Free will re-redux

Can you explain "operating deterministically with probably lots of randomness thrown in"?




Why would it be incoherent? Perhaps a direct proof/argument would be the most helpful thing, since nothing's ever been resolved with the Socratic style of questioning we've been through a few times now.

Like a computer with a true random number generator attached to it. If your objection is that way, way down deep inside the computer I cannot explain the physics to your satisfaction, I would probably agree. But then you are not going to get a satisfactory explanation for anything.

I think the idea of a libertarian free decision is incoherent because random means "not deterministic." Again, I'm quite happy to have someone carve out a bit of randomness and demonstrate that it is not random and yet also not deterministic.

~~ Paul

For example, we could replace it with a different postulate:

All causal sequences must be one of: deterministic or random or influenced by a conscious agent.

But you must explain why this triad is different from the original dyad. If you can, you will have answered a form of my question.

~~ Paul

Oh I just wanted to try and understand the actual claim that free will is incoherent.

I *think* the argument Paul is making is that the free conscious agent can only make decisions that are deterministic, random, or some combination of the two. I don't really understand it myself.

For myself I would actually remove the first two in your postulate, as I think all causation is ultimately grounded in conscious agency.

But yeah we should make amendments to the conversation lest we just end up covering the same ground a[s] the last 75 page debate.

Yes, that is the argument I'm making. But all I am looking for is a hint of a description of how the free agent makes a decision that involves the elusive third way. How does an indeterministic nonrandom aspect creep into the decision making?

And again, I don't care about the source. I care about the method. You may argue that behind what we think is fully deterministic is some "free agent." Fine. How does that agent make a decision?

~~ Paul

1. Brain cells need oxygen and glucose/blood to function. Cut the blood supply off (heart stoppage) and the brain stops functioning after about 10-20 seconds, as does the brain stem (apparently according to experts) 

2. We can tell exactly when a certain thought must have occurred if it is expressed as an observation of an event that took place when the person's brain wasn't functioning. There are hundreds of these cases now. 

3. Contamination. The doctors fed the patient the information accidentally. And this happens every time there is a veridical report. With hundreds of cases however, that is statistically highly unlikely. 

4. I suspect your definition of a good case is one that does not exist

Well, it's certainly one where I can't easily imagine that there may have been some brain function or that contamination may have been a factor.

But I'm lazy these days, so it's easier to sit back and wait for some fantastic news.

~~ Paul

https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-01995-w

But what constrains deterministic events? Why does any particular cause produce a specific effect? We could say its a combination of Energy, Matter, Forces, Fields, etc. But that would all be an explanation for why an event happened, whereas to explain constraint is to explain why all the other possible events - no matter how ludicrous or dreamily absurd - did not happen. At some point someone might invoke the Laws of Physics/Nature, but we can the ask why those Laws don't change. And the only answer that doesn't involve God would be an appeal to a kind of brute fact, which isn't very satisfying.

I'm sure we agree that the laws of physics are descriptive, not prescriptive. So, indeed, invoking the laws of physics doesn't really explain why one thing happened and not something else. But you cannot jump to the conclusion that things happen for no reason at all. You're trying to infer a result from the lack of knowledge.

I'm not sure what you hope to gain from this line of reasoning. You're not going to do any better with a conscious agent or whatever source you pick for free decisions.

But in the interest of moving the conversation along, I'm willing to stipulate that random does not mean "not deterministic." Heck, I'll venture the idea that a free decision is not incoherent. But if I can't get an explanation for how it is done, then I'll have a heck of a time maintaining that venture.

Paul,

Can you just give us your argument as to why free will is incoherent?

Reading your replies I still don't get it and rather than play whack-a-mole it would be more succint for you to just give us the argument.

But you must explain why this triad is different from the original dyad. If you can, you will have answered my question.

~~ Paul

I don't know which is the "original dyad" but if you mean that the addition of the conscious agent makes it a triad then I'll have a go at explaining why I personally think that is crucial to the argument.

If, as a materialist, you start with the assumption that there is no conscious agent, then you are left with determined or random. You have already dismissed mind as a factor thus there can be no triad therefore you are asking the wrong people because almost everyone here accepts the reality of mind as a non-material but real phenomenon. Some of us would maintain that mind is indeed the only thing of which we can be certain. So we can't answer your question without you accepting our staring premise.

So, to you as a materialist, mind is entirely caused. It is, at best, an epiphenomenon arising out of electro-chemical activity in the physical brain and thus subject to the determinism/random dyad.  You appear to be demanding an explanation based on your initial assumption which you will never get because we have a different assumption. We assume the conscious agent is real. I can't see how the debate can progress when the two sides are starting with different assumptions.

If, as a materialist, you start with the assumption that there is no conscious agent, then you are left with determined or random.

I don't think that's true, as Nail's argument for pedesis is about the unpredictable but non-random behavior of matter.

The determinism/randomness dichotomy is just something a group of people have decided has to be true, but I think we need a proof it holds even for materialism let alone the inclusion of a conscious agent.

Paul,

Can you just give us your argument as to why free will is incoherent?

Reading your replies I still don't get it and rather than play whack-a-mole it would be more succint for you to just give us the argument.

I'm happy to drop that claim as an impediment to the conversation.

I believe I make a decision by starting with a particular brain state and then step-by-step, algorithmically, inexorably modifying the brain state until I reach a state on which I act. There may be some random events that affect the brain state, either due to truly random events or events with such a remote cause as to be effectively random with respect to the brain state.

There may be something unknown behind either the deterministic process or the random events or both. But it is not satisfying to simply claim this. How does that unknown thing indeterministically affect my brain state in a way that is not simply another random effect?

If we are going to give up on all this and just decide things happen for no reason at all, then things happen for no reason at all. I don't believe you can suddenly come up with some agent that effects things for a reason.

~~ Paul

I don't know which is the "original dyad" but if you mean that the addition of the conscious agent makes it a triad then I'll have a go at explaining why I personally think that is crucial to the argument.

If, as a materialist, you start with the assumption that there is no conscious agent, then you are left with determined or random. You have already dismissed mind as a factor thus there can be no triad therefore you are asking the wrong people because almost everyone here accepts the reality of mind as a non-material but real phenomenon. Some of us would maintain that mind is indeed the only thing of which we can be certain. So we can't answer your question without you accepting our staring premise.

So, to you as a materialist, mind is entirely caused. It is, at best, an epiphenomenon arising out of electro-chemical activity in the physical brain and thus subject to the determinism/random dyad.  You appear to be demanding an explanation based on your initial assumption which you will never get because we have a different assumption. We assume the conscious agent is real. I can't see how the debate can progress when the two sides are starting with different assumptions.

I'm happy to accept "mind" as a causative agent. How does it cause things in an indeterministic way? (Again, "mind" is just a name for the source of free decisions, not an explanation of them.)

I have no idea why you think determinism implies that the conscious mind is epiphenomenal. But perhaps that is another conversation.

~~ Paul