An Ideal Solution to the Problems of Consciousness

An Ideal Solution to the Problems of Consciousness

Daniel Hutto

This paper distinguishes three conceptual problems that attend philosophical accounts of consciousness. The first concerns the problem of properly characterizing the nature of consciousness itself, the second is the problem of making intelligible the relation between consciousness and the ‘physical’, and the third is the problem of creating the intellectual space for a shift in philosophical framework that would enable us to deal adequately with the first two problems. It is claimed that physicalism, in both its reductive and non-reductive forms, fails to deal adequately with either the first or second problem. The diagnosis of this failure is connected to the fact that consciousness cannot be treated in its own terms while being simultaneously fitted into an object-based conceptual schema. In light of this, it is proposed that a Bradleian version of absolute idealism may provide a metaphysical and epistemological framework which would enable us to recognize the conceptual diversity required to treat conscious phenomena on their own terms without forcing us to abandon naturalism.

We can see the unspoken need for a common schema if we consider the most successful cases of inter-theoretical reduction such as that of chemistry and physics(cf. Patricia Churchland, 1986, p. 279). There is no impossible conceptual jump between talk of atoms to talk of molecules, nor any great leap in thinking about thekinds of relation which hold between such entities. Even the more ‘modest’ accounts of an unified science draw upon examples in which the phenomena described by the reducing theory do not differ from that described by the theory to be reduced so radically as to cast doubt on the possibility of making the connections between them‘intelligible’ (cf. Kirk, 1995, p. 392). The point is that if we think mainly of classical physical phenomena, on either a micro or macro scale, they share what I shall dub a common object-based schema. For example, whatever other differences may exist between them, geo-physical, economic, and biological events (and objects) all oc-cupy relatively normal three-dimensional, spatio-temporal locations.
With consciousness this is not so.Trying to establish such locations is what leads directly to the problem of phenomenal space — finding a place for the world of experience within the world of physical space (McGinn, 1995, pp. 149–53).

Consciousness is not alone in resisting incorporation in a classical object-based schema. A similar problem occurs when we consider the differences between classical and quantum physics. It is well known that the central equation of quantum mechanics (the Schrödinger equation) has thrown up serious puzzles about the very nature of the quantum ‘domain’ (cf. Maudlin, 1997, p. 14). In particular, its features are contrasted with those of the classical, macroscopic physical world. 12

As Folse points out, in quantum physics ‘the observed properties of the system must be considered a  relational rather than possessed 
(or ‘inherent’) properties’ (Folse,1996, p. 128). This is what gives the quantum physical domain ‘a kind of wholeness which precludes attributing a classical mechanical state to the observed object as an isolated system . . .’ (p. 130). On the face of it, quantum mechanics resists understanding within the familiar classical categories we are accustomed to applying. Thus, treated on its own terms,not only does quantum mechanics paint a picture of a reality that is difficult to understand; it paints one which is hard to square with a ‘realist’ treatment of theclassical physical world. The tensions which arise become obvious when we consider the ‘wave-like’ nature of the microphysical world alongside our more object-based accounts of ‘reality’.