Psience Quest

(2023-06-15, 12:12 AM)Merle Wrote: [ -> ]My brain is not made up of the stuff that makes up nails.

Hmmm, let's start fresh with this.

What is this different stuff it's made up of then? I was thinking of this post:

Quote:I know of no scientists that thinks that nails have consciousness. (If one thinks nails have consciousness, some might argue that this person is as dumb as a nail.  ). Those that insist consciousness is strictly material will tell you it occurs only when there is enough material arranged in a complex way that creates consciousness. 

It seemed to me that when you said "enough material arranged in a complex way" you meant the nail and the brain are made of the same stuff but the amount and arrangements were different.

But I am happy to be corrected and for you to tell us how the stuff the brain is made up of is different than the stuff a nail is made up of.

(2023-06-14, 11:24 PM)Merle Wrote: [ -> ][Which of the following are conscious?] is a completely different question.

No, it's the first step in answering your original question:

"Do the following need souls to do what they do?"

Crucial to that question in this context is whether or not part of "what they do" is "experience phenomenally and think consciously".

If they're not conscious and don't have experiences, then, of course, we can all agree that not only do they not "need" a soul to "do what they do", but, by pretty much any definition of "soul" that I can think of, they definitely don't have one.

If, though, they are conscious, then we can proceed to the next step in answering your question:

Why and how are they conscious; what necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness do they satisfy, and, in particular, is having a soul - as you (Merle) define it - part of those conditions?

To satisfy your desire for an answer to your question, I'll answer it given that framing via those two-step questions:

1. Which of the [entities Merle listed] are conscious? All of them, with the potential exception of the waterfall: although I tend towards endorsing animism, it's admittedly difficult to know whether such entities as waterfalls - those that our modern culture sees as "inanimate objects" - really are conscious.
   
2. Why and how are they conscious; what necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness do they satisfy, and, in particular, is having a soul - as you (Merle) define it - part of those conditions? They are conscious because they are embodied minds; minds that are irreducible to anything non-mental (aka physical). Those minds are distinct entities from the physical (non-mental) brains^[1] with which they are associated. Mind and brain though distinct are tightly coupled during the mind's embodiment, and they interact intimately. The soul (as I define it in this context) is the subject of consciousness; the essential conscious self of those embodied minds. "Separable conscious minds each with its own subject of consciousness" seems to generally meet your own - Merle's - definition of a "soul", so, yes, part of the reason why the entities you listed are conscious (and thus "do what they do") is that they have ("need") a "soul".
   

[1] Edited to add: some of the entities you listed don't seem to have brains; for those, simply substitute "bodies" or similar.

Any more questions or is that clear to you?

(2023-06-14, 11:24 PM)Merle Wrote: [ -> ]I understand that it is hard to tell if an animal is conscious.

I don't think that it is at all. It's patently obvious that animals are conscious.

(2023-06-14, 11:24 PM)Merle Wrote: [ -> ]Perhaps everybody just misunderstands what I am asking. If they understood the question, I think they would agree.

I understand well enough the premise of your question; I just think that it's false. That premise is that (of the two) consciousness is not fundamental, but rather neurology is, and that consciousness emerges from neurology at a certain level of complexity of neural structure, so that it is plausible that while the visible behaviour of certain organisms with less complex neural structures appears very similar to that of beings (such as humans) with more complex neural structures and who are conscious, those organisms in fact aren't conscious.

Good reasons have been shared in this thread for thinking that that premise is false, and compelling counter-arguments to your arguments against mind-body dualism have been shared. I don't expect that any of them will change your mind, but maybe when the dust settles you'll reflect on them more thoughtfully.

(2023-06-15, 12:25 AM)Sciborg_S_Patel Wrote: [ -> ]It seemed to me that when you said "enough material arranged in a complex way" you meant the nail and the brain are made of the same stuff but the amount and arrangements were different.

Nails are made of metal. Brains are made of complex hydrocarbons.

The key there is that the atoms need to be "arranged in a complex way" in order to have thoughts, such as the arrangement of atoms in brains.

Carbon chemistry is complex, and can make complex things like elephants and elephant brains. Metals, by contrast, make only simple things like crystals, which can all be grouped together to make things like nails, not functioning brains.

(2023-06-15, 11:05 AM)Merle Wrote: [ -> ]Nails are made of metal. Brains are made of complex hydrocarbons.

The key there is that the atoms need to be "arranged in a complex way" in order to have thoughts, such as the arrangement of atoms in brains.

Carbon chemistry is complex, and can make complex things like elephants and elephant brains. Metals, by contrast, make only simple things like crystals, which can all be grouped together to make things like nails, not functioning brains.

Let's not get ahead of ourselves, plenty of time to discuss what we think complexity can and can't do.

So nails and brains are both made of atoms? Are the atoms made of stuff too? None of this stuff is conscious right?

edit: Part of going slow is I don't want to dominate the discussion as I see Laird and others have replied to you as well.

(2023-06-15, 12:12 AM)Merle Wrote: [ -> ]Some of your sources say minds can't have thoughts about things. I simply do not agree. When frogs jump, for instance, they have thoughts about jumping. When they plan to jump, they have thoughts about future jumping. And so on. So whether frogs do or do not have souls, they have thoughts about jumping.

