Free will re-redux

[Laird]

You're essentially asking me just to imagine libertarian free will

No. Here's a rough summary of the overall dynamic between us in this thread (in the context of all of the other free will-related threads in which we've engaged on PQ and Skeptiko).

1. You offer an implied argument against free will based on a mutually exclusive dichotomy (necessity versus randomness), both horns of which you claim (more or less implicitly) are incompatible with free will.
   
2. I point out that that dichotomy is not mutually exclusive, and that there is a third option (which I've christened "contingent causality") compatible with free will. Here, your argument is defeated, except that...
   
3. ... You try to get your argument to limp on by claiming that you cannot "conceive" of "how" that third option could work. So, in the post to which you've just responded...
   
4. ... I point out a good reason why you cannot "conceive" of this third option - an enthrallment to reductionism - and offer a conceptual pathway out of it to conceivability. At this point, your argument's legs are cut off and it can no longer even limp.
   

Thus, if you want us to continue to consider your argument, then you'll need to do further work.

it doesn't help me.

That's because you don't want to be helped in this way; you want to prosecute an argument in an indirect and implicit way. "Helping" you in the way you want would be for me to concede your argument, which I won't do, because it's unsound.

Though my post doesn't help you, it might at least help others to see what's wrong with the argument you're prosecuting.

1. ... I point out a good reason why you cannot "conceive" of this third option - an enthrallment to reductionism - and offer a conceptual pathway out of it to conceivability. At this point, your argument's legs are cut off and it can no longer even limp.
   

Even at the current limits of reduction one doesn't find determinism or randomness but processes that are unpredictable at the level of the individual occurrence but measurable by statistics in the aggregate.

"Determinism" and "Randomness" are just mental abstractions projected onto the data, they require an argument for why one should regard either as properly describ[ing] the true nature of reality.

And this is still within the boundaries of Physicalism...

[Laird]

Right, Sci - so, we are being generous to even grant that the dichotomy is conceivable in the first place; despite that generosity, the argument still fails.

Right, Sci - so, we are being generous to even grant that the dichotomy is conceivable in the first place; despite that generosity, the argument still fails.

If the argument is about a dichotomy then yeah I don't think it works because all the different half-lives have to be caused but not determined otherwise the very idea of causes/effects is rendered meaningless.

If it is about "how" free will works...it has never been clear to me why free will requires a "how", especially as Physicalism lacks the barest broad sketch of a "how".

Nevertheless, I did provide a set of papers that take one from the bottom level of causation all the way to the mental by way of "Causal Powers" metaphysics. (See my post just before I replied to you.)

It's a "how" explanation that starts with the realization that nature is neither random nor determined and then seeks to provide a broad sketch as to what this would mean for mental causation that also is caused but not necessitated. (Note that causes include past decisions made by the agent, which lead to a new state where new decisions have to be made.)

[Laird]

If it is about "how" free will works...it has never been clear to me why free will requires a "how", especially as Physicalism lacks the barest broad sketch of a "how".

Right. We've been asked, in terms of "the third option", for a "how" explanation of that option, along these lines: What happens in between the moment before a decision is made, and the moment after the decision is made? The implication here is that there should be some such explanation, and that if there is not, then "the third option" should be rejected as "inconceivable". Before returning to the question, let's take a moment to see what happens when, for consistency, we apply this implied principle to "the dichotomy":

Firstly, what explanation have we heard for "how" randomness works? What happens in between the moment before a particle "randomly" decays, and the moment after it decays? Nothing. Crickets. For consistency, then, we are compelled to reject randomness based on its inconceivability...

Nor have we heard any explanation for "how" necessitating physical causality works. What happens in between the moment a rock hits a window and the window cracks and shatters? Apparently, we are asked to understand that some set of physical "laws" "compel" the rock in its inertial motion into the window, and equally "compel" the glass of the window to crack and shatter in response - but where do these purported "laws" come from, and what gives them their power to "compel"? Here, there cannot even be a conceivable answer given that it has been admitted that these "laws" are merely descriptive rather than prescriptive! So, again: crickets. Too bad for the conceivability of "necessitating" physical causality then, which, again, for consistency we are compelled to reject...

On the other hand, you have painstakingly compiled a set of resources which in stepwise fashion provide a "how" for "the third option" grounded in consciousness. And what is the response to that body of work? Crickets...

Ultimately, then, there is no missing "how" explanation for "the third option", let alone a disputed one, and the answer in summary (and which your resources help to flesh out) to the "what happens in between" question is simply that the conscious agent holistically makes a top-down "contingently causal" choice - whereas for the purported dichotomy - well...

