Neuroscience and free will

Peirce is deceased, so he doesn't have anything specific to say at this time.  

https://www.researchgate.net/publication...ng_of_life

Some others with biosemiotics creds:
https://www.thethirdwayofevolution.com/p...-Alexander

https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books...32926.html

Do you see this as supportive of mental causation? I'm trying to think about this myself, why I ask...

As he died in 1914, I'm guessing he would have little to say about DNA.

That's what I figured.

However, this turn in the conversation has triggered some deja vu for me and I'm pretty sure, without looking, that we went over this same ground in that long debate on DNA code with LoneShaman on the Skeptiko forum. I seem to remember posting something about Biosemiotics in relation to the DNA code. Here's something from Howard Pattee that might (once again) be relevant.

"Biosemiotics recognizes that life is distinguished from inanimate matter by its dependence on material construction under the control of coded symbolic description. This distinction between matter and symbol extends from the origin of life throughout all of evolution to the distinction in philosophy between brain and mind and the distinction in physics between laws and measurements. These distinctions are an epistemic necessity that separates the knower from the known. The origin of life requires understanding the origin of symbolic control and how inanimate molecules becomes a message."

I'm not sure why this is any sort of absolute distinction. We can surely imagine life forms without any coded information structures.

"he problem arises acutely with the genetic code. A partial code does not work, and a simple code that works as it evolves is hard to imagine."

This is a but too just-so-y for me. What does he mean by a "partial" code? A simpler one? Certainly there could have been a simpler one. Does he mean one that does not code for all the usual proteins and controls?

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4967479/

There are lots of papers on the evolution of the genetic code.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication...nted_Model

~~ Paul

[Laird]

I'm not sure. Do we agree that the existence of the descriptive law does not oblige the universe to have event X always happen that way, yet it is possible that the event does, in fact, always happen that way?

Yes, but this says nothing meaningful. It could even be seen to be merely a repetition of that same tautology you've been making over the past few pages...

What do you mean by "the reason why it is not possible that the events 'had to' happen the way that they did"? Of course it's possible they had to happen that way. It's just that the descriptive law can't be the reason why they had to happen that way.

But you agreed with this proposition, which directly contradicts what you've just written, especially the emboldened in both:

If laws are descriptive (and not prescriptive) then it is not possible that the events described by those laws "had to" happen the way that they did.

Do you mean this?

Because the laws are descriptive and not prescriptive, the laws do not contribute to any possible physical reason why the events must have occurred the way they did.

The problem with that statement is that if the laws are descriptive and not prescriptive, then there can be no distinct "physical reason" that necessitates the events, so it is only vacuously true (by "distinct" I mean "distinct from the laws"). Why? Because if there is a "physical reason" for why events "must have" occurred, then that "physical reason" covering those events would consist in a law which prescribes that they happen that way, and thus the law pertaining to the events would not be descriptive, but prescriptive - which contradicts the first part of the statement.

So, it remains the case that if laws are descriptive, then the events described by them do not happen necessarily.

I made this point to you in my previous post, and asked you whether you agreed with it (by ending each sentence with "right?") but you avoided even acknowledging that part of my post, just as in general you often avoid acknowledging many of the points that I make. Thus, our exchange becomes repetitive, because you keep on putting forward the same points, and asking the same questions, even though I've addressed them already.

Could you reword the statement without using the word "necessarily"?

You continue to have supplied no good reason why I ought to, and since it follows from the contentions to which you've previously agreed, or which you've voluntarily offered, there is every reason not to.

So, I put it to you again:

The events described by laws do not happen necessarily.

Agreed?

Do you see this as supportive of mental causation? I'm trying to think about this myself, why I ask...

Oh yeah.  Semiosis is life and its mental functions actively dealing with important information.

We can surely imagine life forms without any coded information structures.

There are lots of papers on the evolution of the genetic code.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication...nted_Model

~~ Paul

I cannot imagine life without DNA/RNA/Ribosome systems!!!!!!!

I just posted a quote by Marcello Barbieri  - Post 410 of this thread,

it aims to prove (1) that the cell is a real semiotic system, (2) that the genetic code is a real code, (3) that evolution took place by natural selection and by natural conventions, and (4) that it was natural conventions, i.e., organic codes, that gave origin to the great novelties of macroevolution.