Why do you keep bringing this up?  Nobody disputes this.  A thought consists of two things - information and consciousness.  Information in a computer is not a thought.  A computer therefore cannot think.  Physical processes can certainly contain and work with information, if guided by consciousness, but brains are physical matter only and so you need to be able to explain how physical matter can produce consciousness.  Frogs and cats having thoughts is simply not helping the debate.

(2023-06-15, 05:25 PM)Brian Wrote: [ -> ]Why do you keep bringing this up?  Nobody disputes this.  A thought consists of two things - information and consciousness.  Information in a computer is not a thought.  A computer therefore cannot think.  Physical processes can certainly contain and work with information, if guided by consciousness, but brains are physical matter only and so you need to be able to explain how physical matter can produce consciousness.  Frogs and cats having thoughts is simply not helping the debate.

I understand that consciousness and thoughts are different things. That why I distinguish the two. I want to first establish an agreement that brains can have thoughts about things, and then discuss consciousness. And yet I keep hearing that brains cannot have thoughts about things. As long as I keep hearing people argue that brains cannot have thoughts about things, I will explain that I think brains can have thoughts about things.

So, if we can stipulate that brains can have thoughts about things, and then move on to consciousness, that is what I want to do. Can we all stipulate that brains can have thoughts about things so we can move on?

(2023-06-15, 08:07 AM)Laird Wrote: [ -> ]Which of the [entities Merle listed] are conscious? All of them, with the potential exception of the waterfall: although I tend towards endorsing animism, it's admittedly difficult to know whether such entities as waterfalls - those that our modern culture sees as "inanimate objects" - really are conscious.

That's not the question I was trying to ask. My question got nowhere, so lets lay it aside and address your question. (I added my answers for each.)

Which of these are conscious?  

1. Waterfalls: no
   
2. Bacteria: no
   
3. Sunflowers: no
   
4. Jellyfish: no
   
5. Ants: probably not
   
6. Toads: perhaps minimally conscious
   
7. Monkeys: Yes, but not as much as modern humans
   
8. Chimpanzees: Yes, but not as much as modern humans 
   
9. Homo erectus: Yes, but not as much as modern humans
   
10. Humans: Yes
    

You, however, claim that everything on that list is conscious with the possible exception of waterfalls.

Perhaps we should add another item to our list: nails. If you tend to endorse animism, and think waterfalls might be conscious, could nails also be conscious? 

I find it hard to believe that nails, jellyfish (that have no brain), waterfalls, and sunflowers are conscious.

Quote:Why and how are they conscious; what necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness do they satisfy, and, in particular, is having a soul - as you (Merle) define it - part of those conditions? They are conscious because they are embodied minds; minds that are irreducible to anything non-mental (aka physical). Those minds are distinct entities from the physical (non-mental) brains^[1] with which they are associated.

I see the mind as a set of actions and mental states. Just like a conversation, a stampede, a war, a viral infection, or a ballgame are a set of actions and states of matter, but are not actually physical items, so with the mind.

What does it even mean to say a mind is a non-physical entity? Those words don't even have meaning to me. What are you even talking about?

Quote:Mind and brain though distinct are tightly coupled during the mind's embodiment, and they interact intimately. The soul (as I define it in this context) is the subject of consciousness; the essential conscious self of those embodied minds. 

This non-physical entity you call "mind" somehow becomes tightly coupled with a brain. And yet it doesn't really seem to be doing anything without the brain's participation. When the brain goes under anesthesia, is there no uncoupled part of the mind that could keep on working? Then why does the mind stop under anesthesia? If the mind follows the state of the brain's hardware, how do we know it is not a product of the brain's hardware?

Quote:Good reasons have been shared in this thread for thinking that that premise is false, and compelling counter-arguments to your arguments against mind-body dualism have been shared. 

What good reasons have been shared for thinking that brains cannot be the fundamental source of human consciousness? I keep hearing two weak arguments:

1. Physical things cannot have thoughts about things. Non-physical things can have thoughts about things. Therefore thoughts come from something non-physical.  [This argument is false. Brains do indeed have thoughts about things. And non-physical things are not even defined. What are they? How is saying a non-physical thing did it different from saying it is magic? The arguments that say physical things cannot do these things would also apply to non-physical things.]
   
2. Nails are not conscious. Therefore, no physical thing can be conscious. [How is this logical? Carbon based life forms can do a lot of things nails cannot do.]
   

(2023-06-15, 03:07 PM)Sciborg_S_Patel Wrote: [ -> ]So nails and brains are both made of atoms? Are the atoms made of stuff too? None of this stuff is conscious right?

Yes, yes, and yes.

(2023-06-15, 09:42 PM)Merle Wrote: [ -> ]Yes, yes, and yes.

I am assuming your third "yes" is agreeing that atoms are not conscious.  So where does this consciousness come from?

(2023-06-14, 12:57 PM)Laird Wrote: [ -> ]Natural selection would not be operating on (irrelevant because casually impotent) feelings but on brain patterns which determined survival-promoting behaviour, regardless of how those brain patterns (and the behaviour they caused) felt.

We would, then, have no reason to expect survival-promoting behaviour to feel good, and survival-diminishing behaviour to feel bad, because how it felt wouldn't change anything about the way we acted (so as to enhance our prospects of survival) given our naturally selected brain states.

But how we feel does effect our behavior. If something feels good we tend to do it agian. If it feels bad we tend to avoid it. Thus, evolution would tend to favor those that feel good when good things happen to that person, and feel bad when bad things happen to that person. The brain that is best able to have feelings that match the desirable state for that brain has a survival advantage.