I don't think the supposed exclusiveness of the dichotomy is buttressed by reductionism, given the indeterminism at the quantum level is neither "random" nor "determined" as those terms are usually understood. And since [under reductionism] any macro determinism is grounded in that indeterminism nothing at the classical level can be used as a good argument for the dichotomy either.

Really there is just data and every claim [about what is happening causally] is a philosophical projection/interpretation of sorts onto the observations.

There is no valid metaphysical objection to freewill that follows from the current results of reductionism [that doesn't invalidate Physicalism as well].

Why do you say that quantum indeterminism is not random, as the term is usually understood? Perhaps you mean that it is not uniformly stochastic? I don't see how a nonuniform stochastic process helps the free will argument. I suppose you could suggest that whatever "causes" the half-life of a particular type of particle, even though individual decays are random, could also "cause" a large number of my decisions to have an overall "half-life" pattern. But since that "cause" is not under my control, again, I don't see how it helps.

I agree there is no metaphysical objection to free will. My objection is that I have not yet heard a coherent description of how it works. I have heard various terms that suggest a source, but nothing that explains how the decision is made.

~~ Paul

No. Here's a rough summary of the overall dynamic between us in this thread (in the context of all of the other free will-related threads in which we've engaged on PQ and Skeptiko).
* You offer an implied argument against free will based on a mutually exclusive dichotomy (necessity versus randomness), both horns of which you claim (more or less implicitly) are incompatible with free will.

I have long since given up that argument.

* I point out that that dichotomy is not mutually exclusive, and that there is a third option (which I've christened "contingent causality") compatible with free will. Here, your argument is defeated, except that...

Why would my argument be defeated simply by your coining a term?

... You try to get your argument to limp on by claiming that you cannot "conceive" of "how" that third option could work. So, in the post to which you've just responded...
... I point out a good reason why you cannot "conceive" of this third option - an enthrallment to reductionism - and offer a conceptual pathway out of it to conceivability. At this point, your argument's legs are cut off and it can no longer even limp.

Your argument is that I should reject my "enthrallment" and adopt a "top-down agency." How does that top-down agent make a free decision?

That's because you don't want to be helped in this way; you want to prosecute an argument in an indirect and implicit way. "Helping" you in the way you want would be for me to concede your argument, which I won't do, because it's unsound.

Though my post doesn't help you, it might at least help others to see what's wrong with the argument you're prosecuting.

Now you're simply trying to insult me into adopting your detail-free concept.

~~ Paul

Even at the current limits of reduction one doesn't find determinism or randomness but processes that are unpredictable at the level of the individual occurrence but measurable by statistics in the aggregate.

"Determinism" and "Randomness" are just mental abstractions projected onto the data, they require an argument for why one should regard either as properly describ[ing] the true nature of reality.

And this is still within the boundaries of Physicalism...

What is required is a coherent argument for why one shouldn't call stochastic processes "random." There isn't a shred of evidence that anything is going on behind the scenes of particle decay to cause the half-life. It's simply something we observe and build laws to describe. We call it a "characteristic constant."

If someone wants there to be causes behind half-lives so as to open a door for causes behind free decisions, they first must find evidence for the half-life cause.

~~ Paul

If the argument is about a dichotomy then yeah I don't think it works because all the different half-lives have to be caused but not determined otherwise the very idea of causes/effects is rendered meaningless.

If it is about "how" free will works...it has never been clear to me why free will requires a "how", especially as Physicalism lacks the barest broad sketch of a "how".

Physicalism lacks a sketch of "how"? That's what science is.

Perhaps we have a different idea about what "how" means. If you say that there is no reason to or it's impossible to describe what happens between the final moment of indecision and the first moment of decision, then I have no reason to believe that anything "free" happens at all. You're asking me to take free will on faith.

Again, none of this depends on the dichotomy I no longer discuss.

~~ Paul

Physicalism lacks a sketch of "how"? That's what science is.

Perhaps we have a different idea about what "how" means. If you say that there is no reason to or it's impossible to describe what happens between the final moment of indecision and the first moment of decision, then I have no reason to believe that anything "free" happens at all. You're asking me to take free will on faith.

Again, none of this depends on the dichotomy I no longer discuss.

~~ Paul

Physicalism lacks a "how" of consciousness existing. Idealism, Panpsychism, Neutral Monism can also fit all the descriptions of science. Physicalism means that consciousness isn't one of the fundamentals but arises out of that which has no consciousness. I suppose one could call it Naturalism but really the metaphysics is defined by what is missing at the Ground (God / Mind / Spirit) than what is there.

You've asked us to take "determinism" and "randomness" on faith. [I get that you aren't currently discussing them as part of a dichotomy but I still don't see what makes those to ideas fundamental in a way that doesn't necessitate a "how" explanation.]

And I did give a description, it's the set of papers I listed.