I always refer to DNA as a system with Ribosomes - due to reading the very paper you have just linked.  What in the world are you trying to communicate?  Have you read that paper which contradicts your comment about life without coded information structures?

????

[Laird]

Ah I need to read the Prof. Swartz stuff in more detail.

I think if you did you'd find that you agreed with a lot of it but also found it incomplete and missing stuff. At the beginning of his book The Concept of a Physical Law he explicitly notes that he surprised even himself by finding he could write a book about physical laws without covering causality itself at all.

Admittedly I also think a lot of what we're saying is "immaterialist" only insofar as "materialist" refers to a particular reductionist paradigm.

The material[ism] of varied older civilizations/cultures would accommodate much of what we've said regarding causation.

I'll take your word for that as I'm not well read on older philosophy. What I do know comes mostly from the excellent podcast History of Philosophy without any gaps, which a Skeptiko member put me on to.

I wonder if we need a public google page for references...even for myself I need to keep doubling back...

Great idea! But how about a wiki page instead?

This paper might be of interest...I am working my way through it but it does give a proposal for something "agent-like" that isn't an agent...

Let's see. "Probabilistic interventions are events that need not involve agency but nonetheless mimic certain crucial features of deliberation". Interesting. I'm curious to know more...

It does seem to come down to explaining things from the right perspective, but I do think too much writing about free will accepts the causal picture assumed by modernity. [So] I think the difference is placing the agent in a world where the rest of causation works very similarly to the conscious decision maker. Why I wanted to start with something simple originally, like a brick going through a window - the ideal is to have the seemingly miraculous folded into a picture of the world entire - sort of like Kripal saying the Supernatural is instead Super Natural.

I'd be happy to work through the brick-window scenario with you if you can remind me of where you made a start.

This actually is very much Whitehead's philosophy, this continual growth via self-actualization of the individuals but also all of the Real.

Would you describe it as an "evolutionary" sort of thing?

It's also what I think can realistically be accomplished on a forum - synthesizing writers who may have prior commitments to positions like theism/atheism of a certain kind.

Agreed, and those who've done the reading work are best placed to facilitate this accomplishment.

The problem with that statement is that if the laws are descriptive and not prescriptive, then there can be no distinct "physical reason" that necessitates the events, so it is only vacuously true (by "distinct" I mean "distinct from the laws"). Why? Because if there is a "physical reason" for why events "must have" occurred, then that "physical reason" covering those events would consist in a law which prescribes that they happen that way, and thus the law pertaining to the events would not be descriptive, but prescriptive - which contradicts the first part of the statement.

But events don't "consist in a law." The point of descriptive laws is to admit that all we are doing is observing events and trying to explain them. We are not claiming that laws are prescriptive, that they are part of nature and direct how it operates, that they have causal effect on nature. If the laws are only descriptive, then they cannot prescribe that events do not happen in particular ways for physical reasons.

Now, if laws being descriptive actually has the power to dictate that no events are necessitated, then I have severely misunderstood the meaning of descriptive and prescriptive laws. For that I apologize. But then I do not agree that we should assume that no physical events are necessitated, only that we may not know which ones are and which ones are not and why that is so.

I made this point to you in my previous post, and asked you whether you agreed with it (by ending each sentence with "right?") but you avoided even acknowledging that part of my post, just as in general you often avoid acknowledging many of the points that I make. Thus, our exchange becomes repetitive, because you keep on putting forward the same points, and asking the same questions, even though I've addressed them already.

You don't think that I have been trying hard to understand your point and decide whether I agree with it? Interesting.

So here is your statement again.

If laws are descriptive (and not prescriptive) then it is not possible that the events described by those laws "had to" happen the way that they did.

If I now understand the power of saying that laws are descriptive, then I agree with the definition. I do not agree that we can possibly know whether this is the way nature works.

~~ Paul

[Laird]

But events don't "consist in a law."

I'm not sure why you make this point because I haven't contended that they do.

What, in a nutshell, I have contended is this: that which you refer to as a "physical reason" is synonymous with that which we have otherwise been referring to as a "law". So, if "physical reasons" necessitate events, then that means that "laws" necessitate events, and thus that laws are not descriptive, but are instead prescriptive.

