Physicalism Redux

[Laird]

But it seems to me that W.Craig's argument is that no Law of Nature can get around the problem of an infinite regress into the past?

It seems so. He seems to argue that it is impossible for the laws of physics, especially of quantum physics, to spontaneously create space-time, because those "laws" are merely descriptive propositions of how space-time does behave, and thus cannot causally precede space-time.

That doesn't prove God but it does - if the argument is sound - strike a body blow to Physicalism?

I'm convinced by the arguments against an infinite past, with one possible "out": the infinite past could be in a sense "virtual" in that beyond a point, no conscious entity or entities were present during it, such that the "virtual" past only actualises if/when a conscious being (re)incarnates into it from a timeless realm or, more likely, a separate timeline. A conscious being could, then, actualise a past time as far back as s/he wanted to, without limit.

But yes, I think that even that would be quite a blow to physicalism, because it would not be anything "physical" that (re)incarnates into the past.

I'm not entirely sure about the argument against the idea that some sort of impersonal "law(s)" could cause a universe with a beginning. I'd have to think on it more.

Can physicalism explain phenomenal consciousness?

Emerson Green

For all the other examples of weak emergence, we have the same category of concepts on either side of the emergent divide: we go from objective description to objective description. But with consciousness, we go from objective description to subjective description. How many objective descriptions does it take to add up to a subjective description? How can we describe behavior in such a way that leads to experience, i.e., how do we go from third-personal description to first-personal description? At the very least, there’s an epistemic problem here.

But why should we think this objective/subjective gap is also an ontic gap? Well, it seems impossible in principle to give an intelligible account of how we go from one to the other.

If subjective reality emerged non-subjectivity, we should be able to give an intelligible account of how that happened. We can give a perfectly intelligible account of how we get from chemistry to biology, from non-tables to tables, from non-liquid molecules to liquidity. But how do we bridge the objective and subjective? How can we start with third-person, objective description and end up at first-person, subjective description? Physicalists need to do more than simply appeal to unrelated examples of successful reduction and cases of weak emergence without explaining why we should think the emergence of experience was also a case of weak emergence.

Look, I don’t need all the details. Just the broad strokes will do!

To quote David Chalmers, “[Reductive physicalists] will have to give us some idea of how the existence of consciousness might be entailed by physical facts. While it is not fair to expect all the details, one at least needs an account of how such an entailment might possibly go.” All I want is an intelligible explanation of how we get from non-experiential reality to experiential reality, just like we have an intelligible explanation of the examples commonly mentioned. In those cases, we have a smooth gradient of gradual change. How could this be true of the emergence of experience, given phenomenal precision?

Can physicalism explain phenomenal consciousness?

Emerson Green

My first reply in forever... but it's something. Turned into a bit of a rant... hopefully everyone's fine with that...

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I find there to be seemingly curious parallels between the Physicalist and Buddhist accounts of mind and consciousness. Both believe mind to be an illusion, a lie, a delusion.

For the Physicalist, mind is emergent from matter, and therefore, has no real existence. For the Buddhist, mind is emergent from the five aggregates, and therefore, has no real existence. In both cases, experiential mind is composed of the non-experiential. The Buddhist five aggregates just... happen, for no reason, and magically conjure up a mind somehow, which then just suffers... for no reason. The Physicalist emergent-from-matter mind also just... happens, after enough matter congregates into just the right special sauce combination, for no cognizable reason.

To the Physicalist, and to the Buddhist, I ask: "if mind is a mere illusion, composed of lesser substances, how can mind even be aware of this?" No illusion has ever demonstrated that it can become magically self-aware, and determine that it is an illusion. So why should mind be some special exception to this profoundly solid rule?

My first reply in forever... but it's something. Turned into a bit of a rant... hopefully everyone's fine with that...

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I find there to be seemingly curious parallels between the Physicalist and Buddhist accounts of mind and consciousness. Both believe mind to be an illusion, a lie, a delusion.

For the Physicalist, mind is emergent from matter, and therefore, has no real existence. For the Buddhist, mind is emergent from the five aggregates, and therefore, has no real existence. In both cases, experiential mind is composed of the non-experiential. 

Good to see you posting.

The problem is that a simple and functionality-based definition for mind is not framed by either viewpoint.

Functionally, the biological action of mind changes real-world-probabilities.  This is viewed as intentional behavior, with the aspect of shaping the information in the environment to line-up with needs.  These changes can be addressed as a reduction in entropy in terms of organizational outcomes. Organisms detect nutrients as affordances.  Ordered behavior is increased in the life of organism.  Hence, the reduction in entropy (or increase in negentropy) manifesting when the organism ingests useful molecules.

Mind - defined as directly acting on real-world information structures - reveals the basic purposeful activity that can be framed as data formed with formal units of measure. These measures contribute data on all organisms using communication tools to maintain homeostasis.  Data representing informational transformations.  Transformations accumulating in both physical and mental environments.  Mind acting according to the facts of biology, logic, information science, linguistics, thermodynamics and psychology.