(2024-02-13, 11:15 PM)sbu Wrote: [ -> ]We seem to agree on a fundamental point: consciousness, or qualia, eludes objective description and cannot be distilled into any computational process. Our divergence lies in your belief in the necessity of a spiritual realm beyond our physical existence. In contrast to your argument about the neurological structures of the brain, I attribute the complexity of the human brain to our remarkable sensory capabilities, particularly our vision, and our highly adaptable anatomy.
The human anatomy is exceptionally versatile, offering numerous survival advantages across various environments. Bipedalism, for example, not only enables efficient movement over long distances but also allows for the use of hands in carrying objects and tools. This, combined with an upright stance, improves our ability to see further. Moreover, the human hand, with its dexterity and opposable thumb, is crucial for tool use and fine motor tasks. Compared to other primates, such as chimpanzees, humans possess superior visual acuity, largely due to a denser concentration of cone cells in the fovea, facilitating detailed visual tasks and craftsmanship.
A personal anecdote illustrates the brain's role in our mental functions. A relative of mine, who survived a stroke, developed prosopagnosia, losing the ability to recognize faces, yet retains the ability to navigate daily life independently. This condition underscores the brain's specialized functions, challenging the simplicity with which we often view the world and arguing against dualism. When the brain is compromised, so too is our mental existence. Instances of individuals emerging from persistent vegetative states contradict dualistic expectations of a spiritual existence separate from the physical body, as these 'awakenings' resemble more of a system reboot, with no recollection of the elapsed time.
A concluding remark on the transmitter theory. David references a theory by Henry Stapp (and previously Von Neumann) within physics, suggesting consciousness might influence the outcome of quantum superpositions. This hypothesis offers a potential bridge between a realm of consciousness and physical reality, yet remains unverifiable with current scientific methods. It's also not clear to me within this framework how sensory information is 'transmitted' back to the external consciousness. Maybe David will elaborate.
I think this is perfectly explainable within monism while it of course is quite a problem for reductionism.
On your claim that most of the complexity of the brain is due to sensory processing. According to much research, the brain enables the following long list of functions only one item of which is sensory processing. Most of the neurons of the brain are occupied in non-sensory processing of various kinds that can be interpreted as parts of a vastly complex multiple-stage interactional mechanism.
Thoughts and decisions; problem solving, thinking, finding meaning.
Memories and emotions including happiness and sadness responses.
Perception of various sensations: sight including processing of shapes, colors and image movement, also hearing, smell, touch and pain.
Movements (motor function): the faculty of conscious agency, turning mental decisions into actions in the world.
Speech and language functions.
Balance and coordination.
Fight or flight response (stress response).
Automatic behavior such as breathing, heart rate, sleep and temperature control.
Autonomic regulation of organ function.
As can be seen, the brain enables most all mental functions not just sensory. The term "enables" is typically used in such compilations simply because it is quite descriptive of what seems to be going on: an immaterial conscious awareness capable of agency manifesting in the physical by intricately interfacing with a supremely complex neurological system.
Sorry, but you still need to identify what functions the bulk of the neurological structures of the brain are accomplishing, if it isn't enabling this interactional interface.
On the "reboot" from a vegetative state argument: of course - when the physical brain is damaged, the mind appears also to be damaged. But this is only an appearance, since the functioning of the immaterial spirit is also severely impaired while embodied because it is intricately enmeshed in the damaged neurological apparatus. Accordingly, under such conditions as your suggested persistent vegetative state consciousness including consciousness of time are damped out. And as long as the spirit is embodied consciousness will be subject to any damage and distortions incurred in the neurological apparatus it is inhabiting.
It would be interesting to hear how monism can account for this picture. We agree that materialist reductionism is a no-show in this contest.