Neuroscience and free will

How it works can be known through introspection.

This is where the conversation breaks down unfortunately. The list of ways our sensory/subconscious/conscious systems can lead us down the wrong path is extensive, and well documented...

If there is no worry about [everything] being random or deterministic not sure what exactly would be the problem?

The problem is that scientific inspection has discovered that, so far, everything we find is indeterminate/random or deterministic, including the neurons which seem to be producing our consciousness (or at least are intimately connected in some way). If there is some novel finding, we'd all be very, very interested in hearing at least a general description of it. 

Then free will just is a property of conscious agents, maybe gifted by God or just something they possess b/c of some other reason. How it works can be known through introspection.

"How it works" is inaccessible to us through introspection. We only have access to that tiny bit of activity we call "consciousness", not to any of the heavy lifting which takes places non-consciously. All we can do is put labels on what something feels like, which of course, doesn't tell us about its nature.

And actually I said all human life is worthless since there is no real sense of human achievement or human morality. So far the only answers I've gotten seem to be saying we can just pretend we have those things. Not very satisfying - when do you tell a child they have no control over their actions, but are still responsible for them?

I'm not interested in your discomfort with the idea of random/determined governing human consciousness. Finding something palatable/unpalatable has nothing to do with whether or not it is valid.

I just said I don't think the kind of randomness you are talking about is a real thing, because it violates the PSR? Again, the issue of randomness was discussed in the thread, but as noted below there is more that could potentially be said on the subject without even getting into free will.

I was asking whether you had a coherent answer for the question. 

I'm a bit lost on why you - someone who lacks interest in philosophy/metaphysics - are speaking for Paul, who has actually been reading the thread & AFAIK based on our past conversations has some interest in philosophy/metaphysics? This back & forth between us seems like an odd use of everyone's time?

I'm not speaking for Paul. He has stated, in this thread, that up to this point, he has not received an answer to his question. I am interested in whether such an answer exists because of my second sentence in this post. I find it quite astonishing that, while you and others are willing to devote pages and pages of writing to talking around the answer and claiming that it exists, no one has simply given that answer.
 

As I said earlier in the thread, what I wrote is really just a sketch of ideas from Process Philosophy. I fully accept that as a sketch it leaves a lot of things to be filled in (greater defense of Efficient & Final Cause, the continued validity of the PSR, more on the invalidity of true randomness, etc) - why I said in the very beginning of the thread it's better to talk about causation first without getting into human free will. 70 pages in and it seems I was right?

I even made a new thread for that as I fear we'll all just be going in circles otherwise.

So I can give the same answer I gave Paul about why the fish was selected - Final Cause - but I suspect without some more discussion of causation it won't be satisfying to either of you in the way Laird and I feel the sketch successfully communicated the basic idea of process philosophy's version of free will.

Giving a proper name to the process does not, in any way, answer the question. And I asked you specifically what made the process you described "free", which you also have not given a direct answer to:

"So we have a singular decision/selection which is non-composite. What about that makes it "free"?"

"Given that we have our possibility selector (consciousness), and that it is not composite, what about the selection is "free", rather than something else, like "indeterminate"?"

Your only direct answer to this was to say it would appear "stochastic". "Stochastic" describes random processes.

Linda

The problem is that scientific inspection has discovered that, so far, everything we find is indeterminate/random or deterministic, including the neurons which seem to be producing our consciousness (or at least are intimately connected in some way). If there is some novel finding, we'd all be very, very interested in hearing at least a general description of it.


"How it works" is inaccessible to us through introspection. We only have access to that tiny bit of activity we call "consciousness", not to any of the heavy lifting which takes places non-consciously. All we can do is put labels on what something feels like, which of course, doesn't tell us about its nature.

I thought you just said it wasn't about everything being random/deterministic? I'd disagree about what has been found being in that dichotomy, a good part of the thread was spent discussing this.

And I already said I was discussing a "how" question in the sense of free will being possible metaphysically in some possible world, not in relation to any finding.

