Some interesting thoughts on an interesting possibility from Gabriel. I like this sort of synthetic thinking: the thinker as a matchmaker, marrying ideas.
That said, I think he is being a little cheeky in his incorporation of illusionism as the bride, in that, per her original nature, there is no self whatsoever - not even a universal self with which our individual psyches identify - or in which they hide, if I may be a little poetic.
The presentation by Luke Roelofs which Gabriel references is particularly interesting. I think that I follow his (Luke's) reasoning, although - expressed as it is in terse slides - I am not 100% confident of that. In one of my responses to your (Sci's) thread which shared the paper "Panpsychism and Mental Monism: Comparison and Evaluation", I noted a problem which in Luke's terms is most probably that which he refers to as either "The Incompatible Contexts Problem", or, alternatively, his "Subject-Summing Problem" (that I am not sure which applies best is probably an artifact of the necessary terseness of Luke's slides): I noted that summing up a variety of micro-perspectives could not plausibly lead one to a macro-perspective of "hunger" since the stomach from which that perception of hunger arises is not visible to the micro-perspectives; it is visible only from a macro perspective.
But now: to the heart of the matter. Is this idea that Luke and Gabriel are advancing here - that of, in Luke's terms, "identifying existence cosmopsychism (IEC)" - coherent? I actually think that it can be. I think that in a sense, it is that for which Bernardo Kastrup is advocating, but I also think that Bernardo gets it wrong, and I hope to share in a new thread my argument to that effect soon (Sci, you will know that argument already, seeing as I have already shared it with you privately - I am simply trying to get some feedback on it / editing help with it before publicising it widely).
Basically, where I think Bernardo goes wrong is in contending that experiences (of mind at large) can themselves experience. Take away that contention, and IEC seems coherent to me - in my terms, it would be the idea that everything that exists is mental energy consisting in minds, the subject of which (i.e., of each mind) is identical. That said, whilst I hold that this view is coherent, I do not think that it is the most plausible model of conscious reality... but as for why, you'll have to wait until after I've had my explanation properly vetted - unless you find it before I've done that (it's already public even though I still want it properly vetted).
That said, I think he is being a little cheeky in his incorporation of illusionism as the bride, in that, per her original nature, there is no self whatsoever - not even a universal self with which our individual psyches identify - or in which they hide, if I may be a little poetic.
The presentation by Luke Roelofs which Gabriel references is particularly interesting. I think that I follow his (Luke's) reasoning, although - expressed as it is in terse slides - I am not 100% confident of that. In one of my responses to your (Sci's) thread which shared the paper "Panpsychism and Mental Monism: Comparison and Evaluation", I noted a problem which in Luke's terms is most probably that which he refers to as either "The Incompatible Contexts Problem", or, alternatively, his "Subject-Summing Problem" (that I am not sure which applies best is probably an artifact of the necessary terseness of Luke's slides): I noted that summing up a variety of micro-perspectives could not plausibly lead one to a macro-perspective of "hunger" since the stomach from which that perception of hunger arises is not visible to the micro-perspectives; it is visible only from a macro perspective.
But now: to the heart of the matter. Is this idea that Luke and Gabriel are advancing here - that of, in Luke's terms, "identifying existence cosmopsychism (IEC)" - coherent? I actually think that it can be. I think that in a sense, it is that for which Bernardo Kastrup is advocating, but I also think that Bernardo gets it wrong, and I hope to share in a new thread my argument to that effect soon (Sci, you will know that argument already, seeing as I have already shared it with you privately - I am simply trying to get some feedback on it / editing help with it before publicising it widely).
Basically, where I think Bernardo goes wrong is in contending that experiences (of mind at large) can themselves experience. Take away that contention, and IEC seems coherent to me - in my terms, it would be the idea that everything that exists is mental energy consisting in minds, the subject of which (i.e., of each mind) is identical. That said, whilst I hold that this view is coherent, I do not think that it is the most plausible model of conscious reality... but as for why, you'll have to wait until after I've had my explanation properly vetted - unless you find it before I've done that (it's already public even though I still want it properly vetted).
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