An excellent concise and accurate statement of the interactive dualism theory of mind

[Laird]

Apologies, but I feel as if I am missing a step?

Or perhaps several steps?

Earlier, you wrote:

perhaps it is just best to recognize that metaphysics is Experience, Experiencer, and Structure

Structure entails that which is structured.

I understood given that you listed "structure" separately from experience and experiencer that whatever it is that is structured is neither experience nor experiencer.

Therefore, whatever it is that is structured, being neither experience nor experiencer, is a distinct substance.

Given that we seem to agree that experience itself is not a substance, but is contingent on an experiencer, there is only one substance there, and then there is another substance in that which is structured. Thus, we have two substances, thus dualism.

Have I misunderstood?

[Laird]

I didn't notice the edit to your post until now, a while after I've responded.

Belatedly responding:

So epistemologically we can start with an Experiencer having an Experience. Experience could be subdivided into Experiencers, though perhaps we are then utilizing Intentionality to carve up the Experience?

This makes no sense. Experience is not a thing in itself; it is contingent on an experiencer. You can't create a new experiencer by "carving up" the experience of an experiencer! Any carving up is a mere abstraction. This is the basic error made in monistic idealism of the Analytic Idealism ilk.

Given that the rest follows from this basic error, I won't address it.

I didn't notice the edit to your post until now, a while after I've responded.

Belatedly responding:


This makes no sense. Experience is not a thing in itself; it is contingent on an experiencer. You can't create a new experiencer by "carving up" the experience of an experiencer! Any carving up is a mere abstraction. This is the basic error made in monistic idealism of the Analytic Idealism ilk.

Given that the rest follows from this basic error, I won't address it.

I'm speaking epistemologically there, not ontologically?

[Laird]

I'm speaking epistemologically there, not ontologically?

I'm not sure that it makes a difference. It remains the case that you're treating experience as primary, being a sort of seamless ocean which can be divided into patches of water, each of which has its own experiencer.

Given, though, that experiencers, and not experience, are primary, this is the opposite of the way to treat it: as a set of experiencers, each having their own experiences, which are distinct and not composable into a seamless ocean.

Fair?

I'm not sure that it makes a difference. It remains the case that you're treating experience as primary, being a sort of seamless ocean which can be divided into patches of water, each of which has its own experiencer.

Given, though, that experiencers, and not experience, are primary, this is the opposite of the way to treat it: as a set of experiencers, each having their own experiences, which are distinct and not composable into a seamless ocean.

Fair?

I don't [think] there are "primaries" in what I'm saying since I'm not talking ontologically?

Not sure where the "seamless ocean which can be divided" came from?

[Laird]

I don't [think] there are "primaries" in what I'm saying since I'm not talking ontologically?

Not sure where the "seamless ocean which can be divided" came from?

OK, so is it fair to interpret you simply as saying that there is a set of experiencers each having their own experiences, and that all of those experiences can in turn be considered as a singular set?

OK, so is it fair to interpret you simply as saying that there is a set of experiencers each having their own experiences, and that all of those experiences can in turn be considered as a singular set?

I don't know about the "singular set" part.

I'm just trying to start with epistemology without, at first, worrying about ontology.

So [I said to myself] let's start with an Experiencer. From there I am not sure if we should say there is an Experience taken as a Whole or Experiences as a set.

I can see it being argued either way. which I guess just compounds the problem...

[Laird]

So let's start with an Experiencer. From there I am not sure if we should say there is an Experience taken as a Whole or Experiences as a set.

So, we're now considering just this one experiencer out of all experiencers who exist?

In that case, I don't think it is particularly important whether we consider his/her experiences as a whole or as a set; I'm not even sure that it's more than a semantic distinction.

In any case, it seems to distract from the line we were pursuing, which is impossible if we're going to consider only a single experiencer when we know that there are in fact many experiencers:

I don't know about the "singular set" part.

OK, let's remove that and try again:

Is it fair to interpret you simply as saying that there is a set of experiencers each having their own experiences?

So, we're now considering just this one experiencer out of all experiencers who exist?

In that case, I don't think it is particularly important whether we consider his/her experiences as a whole or as a set; I'm not even sure that it's more than a semantic distinction.