I'm not as convinced as you re: introspection, specifically not in the context of the "how" that was being discussed in this thread.

I'm not interested in your discomfort with the idea of random/determined governing human consciousness. Finding something palatable/unpalatable has nothing to do with whether or not it is valid.

Already said to Paul, in this thread, that I am not making a fallacious Argument from Consequences. I agree that Physicalism meaning human life is worthless doesn't mean free will is then real.

Was just curious if you could provide an answer as to how free-will skeptics plan to teach children they have no control over their actions but are still in some way responsible for them.

If there's no answer, so be it, but then it seems to me promotion of Physicalism is rather immoral.

I was asking whether you had a coherent answer for the question. 

Yeah, it was discussed in this thread...I just mentioned this in my last post. Final Causation. Exactly how this works in context to the rest of the causal world as a process was developed in the discussions in this thread.

And I said what I sketched out could be fleshed out more, made a new thread for this purpose if people want to talk about causation without immediately going to mental causation.

I'm not speaking for Paul. He has stated, in this thread, that up to this point, he has not received an answer to his question. I am interested in whether such an answer exists because of my second sentence in this post. I find it quite astonishing that, while you and others are willing to devote pages and pages of writing to talking around the answer and claiming that it exists, no one has simply given that answer.

 
Actually by my reading of this thread, an argument for free will was developed & summarized a few times over rather just being "claimed". In fact both causation and mental causation were fleshed out in the pages and pages that came before. As one who actually read the whole thread I don't see that as "talking around the answer".

That being said, I don't claim any answer given cannot be debated further.


I've even offered to go back through the metaphysics of causation in a new thread, I just don't think there's much point for me to reiterate in detail different parts of the long arguments that have already been gone over several times in this thread. There seems to be an obvious difference of opinion re: Causation itself.

Giving a proper name to the process does not, in any way, answer the question. And I asked you specifically what made the process you described "free", which you also have not given a direct answer to:

"So we have a singular decision/selection which is non-composite. What about that makes it "free"?"

"Given that we have our possibility selector (consciousness), and that it is not composite, what about the selection is "free", rather than something else, like "indeterminate"?"

Actually the "proper name" I gave is something that was gone into detail in the thread.

By indeterminate I assume you're asking "how do you know it's not random", and by "random" you mean something which has, inherently, no explicable cause and thus violates the PSR.

I don't think of this is as serious objection to the process philosophy account that was sketched out in the thread.  I don't think the objection:

"The decision you made might be free...but how do you know it's not because events can happen for no reason at all ?"

Holds any teeth because I don't believe that kind of inherent randomness can be justified. Happy to discuss randomness as a topic in the new thread when it comes up.

Your only direct answer to this was to say it would appear "stochastic". "Stochastic" describes random processes.

I was speaking in the context of this thread where an argument was made that stochastic means neither deterministic nor random, and in any case is an outside attribution - a projection of probabilistic expectation.

My short answer was "Final Cause", and is in my last post. The longer answer was gone over a few times in this thread but I agree more can be said regarding causality and people's different ideas about how causation works.

Thus I've also said, again, that I am happy to flesh out the sketch I gave in this thread by discussing causality in that new thread. I can see without resolving the issues related to the metaphysics of causation this thread will just keep going in circles.

This is where the conversation breaks down unfortunately. The list of ways our sensory/subconscious/conscious systems can lead us down the wrong path is extensive, and well documented...

Regarding the topic of free will, I've seen it framed as introspection about decisions feeling free are mistaken b/c everything is deterministic, random, or some combination of the two and nothing else.

All I was referring to.

My short answer was "Final Cause", and is in my last post. The longer answer was gone over a few times in this thread but I agree more can be said regarding causality and people's different ideas about how causation works.

So another way to ask the question is: Why/how did the Final Cause cause me to choose chicken instead of fish? And why could it have chosen fish under the same circumstances in a way that isn't just a coin flip? And by "same circumstances" I mean that very same time.

