(2017-09-11, 03:59 PM)fls Wrote: [ -> ]Sorry, but even proponents say this (those who are familiar with how evidence is evaluated and where risk of bias is a problem). For example, Stevenson stated that the vast majority of his case reports were too weak to provide evidence for reincarnation. The best which could be said was that they were suggestive. The presentment studies mostly don't exclude an expectation bias (see Julia Mossbridge's pre-registered studies at the KPU registry where she specifically tries to find research designs which may overcome this problem). I can give you lots of other examples, if necessary.
Linda
Now to be fair here, Stevenson was notoriously careful about not making any especially speculative conclusions because he knew the implications that could have when people read his paper - people who respected the scientific method and who he was hoping would respect his research.
Too weak to provide evidence for "reincarnation" - but what does that mean? A very specific, ego-centric reincarnation as would be most commonly deduced from the term? There's obviously a variety of interpretations of what reincarnation could be like, some of which the evidence is more strong for, and some which it's weaker for.
Furthermore, while I know you weren't speaking specifically to this, the implications of his research aren't (at least right now) necessarily most impactful for what they show might be "true" (i.e. reincarnation in one form or another), but rather for what they show might not be (reduction of all conscious experience and memory to the brain, etc). I find those studies, and the ones carried further by Tucker and others, to be persuasive and very strong evidence - but not directly
for reincarnation, as much as the challenges they bring
to reductionism in its various forms. Again, I do think, depending on which reincarnative (made up word alert) theory you're discussing, the evidence has varying degrees of strength to support a positive theory. But in its current stage, I think its greatest impact is felt in the implications it has as a
negative theory - a set of data that is very hard to explain in terms of any reductive model.
So in my point of view, evidence that is against something is every bit as valuable, and in some situations more valuable, than evidence that is for something (not that the same evidence cannot serve dual roles, of course). I'm confident that's the case as much in general scientific research as it is for any type of other research like the studies by Stevenson and Tucker. Saying that the evidence is broadly weak is, therefore, sort of a misrepresentation. It's based on perspective too, and I think many are caught up in trying to prove or show that something is/might be the case, and they forget the importance of showing the alternative.