Our Improbable Existence Is No Evidence for a Multiverse

The problem is in the general roll of the dice case you cannot estimate the number of rolls by observing a single roll.

Similarly, when you only have one universe you cannot use observed conditions as an argument for other unobserved universes.

Another way to look at this is let's say I turn the corner and see someone roll 10 dice that all come up 6. If I were to then exclaim there are actually people all over the city rolling 10 di[c]e in different street corners it would be an error of reason.

But the problem is, there is no certain limit to the possible number of rolls of the universe dice, and in an infinite number over infinite time inevitably the double six Universe with fine tuning will certainly happen, likely another level of infinity of times. Hence a multiverse spread out in time supposedly explains the existence of our fine tuned Universe. Except that this speculation is not falsifiable science.

But the problem is, there is no certain limit to the possible number of rolls of the universe dice, and in an infinite number over infinite time inevitably the double six Universe with fine tuning will certainly happen, likely another level of infinity of times. Hence a multiverse spread out in time supposedly explains the existence of our fine tuned Universe. Except that this speculation is not falsifiable science.

Sure, *if* there is other evidence for a multiverse then it could explain fine tuning.

The issue Goff is referring to is you can't see fine tuning and then say that is evidence of the multiverse. Especially since the alternative hypothesis - Design - is far more reasonable.

In fact it is because of Fine Tuning that Goff became a theist, albeit of the Cosmopanpsychist Limited God variety.

Essentially the Multiverse is the Materialist Faith's "get out of jail" card. Firstly with having to try and explain the collapse of the wave function, now with avoiding the implications of a Finely Tuned universe.

I think it's an excellently argued article. While there may or may not be other universes, the possibility of multiverses alone cannot explain the observed fundamental constants.

[Laird]

Our Improbable Existence Is No Evidence for a Multiverse

Phillip Goff

Belatedly, I just wanted to cross-reference with my critique of Phillip's argument in the "Fine tuning?" thread.

As in the article linked to in that thread, I think that here Phillip makes a false analogy to deny the saliency of the anthropic principle (which here he refers to as "the selection effect"):

Some have objected that this argument against the inference from fine-tuning to a multiverse ignores the selection effect that exist in cases of fine-tuning, namely that fact that we could not possibly have observed a universe that wasn’t fine-tuned. If the universe wasn’t fine-tuned, then life would be impossible, and so nobody would be around to observe anything. It is of course true that this selection effect exists, but it makes no difference to whether or not the fallacy is committed.

You wake up to find yourself in a room sat opposite the Joker (from Batman) and a monkey called Joey on a typewriter. The Joker tells you that while you were unconscious, he decided to play a little game. He gave Joey one hour to bash on the typewriter, committing to release you if Joey wrote some English or to kill you before you regained consciousness if he didn’t. Fortunately, Joey has typed “I love how yellow bananas are,” and hence you are to be released.

In the above story, you could not possibly have observed Joey typing anything other than English—the Joker would have killed you before you had a chance—just as we could never have observed a non-fine-tuned universe. And yet the inference to many monkeys is still unwarranted. Given how unlikely it is that an ordinary monkey would come up with “I love how yellow bananas are” just by randomly bashing away, you might suspect some kind of trick. What you would not conclude, however, is that there must be many other monkeys typing rubbish. Again, what you need explaining is why Joey is typing English, and the postulation of other monkeys doesn’t explain this. By analogy, what we need explaining is why the only universe we’ve ever observed is fine-tuned, and the postulation of other universes doesn’t account for this.

The main problem is that the awakening person (analogous to our finely-tuned universe) preexists, i.e., given that (s)he was unconscious for a period, implying that prior to that, (s)he was conscious, and thus already existed. This unfairly biases our intuition that something specific to this situation (Joey in particular) needs to achieve something implausibly improbable in relation to a specific person (the awakener), analogous to our specific universe.

A fairer analogy would be based on the bringing into existence of the person opposite the Joker. There would not be a single room with a Joker and monkey, but a veritable infinity of rooms, each with a Joker and a monkey. If, in any given room in this infinity, the monkey happened to type an English sentence, then a hitherto inanimate, inert human form opposite the Joker would be brought to life.

Another fair alternative, one that allows for the preexistence of the awakener, would stipulate that when (s)he loses consciousness, his/her soul separates from his/her body, and when the first monkey in any of the infinity of rooms types a sentence in English within the hour, his/her soul is transported into the body in that room and awakened in it - each of the bodies in each of the rooms would be a perfect duplicate of the actual body in which his/her soul lost consciousness.

This strips the analogy of its unfair specificity: no given room and no given monkey needs to do something implausibly improbable; it is sufficient for any of them to do this. Analogously, then, no specific universe (i.e., the one in which we find ourselves) needs its implausibly improbably fine-tuning accounted for; it is sufficient for any of the infinity of them to randomly hit on finely-tuned laws - and that's the one we happen to "wake up in next to (one of) the Joker(s) and (one of) Joey the monkey(s)".

All of that said, I do think that Phillip makes a fair point that the inference, "This scenario in front of us is highly improbable, therefore there must be an infinity of varied scenarios such that this highly improbable scenario we see was in fact inevitable (or at least not so improbable)", is a dubious one.