Why physicalism is FALSE

https://osf.io/preprints/osf/fqm7r_v1

https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/5g2xj_v3

OK thanks, I've looked at Levin's work separately, and also with respect to your thread. I understand Levin's position much more clearly. I understand both your (and potentially Laird's positions) with regards to Levin much more clearly, although I admit, I'm still somewhat hazy about your overall current position on things in general, and as Laird has had no input yet, I'm completely unclear on his general position. This was Grok's position on Levin and your thread:

Levin’s Platonism and Dualism

Article Context: The article we discussed portrayed Levin as rejecting materialism for a "radical Platonist view" where causal inputs come from outside the physical world. This paper fleshes that out: Platonic space isn’t just abstract math but a source of agential patterns, including minds (pp. 14-16). This aligns with his speculated "immaterial minds" from the article.

Sci’s View: Sci saw Levin’s dualism as suggesting mental entities flexibly attach to physical states, not requiring a Designer. The paper supports this with examples of biological plasticity (e.g., flatworms, p. 8) and a broad Platonic space (pp. 11-13), reducing the need for a fine-tuned mapping. Levin doesn’t deny design but doesn’t necessitate it either—evolution opportunistically uses what’s available (p. 16).

Laird’s Skepticism: Laird questioned how Platonic entities could be conscious or relate to psychophysical laws. Levin admits the mechanism of ingression is unknown (p. 36)—he speculates about a "force" or "pressure" but leaves it open, addressing Laird’s "how does it work?" concern with a call for research, not answers.

Dualism and Theism

Sci’s Clarification: Sci argued dualism doesn’t imply theism just because minds map to specific physical states. Levin’s framework supports this: if minds ingress from a rich, pre-existing space accessible to many substrates (biological or synthetic), the specificity of brain-mind correlation weakens as a theistic argument. Levin’s focus on evolution exploiting Platonic affordances (p. 16) leans naturalistic, though he doesn’t rule out a "Universal Mind" (p. 36), leaving room for Sci’s separate reasons for suspecting Design.

Anomalous Mapping: Sci’s point about "anomalous" mappings (e.g., malformed brains functioning) finds backing in Levin’s citations (p. 13, ref. 107) and examples like tadpoles seeing with tail-eyes (Fig. 7). This plasticity fits Levin’s view of minds as ingressing patterns, not tied to rigid physical designs.

Collective Intelligence and Symmetry
Levin’s symmetry between morphogenesis and cognition (p. 2) echoes our neuroscience abstract discussion—both involve collective intelligence navigating toward goals. This bridges the gap between physical form and mental states, supporting Sci’s animism-like reading of Levin (e.g., agency in a triangle, p. 16).

Unanswered Questions and Levin’s Humility. Levin ends with big, open questions (p. 36):

Mechanism: How do patterns ingress? Is there a force, or do they "push" into matter?

Origin: Where does Platonic space come from? Is it a final answer or a "strange loop"?

Ethics: If minds ingress into diverse embodiments, how do we handle the moral status of synthetic beings?

He admits vast ignorance and calls for humility—a refreshing stance that invites exploration rather than dogma.

Summary

Levin’s paper proposes that life and mind arise from a triad: genetics, environment, and ingressing patterns from a Platonic space. It’s a rejection of physicalism, rooted in biological evidence (plasticity, bioelectric memories) and mathematical reasoning (non-physical truths). It supports Sci’s view of a flexible mind-body relationship, challenges Laird’s demand for causal clarity with a research agenda, and reframes dualism as potentially naturalistic—though it leaves theistic interpretations open. It’s a provocative blend of science and philosophy, aiming to unlock new frontiers in understanding and creating life.