In any case, it seems to distract from the line we were pursuing, which is impossible if we're going to consider only a single experiencer when we know that there are in fact many experiencers:


OK, let's remove that and try again:

Is it fair to interpret you simply as saying that there is a set of experiencers each having their own experiences?

I do agree there are experiencers having their own experiences, though "own" gets tricky when we consider telepathy and maybe empathy. 

[Possibly also just by mundane quales like red, and if people can correctly solve a proof that has an answer or even grasp a known fallacy/syllogism logical correctness. These suggest while there's a 1st Person PoV the raw nature of experience may be shared in some way. But I would agree these are still within the 1st person PoV so the set of Experiences for any one Person is still unique and not describable in 3rd person terms.]

(Throwing in the [empathy] because IIRC some Process Philosophers believe empathy is how causality works, and I'm trying to have the fairest starting assumptions. But I am willing to discuss if this is too biased a leaning.)

But I'm considering one experiencer for the sake of epistemology, and to make sure it's clear that before any ontological consideration there's some basic agreement.

Though I do think we be covered if there's agreement on the following:

There's an Experiencer who has Experiences which are "Bound" in the sense of coming to a person as a Whole picture, at least when considering external experience. There's room to consider daydreaming, thinking hard about a math proof, and other internal mental activities [that make us lose focus on the incoming Experience].

The Experiences have some causal ordering, which doesn't demand a particular Structure. Ontologically Experience could be Humean "Hyperchaos", but epistemologically there at least *seems* to be Structure.

[The Experiences are also of what seems to be an external world, as well as internal experience of thoughts/reasoning/etc.]

I think anyone, no matter their metaphysics, would be amenable to these starting assumptions? I feel it's important for me to emphasize that these are epistemological to me, with any ontological assumptions being foundational enough most would agree these are fair and unbiased starting points.

I'd personally go a step further and argue against a Humean view where Causality is illusory, but I feel we both agree on that - as do most - but we can look deeper into this if you desire.

[Laird]

I do agree there are experiencers having their own experiences, though "own" gets tricky when we consider telepathy and maybe empathy. 

I think a helpful way of clarifying this (which I first suggested in another thread) is to make the distinction between the experience itself and its contents. Via telepathy and empathy our own experience(s) might share the contents of another's own experience(s).

[Possibly also just by mundane quales like red, and if people can correctly solve a proof that has an answer or even grasp a known fallacy/syllogism logical correctness. These suggest while there's a 1st Person PoV the raw nature of experience may be shared in some way. But I would agree these are still within the 1st person PoV so the set of Experiences for any one Person is still unique and not describable in 3rd person terms.]

Again, the distinction between the experience itself (of an own person) and the contents of the experience (duplicable for redness, proofs, and logical fallacies/syllogisms) seems helpful here.

But I'm considering one experiencer for the sake of epistemology, and to make sure it's clear that before any ontological consideration there's some basic agreement.

Though I do think we be covered if there's agreement on the following:

There's an Experiencer who has Experiences which are "Bound" in the sense of coming to a person as a Whole picture, at least when considering external experience. There's room to consider daydreaming, thinking hard about a math proof, and other internal mental activities [that make us lose focus on the incoming Experience].

The Experiences have some causal ordering, which doesn't demand a particular Structure. Ontologically Experience could be Humean "Hyperchaos", but epistemologically there at least *seems* to be Structure.

[The Experiences are also of what seems to be an external world, as well as internal experience of thoughts/reasoning/etc.]

I think anyone, no matter their metaphysics, would be amenable to these starting assumptions?

Yes, I'm amenable to those.

I feel it's important for me to emphasize that these are epistemological to me, with any ontological assumptions being foundational enough most would agree these are fair and unbiased starting points.

By "epistemological" do you mean roughly that you're simply describing that which we can know by mere observation or self-reflection, prior to speculating or making any assumptions, inferences, arguments, or extrapolations?

I'd personally go a step further and argue against a Humean view where Causality is illusory, but I feel we both agree on that - as do most - but we can look deeper into this if you desire.

Yes, the view that causality is illusory seems pretty absurd to me.

So, we're agreed as to how to describe at a basic level what seems to be the case for a single experiencer. Now can we bring in multiple experiencers?