The Good Place

I don't know whether this will help anyone, but these are the definitions of materialism and physicalism in philosophy, from the Oxford English Dictionary online:

Materialism
1. Philosophy. The theory or belief that nothing exists except matter and its movements and modifications; (more narrowly) the theory or belief that mental phenomena are nothing more than, or are wholly caused by, the operation of material or physical agencies.
 
Physicalism
Philosophy.
1. The theory that all reality is explicable in terms of physical properties and laws.
2. In the philosophy of the Vienna Circle: the theory that all science must be ultimately expressible in the language of physics.

Physicalism
Philosophy.
1. The theory that all reality is explicable in terms of physical properties and laws.

In order to understand the meaning / significance / relevance of this definition, it is necessary to have a definition of reality. In particular I think we should beware of circularity in defining such dependent terms. If reality is defined in terms of physical properties and laws, it gets us precisely nowhere!

In order to understand the meaning / significance / relevance of this definition, it is necessary to have a definition of reality. In particular I think we should beware of circularity in defining such dependent terms. If reality is defined in terms of physical properties and laws, it gets us precisely nowhere!

That's true. But at least we can be clear - when circular definitions aren't used - that physicalism is a philosophical theory, not a fact.

This has turned into a very interesting discussion.

Methodological naturalism refers to events and experiences. As far as I can tell, anything that is "real" corresponds to an event and/or experience (examples of what people think of as exceptions to this would be welcome in case it's a failure of my imagination). Physics is the description of the fundamental 'stuff' producing those phenomena. So by definition, any scientific discoveries which contribute to an understanding of the fundamental nature of events and experiences are physical. There aren't any restrictions put on what "physical" looks like in these definitions. There are restrictions on what "immaterial" looks like, though. 

But I don't think recognizing or agreeing with this is the same as adhering to physicalism/materialism/realism. We have intuitions about what is physical or what is real. When the description of the fundamental 'stuff' producing these phenomena contradicts our intuitions about what is physical or real, do we drop those terms? The suggestion seems to be that only someone with a philosophical commitment to physicalism/materialism/realism would continue to use the terms for descriptions which are nothing like our intuitions. We are already reaching that point with what quantum mechanics is telling us about realism. Yet it still seems to be physics. 

The conflict seems to be about whether or not to go with our intuitions and start calling some of this stuff immaterial. I can think of things that would be too weird to call "material" (and if consciousness were fundamental, that would be one of them). But non-immaterialists seem to be like the proverbial frog in the pot of water - the temperature (weirdness) has been introduced gradually, so we haven't noticed that we're already in hot water. We may not be able to notice when it starts to boil. So we'd continue to call things that immaterialists would put under their umbrella, "physical", which would probably be annoying to them. 

Linda

I've removed the definitions not applicable. That fact that you don't like the reductionist materialist view is of no concern to me and irrelevant to determining what is real. "Your" choice is binary. Either the things "you" believe are real or illusory.

lol.  "Not applicable"?  Who determines that Steve, you?  Or some other High Priest?

Methodological naturalism refers to events and experiences. As far as I can tell, anything that is "real" corresponds to an event and/or experience (examples of what people think of as exceptions to this would be welcome in case it's a failure of my imagination). Physics is the description of the fundamental 'stuff' producing those phenomena. So by definition, any scientific discoveries which contribute to an understanding of the fundamental nature of events and experiences are physical. There aren't any restrictions put on what "physical" looks like in these definitions. There are restrictions on what "immaterial" looks like, though. 

I think this echoes or at least gets at what I was trying to say. I suppose it's fair to say there are restrictions on what "immaterial" can look like but again that assumes that someone would stubbornly adhere to being an "immaterialist" even if new discoveries were nominally called "physical" but were really what they had in mind, or something like it, all along. And again, I don't really have any issue with defining physical as such, as long as everyone understands that it doesn't mean the same thing as reductive materialism and the like. That's a broad definition of physical that goes beyond any traditional meaning thereof.

