Interview with Dr. Henry Bauer - Part 1

The most interesting part of it for me was that with which I engaged with Linda above: the question of whether science can be adequately demarcated from other intellectual activity, and if so, how. Henry Bauer's suggestion that "there is no workable process or reasoning by which science can be distinguished from non-science" is extremely challenging and provocative.

He does quote that view with approval, and he ends by saying "there is no satisfactory definition of science and no objective way to distinguish it from other things". 

But he also says there is an empirical way of demarcating science from non-science and pseudo science:

The scientific consensus at any given time determines what is science and what is not. There are three things science deals in: methods, facts, theories. The scientific consensus accepts as science anything that is orthodox in all three aspects. When one of them is unorthodox but eventually becomes accepted, that counts as a “scientific revolution”: say, new facts or phenomena (X-rays, radioactivity) or a new theory (relativity; continental drift). When TWO aspects are unorthodox, it is what Gunther Stent called “premature” and the scientific consensus leaves it in limbo, sometimes for a long time (Mendel's laws of heredity; Wegener's continental drift, both in limbo for several decades. When all THREE aspects are unorthodox,  the scientific consensus says it's wrong, pseudo-science, say the Loch Ness Monster.

However, I'm afraid the more I look at that paragraph the less I understand it.

I don't know much about the theory of science - but did Popper really abandon the idea of falsifiability?

Henry Bauer seems to have thought it had some validity when he was criticising the theory of anthropogenic global warming in his book "Dogmatism in Science and Medicine" (2012). He claimed it had been made "infinitely flexible", and remarked "Such unfalsifiable theories are often described as unscientific."
https://books.google.com/books?id=tzycIWTHZtgC&pg=PA63

[Laird]

But he also says there is an empirical way of demarcating science from non-science and pseudo science

However, I'm afraid the more I look at that paragraph the less I understand it.

I admit it seems rather (unappealingly) relativistic - at any given moment, science is whatever the scientific consensus is in terms of facts, methods and theories. I think I'd need to read the referenced paper before commenting further though.

[Laird]

did Popper really abandon the idea of falsifiability?

A good question to which I would like to know the answer too.

[Laird]

I think I'd need to read the referenced paper before commenting further though.

It can be found here: https://sci-hub.cc/https://doi.org/10.10...9-7055-7_6

(For the benefit of others, not as a promise that I personally will read it in full, though I very well might!)

I admit it seems rather (unappealingly) relativistic - at any given moment, science is whatever the scientific consensus is in terms of facts, methods and theories. I think I'd need to read the referenced paper before commenting further though.

Perhaps it would be interesting to apply these criteria to parapsychology, as a kind of worked example or illustration.

It can be found here: https://sci-hub.cc/https://doi.org/10.10...9-7055-7_6

(For the benefit of others, not as a promise that I personally will read it in full, though I very well might!)

Sorry, I thought you meant you wanted to look at Henry Bauer's book on the Loch Ness Monster, in which he said he had suggested his "empirical criteria" for science. Quite a lot of that is available as a preview on Google Books, but I couldn't find anything close to the description in the interview.

There is an online survey of the literature in this area, entitled "Science and Pseudo-Science", in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy here. (It's quite long, so I'm not promising to read it either!)
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/

Just a thought: maybe what's wrong with it is that it doesn't describe anything specific or meaningful? Compare with: "Fruglebunding is what fruglebunders do". Does this tell you anything about what fruglebunding is or what fruglebunders do? Does it give you any indication as to who might reasonably claim to be a fruglebunder, and why that person would be justified in their claim?

I realize that it's not specific. Why does it need to be specific? Other than name-calling, what is it that depends upon specifying this?

Linda

[Laird]

I realize that it's not specific. Why does it need to be specific? Other than name-calling, what is it that depends upon specifying this?

Well, if it's not specific, then what stops some random nobody from declaring themselves a "scientist" (or "fruglebunder") following "the scientific method" (or "the way of the fruglebunder"), and how would you decide whether or not their claim was true?

[Laird]

Sorry

Why are you sorry when you've done nothing wrong?!

I thought you meant you wanted to look at Henry Bauer's book on the Loch Ness Monster, in which he said he had suggested his "empirical criteria" for science. Quite a lot of that is available as a preview on Google Books, but I couldn't find anything close to the description in the interview.

Why would you have thought that? It's not that I don't want to look at that, as it seems very interesting, I just don't recall doing or saying anything that would have led you to the conclusion that I would! It's all good, though, Chris, I appreciate the charitable sentiments! If I find the motivation, I'll check out your link.

There is an online survey of the literature in this area, entitled "Science and Pseudo-Science", in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy here. (It's quite long, so I'm not promising to read it either!)
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/

Thanks! I have to admit that I tend to read only the bits of SEP articles that I am particularly interested in, because they are quite academically dry and require intense concentration.