So, if you want to allow that events are necessitated, then you have to drop the claim that laws are descriptive. But at the same time you have to explain what it is (about the prescriptive laws) that necessitates the events. Typically, this is done by invoking God as the prescribing agent. But, as an atheist, that option is not open to you.

If the laws are only descriptive, then they cannot prescribe that events do not happen in particular ways for physical reasons.

In virtue of the above (the synonymity of "law" and "physical reason"), this is a badly confused statement. It amounts to (substituting synonyms):

"If the laws are only descriptive, then they cannot prescribe that events do not happen in particular ways due to laws".

Which amounts to:

"If the laws are only descriptive, then they cannot prescribe that laws are not prescriptive".

Which amounts to:

"If laws are not prescriptive, then they cannot prescribe that laws are not prescriptive".

Which is... pretty meaningless, really. Sure, by definition, non-prescriptive laws can't prescribe anything, but that which you conditionally assert they could not prescribe just happens to be the case (by virtue of the antecedent of the conditional) anyway.

You are clearly very confused about all of this and I'm not quite sure how best to resolve your confusion. My best suggestion is for you to (re)read Prof. Swartz's Lecture Notes on Free Will and Determinism. Please let me know if/when you do that and whether or not it helped.

Now, if laws being descriptive actually has the power to dictate that no events are necessitated

The fact (if it is a fact) of laws being descriptive doesn't "have power" over or "dictate" anything. It simply entails, by virtue of what "descriptive" means, that events are not necessitated.

So here is your statement again.

If laws are descriptive (and not prescriptive) then it is not possible that the events described by those laws "had to" happen the way that they did.

If I now understand the power of saying that laws are descriptive, then I agree with the definition. I do not agree that we can possibly know whether this is the way nature works.

So, to be clear:

You now recant your claim that laws are descriptive. You now claim that laws might or might not be descriptive, and that we (or at least you) cannot know whether they are or are not.

Correct?

[Laird]

What I'm trying to understand is whether Laird believes there are no necessary events.

It's not relevant for the moment. You are challenging the possibility of free will, so for the moment we are interrogating the basis on which you've made that challenge, and whether/how your challenge can stand based on what you believe, and on what follows from your beliefs.

I think if you did you'd find that you agreed with a lot of it but also found it incomplete and missing stuff. At the beginning of his book The Concept of a Physical Law he explicitly notes that he surprised even himself by finding he could write a book about physical laws without covering causality itself at all.

I'll take your word for that as I'm not well read on older philosophy. What I do know comes mostly from the excellent podcast History of Philosophy without any gaps, which a Skeptiko member put me on to.

Thanks for these recs!

Great idea! But how about a wiki page instead?

Sounds good to me.

Let's see. "Probabilistic interventions are events that need not involve agency but nonetheless mimic certain crucial features of deliberation". Interesting. I'm curious to know more...

Yeah taking a first skim I can see I won't agree with the final idea of probabilistic intervention, but the fact it borrows so much from mental causation seems like a good start.

I'd be happy to work through the brick-window scenario with you if you can remind me of where you made a start.

Hmmm...for my part I think the thread has covered that which I wanted to get out of the example. We've covered:

Actuality and Potentiality,
Efficient/External and Final/Inner Causes,
Effectiveness of the Brick and Receptivity of the Window & how this mirrors Phenomenal & Experiential aspects
Location of Final Causes as Effects of Efficient  Causes
Possibility Space and possibility selection,
the true poles of Inexorable Fate (no true counterfactuals) vs Hyperchaos (no possible probability distribution),
Unique Events are neither determined nor random,
Laws and their need for something within the entities to obey,
how Determinism/Randomness are projections of probabilistic confidence,
the "deterministic" causal arc of a "random" probabilistic position cloud corresponding to a single electron that's helping to constitute the thrown brick
...there's even a bit of Material & Formal cause that has been touched on.

We could go further with the example, discuss the Brick Thrower as a conscious agent possessing Rationality / Subjectivity / Intentionality and what it means to experience a brick-as-a-brick & a window-as-a-window then rationally conclude that if one wants to shatter the window the brick is an appropriate part of the interest-relative causal sequence...

Would you describe it as an "evolutionary" sort of thing?

It's definitely teleological...but I've not read enough of Whitehead to give you an exact answer...