But I don't think recognizing or agreeing with this is the same as adhering to physicalism/materialism/realism. We have intuitions about what is physical or what is real. When the description of the fundamental 'stuff' producing these phenomena contradicts our intuitions about what is physical or real, do we drop those terms? The suggestion seems to be that only someone with a philosophical commitment to physicalism/materialism/realism would continue to use the terms for descriptions which are nothing like our intuitions. We are already reaching that point with what quantum mechanics is telling us about realism. Yet it still seems to be physics.

I'm on the same page that agreeing with what you said above is not equivalent to professing belief in physicalism or materialism. The other sort of trouble with defining things by "what we discover using physics" doesn't especially account for the fact that physics itself can, and may be very like to, change, at least in terms of how it approaches issues and what kinds of topics it covers in the future. I don't mean to suggest that calling such things physical is inherently bad - just that, if one is going to do so, they understand that what they are calling physical goes beyond the typical idea of such a thing. More specifically, that just calling it physical does not make a materialistic or physicalistic reductive model correct.

The conflict seems to be about whether or not to go with our intuitions and start calling some of this stuff immaterial. I can think of things that would be too weird to call "material" (and if consciousness were fundamental, that would be one of them). But non-immaterialists seem to be like the proverbial frog in the pot of water - the temperature (weirdness) has been introduced gradually, so we haven't noticed that we're already in hot water. We may not be able to notice when it starts to boil. So we'd continue to call things that immaterialists would put under their umbrella, "physical", which would probably be annoying to them.

This seems to be getting at the heart of what I said in my most recent post, unless I misunderstand you. At such a point, though, the words we use to describe things are just words. It's the actual content, of course, that matters. It might be annoying, but in the case you laid out here there very well could/would be overlap between what we're calling "physical" in such a scenario and what immaterialists actually believe. So, at that point it may just be a word choice thing without much substance. In any event, I think I agree with your general premise here, if I understood it correctly.

lol.  "Not applicable"?  Who determines that Steve, you?  Or some other High Priest?

By consensus.

By consensus.

Oh no it's not!

This has turned into a very interesting discussion.

Methodological naturalism refers to events and experiences. As far as I can tell, anything that is "real" corresponds to an event and/or experience (examples of what people think of as exceptions to this would be welcome in case it's a failure of my imagination). Physics is the description of the fundamental 'stuff' producing those phenomena. So by definition, any scientific discoveries which contribute to an understanding of the fundamental nature of events and experiences are physical. There aren't any restrictions put on what "physical" looks like in these definitions. There are restrictions on what "immaterial" looks like, though. 

But I don't think recognizing or agreeing with this is the same as adhering to physicalism/materialism/realism. We have intuitions about what is physical or what is real. When the description of the fundamental 'stuff' producing these phenomena contradicts our intuitions about what is physical or real, do we drop those terms? The suggestion seems to be that only someone with a philosophical commitment to physicalism/materialism/realism would continue to use the terms for descriptions which are nothing like our intuitions. We are already reaching that point with what quantum mechanics is telling us about realism. Yet it still seems to be physics.

The conflict seems to be about whether or not to go with our intuitions and start calling some of this stuff immaterial. I can think of things that would be too weird to call "material" (and if consciousness were fundamental, that would be one of them). But non-immaterialists seem to be like the proverbial frog in the pot of water - the temperature (weirdness) has been introduced gradually, so we haven't noticed that we're already in hot water. We may not be able to notice when it starts to boil. So we'd continue to call things that immaterialists would put under their umbrella, "physical", which would probably be annoying to them. 

Linda

Some notice the hot water. And because we do that allows us to consider and be flexible too include unknown unknowns.
To emphasize the point in bold. Everyone I'm sure everyone knows Quantum theory is known by only two descriptions, they are quantum mechanics or quantum physics. It's physics.

Oh no it's not!

Sarcasm?