Monism: The Priority of the Whole

Monism: The Priority of the Whole

J. Schaffer

I will defend the monistic view. In particular I will argue that there are physical and modal considerations that favor the priority of the whole.

Physically, there is good evidence that the cosmos forms an entangled system and good reason to treat entangled systems as irreducible wholes. Modally, mereology allows for the possibility of atomless gunk, with no ultimate parts
for the pluralist to invoke as the ground of being.

The debate between monists and pluralists has long occupied philosophical center stage, with William James (1975, 64) considering it “the most central of all philosophic problems, central because so pregnant.” The monistic side can claim an intellectual pedigree tracing from Parmenides, Plato, and Plotinus, to Spinoza, Hegel, and Bradley. During
the nineteenth century, the monistic side had achieved a position of dominance.

Yet today, monism is routinely dismissed as obviously false or merely meaningless. These attitudes are rooted in the philosophical revolts of the early twentieth century. During the early analytic revolt against the neo-Hegelians, Russell and Moore dismissed monism as contrary to common sense.  During the positivistic revolt against metaphysics generally, Carnap and Ayer ridiculed the whole debate as mystical nonsense. 3 So the
fashions turn.