~~ Paul

I thought you just said it wasn't about everything being random/deterministic? I'd disagree about what has been found being in that dichotomy, a good part of the thread was spent discussing this.

Whether something is random, deterministic, or "something else" is an empirical question, not a matter of opinion.

Yeah, it was discussed in this thread...I just mentioned this in my last post. Final Causation. Exactly how this works in context to the rest of the causal world as a process was developed in the discussions in this thread.

I realize that, which is why I zeroed in on where you landed,

"A singular free discussion (decision?) is non-composite, just as the selection of outcomes in any causal event has to be at the base level."

and asked "so we have a singular decision/selection which is non-composite. What about that makes it "free"?"

I'm just looking for an answer to that question. And I see Paul has asked it again, as well. I don't need anything about causation or mental causation. We've already stipulated that this thing you are talking about is Final Cause. I also don't need anything about random or indeterminate (or stochastic). Because it is also not palatable to free will proponents, the details are irrelevant.

Linda

So another way to ask the question is: Why/how did the Final Cause cause me to choose chicken instead of fish? And why could it have chosen fish under the same circumstances in a way that isn't just a coin flip? And by "same circumstances" I mean that very same time.

~~ Paul

Yeah this is why I feel we are talking past each other. If there is some internal process to Final Cause / Inner Cause / Possibility Selection itself we get into what I talked about before -> the need for a process which itself has outcomes that need to be selected for...which is then an infinite regress...

Also why I think it's better to talk about causation itself without getting into free will - if you go back you'll see the last few pages of this thread, 70 pages in, bear an uncanny resemblance to the first few pages.

Yeah this is why I feel we are talking past each other. If there is some internal process to Final Cause / Inner Cause / Possibility Selection itself we get into what I talked about before -> the need for a process which itself has outcomes that need to be selected for...which is then an infinite regress...

I don't think we have to worry about an infinite regress. No one has any objection to some fundamental axioms or methods of free selection. What's unsatisfying is to say that the decision is all-of-a-piece and can't be broken down at all. Heck, even if it is all-of-a-piece, surely we can say something about how that unitary decision is made. What's missing from the discussion is any sense of "freeness."

Also why I think it's better to talk about causation itself without getting into free will - if you go back you'll see the last few pages of this thread, 70 pages in, bear an uncanny resemblance to the first few pages.

But I thought the whole point is that we have some sort of causation that is free. If we ignore free will, why do we need anything other than deterministic causation?

~~ Paul

I don't think we have to worry about an infinite regress. No one has any objection to some fundamental axioms or methods of free selection. What's unsatisfying is to say that the decision is all-of-a-piece and can't be broken down at all. Heck, even if it is all-of-a-piece, surely we can say something about how that unitary decision is made. What's missing from the discussion is any sense of "freeness."

How is a decision - as in a single event - something fundamental if it can be broken down? From what I've read the problem with looking at introspection ("my decisions feel influenced by varied factors but are ultimately free") was the question of how free will fits into the causal sequences in a metaphysical picture. So:

1) Is everything deterministic/random by some logical necessity?

As discussed in the thread, this isn't the case, those terms refer to external projects of probability.

2) One feels like they are incorporating the past/present from the inside, but how to explain this in terms of some causal picture that allows for the influence of the past/present (otherwise it's random) but also not necessitated by past/present (otherwise it's determined?

As discussed Past/Present determine the Possibility Space, not the choice itself. The choice is found in the effect of those Past/Present factors, which was the point of dividing an event into Efficient & Final Cause.

But I thought the whole point is that we have some sort of causation that is free. If we ignore free will, why do we need anything other than deterministic causation?

The point would be to discuss the pictures of causation people are thinking about. At some point mental causation would presumably come back into the discussion.

Even now there's still disagreement on what it means to designate things as deterministic/random.

Why I didn't want to get into the free will question without digging more into causation, I just posted a sketch of Process Philosophy to break another conversational dead end it seemed this thread was in...