you were to elaborate a little as to what you mean.


Hence, dualism.

Ah I think I mentioned this before but at least some Jains believe souls are Eternal, they've always been here [as part of Reality] reincarnating across the Ladder of Being.

Dualism isn't necessary, there can just be one substance from which Everything comes from including bodies and souls. OOBEs where a person makes physical contact with the world would suggest there's a continuity to substance...

...arguably mediums' "ectoplasm" is also another indicator...
...also spirits interacting with the world...
...also temperature drops accompanying some apparitions...
...also PK...

[Laird]

Ah I think I mentioned this before but at least some Jains believe souls are Eternal, they've always been here [as part of Reality] reincarnating across the Ladder of Being.

Oh, I misunderstood what you meant then.

Re an eternal past, we've discussed this already: I endorse arguments such as those of William Lane Craig against this possibility.

Dualism isn't necessary, there can just be one substance from which Everything comes from including bodies and souls. OOBEs where a person makes physical contact with the world would suggest there's a continuity to substance...

...arguably mediums' "ectoplasm" is also another indicator...
...also spirits interacting with the world...
...also temperature drops accompanying some apparitions...
...also PK...

OK, that makes some sense to me, but what interests me most in such a situation is the relationship between conscious experience and this substance: does this substance everywhere support conscious experience, or only in some cases/forms? If the latter (which I would suggest is the case), then that's dualism enough for me.

Oh, I misunderstood what you meant then.

What did you think I meant?

OK, that makes some sense to me, but what interests me most in such a situation is the relationship between conscious experience and this substance: does this substance everywhere support conscious experience, or only in some cases/forms? If the latter (which I would suggest is the case), then that's dualism enough for me.

I would say we have no idea right now of knowing if the substance is conscious throughout. I think there's the distinction in BK's Idealism that some objects are *in* consciousness but not conscious, and Whitehead suggest some aggregates are made up of conscious particles but the macro-object isn't conscious.

[Laird]

What did you think I meant?

You wrote that it seems "odd [...] why first person PoVs have to come from some prior state."

I interpreted this as meaning:

'Subjects of consciousness ("first person PoVs") precede consciousness; that is, a subject of consciousness is not "generated" by some state of (conscious) affairs, because the subject of consciousness is a prerequisite for such (conscious) states of affairs. Thus, it is odd that the article seems to suggest the opposite.'

I would say we have no idea right now of knowing if the substance is conscious throughout. I think there's the distinction in BK's Idealism that some objects are *in* consciousness but not conscious, and Whitehead suggest some aggregates are made up of conscious particles but the macro-object isn't conscious.

Yep. I happen to think that that's a weak point in BK's Analytic Idealism, amounting to "non-conscious consciousness". I don't think it's necessarily fatal, but it is conceptually problematic. I haven't studied Whitehead very much if at all (apart from snippets you've posted to PQ), so can't comment on his suggestion.

Ah I think I mentioned this before but at least some Jains believe souls are Eternal, they've always been here [as part of Reality] reincarnating across the Ladder of Being.

Dualism isn't necessary, there can just be one substance from which Everything comes from including bodies and souls. OOBEs where a person makes physical contact with the world would suggest there's a continuity to substance...

...arguably mediums' "ectoplasm" is also another indicator...
...also spirits interacting with the world...
...also temperature drops accompanying some apparitions...
...also PK...

But in the face of an elegant seeming Idealist concept, the good old principle of parsimony would seem to rear its ugly head, in that there would have to be an elaborate and complex set of rules and conditions specifying exactly why, when, where and with what there is to be the illusory appearance of duality. Seemingly making the Idealist view at least as complicated and equally likely or unlikely as interactive dualism, per Ockham's principle.  Having the whole human experience of duality an elaborate illusion is surely a great complication. Then this leaves the standard old objection to dualism (how can an immaterial substance interact with a material substance?). This is easily overcome by merely specifying a by fiat design feature of reality dictating a few exceptions that are necessary for humans to exist in the physical, primarily when spirit is intertwined with and interpenetrates the special matter of the brain.

But in the face of an elegant seeming Idealist concept, the good old principle of parsimony would seem to rear its ugly head, in that there would have to be an elaborate and complex set of rules and conditions specifying exactly why, when, where and with what there is to be the illusory appearance of duality. Seemingly making the Idealist view at least as complicated and equally likely or unlikely as interactive dualism, per Ockham's principle.  Having the whole human experience of duality an elaborate illusion is surely a great complication. Then this leaves the standard old objection to dualism (how can an immaterial substance interact with a material substance?). This is easily overcome by merely specifying a by fiat design feature of reality dictating a few exceptions that are necessary for humans to exist in the physical, primarily when spirit is intertwined with and interpenetrates the special matter of the brain.

For some entities to enforce a fiat would then require asking what they are made of, that they can arrange this set of specific relations where a drug can alter your mind and your mind can move your arm.

Whatever this "stuff" is that encompasses souls and matter, it doesn't have to be pure consciousness. It just has to be capable of making the "physical" while also allowing some beings with mental capacity.

You wrote that it seems "odd [...] why first person PoVs have to come from some prior state."

I interpreted this as meaning:

'Subjects of consciousness ("first person PoVs") precede consciousness; that is, a subject of consciousness is not "generated" by some state of (conscious) affairs, because the subject of consciousness is a prerequisite for such (conscious) states of affairs. Thus, it is odd that the article seems to suggest the opposite.'

I assume you mean 1st person PoVs logically, rather than temporally, precede consciousness? 

Yep. I happen to think that that's a weak point in BK's Analytic Idealism, amounting to "non-conscious consciousness". I don't think it's necessarily fatal, but it is conceptually problematic.

I don't think this is any different than saying thoughts are in consciousness but are not themselves conscious. To me it isn't problematic at all - which isn't to say there aren't other problems/critiques.