Free will re-redux

Nevertheless, quantum theories of consciousness suffer from the same difficulties as neural or computational theories. Quantum phenomena have some remarkable functional properties, such as non-determinism and non-locality. It is natural to speculate that these properties may play some role in the explanation of cognitive functions, such as random choice and the integration of information, and this hypothesis cannot be ruled out a priori. But when it comes to the explanation of experience, quantum processes are in the same boat as any other. The question of why these processes should give rise to experience is entirely unanswered. ---David Chalmers

Well that's just an objection to quantum mechnanics solving Physicalism. Are you saying you also find Physicalism impossible?

Also are you objecting to something specific in Kauffman's presentation? A time stamp would be helpful here.

Well that's just an objection to quantum mechnanics solving Physicalism. Are you saying you also find Physicalism impossible?

Also are you objecting to something specific in Kauffman's presentation? A time stamp would be helpful here.

Why is it an objection just to physicalism? Everyone tosses around QM as if it's got the hidden answer to everything.

My comment was in response to your quote. I don't see how any of that helps free will.

~~ Paul

Why is it an objection just to physicalism? Everyone tosses around QM as if it's got the hidden answer to everything.

My comment was in response to your quote. I don't see how any of that helps free will.

~~ Paul

Chalmers' quote is specifically about finding an answer to consciousness being produced by the physical via QM. The issues with Physicalism cannot be escaped by appeal to QM, it has no hidden answer that can justify that faith.

The quote [I posted under the video] is just the introduction to the video, where the biologist Kauffman goes into more detail regarding his ideas.

But note that we are waiting for any vague notion at all of how it might work.

~~ Paul

I gave you the best that words can do. It is like a black hole: we can orbit around it and see its effects but explanations cannot enter without undergoing spaghettification.

I think I agree with you but if you could elaborate for the rest of the class. ;-)

The more the words the less the meaning.

The more the words the less the meaning.

I can sorta agree with this at times, and see some value in the idea that what is irreducible can only be "harmed" by explanation**...but I think this makes free will seem too mysterious.

Rather, it seems to me even the physical universe is made of non-random, non-deterministic motion at the quantum level that resolves itself into the macro/classical world. (This resolving "decoherence" [is] further proof against actual "randomness" where no relation exists between past/present states of the Universe).

And so free will fits in quite nicely, even the physicalist biologist Kauffman comes to similar ideas in his own way in that video I linked above.

** "...words are very, unnecessary, they can only do harm.."

Chalmers' quote is specifically about finding an answer to consciousness being produced by the physical via QM. The issues with Physicalism cannot be escaped by appeal to QM, it has no hidden answer that can justify that faith.

The quote [I posted under the video] is just the introduction to the video, where the biologist Kauffman goes into more detail regarding his ideas.

So you're suggesting that this statement by Chalmers:

"But when it comes to the explanation of experience, quantum processes are in the same boat as any other. The question of why these processes should give rise to experience is entirely unanswered."

is limited to physicalism, and that he might believe that QM could provide an answer under some other metaphysic?

I don't think so.

~~ Paul

So you're suggesting that this statement by Chalmers:

"But when it comes to the explanation of experience, quantum processes are in the same boat as any other. The question of why these processes should give rise to experience is entirely unanswered."

is limited to physicalism, and that he might believe that QM could provide an answer under some other metaphysic?

I don't think so.

~~ Paul

Why would Neutral Monism / Idealism / Panpsychism need a way to "give rise to experience" when each of those paradigms realize consciousness is fundamental and present from the Ground up?

Only Physicalism has the self-created problem of trying to get Something - Consciousness from Nothing - a physical universe defined as not starting with Consciousness as among its funadmentals.

edit:

Chalmer's quote in context from Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

But when it comes to the explanation of experience, quantum processes are in the same boat as any other. The question of why these processes should give rise to experience is entirely unanswered.

(One special attraction of quantum theories is the fact that on some interpretations of quantum mechanics, consciousness plays an active role in "collapsing" the quantum wave function. Such interpretations are controversial, but in any case they offer no hope of explaining consciousness in terms of quantum processes. Rather, these theories assume the existence of consciousness, and use it in the explanation of quantum processes. At best, these theories tell us something about a physical role that consciousness may play. They tell us nothing about how it arises.)

At the end of the day, the same criticism applies to any purely physical account of consciousness. For any physical process we specify there will be an unanswered question: Why should this process give rise to experience? Given any such process, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instantiated in the absence of experience. It follows that no mere account of the physical process will tell us why experience arises. The emergence of experience goes beyond what can be derived from physical theory.

Why would Neutral Monism / Idealism / Panpsychism need a way to "give rise to experience" when each of those paradigms realize consciousness is fundamental and present from the Ground up?

Only Physicalism has the self-created problem of trying to get Something - Consciousness from Nothing - a physical universe defined as not starting with Consciousness as among its funadmentals.

edit:

Chalmer's quote in context from Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

I agree that if you are going to assume consciousness as a fundamental, and also assume that full-blown human consciousness is a fundamental or else make no attempt to explain how human consciousness emerges, then nonphysicalist accounts might seem satisfying. (That is, assuming we do not eventually find a physical fundamental consciousness.)

"At the end of the day, the same criticism applies to any purely physical account of consciousness. For any physical process we specify there will be an unanswered question: Why should this process give rise to experience? Given any such process, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instantiated in the absence of experience. It follows that no mere account of the physical process will tell us why experience arises. The emergence of experience goes beyond what can be derived from physical theory."

His third sentence is flawed. To rephrase: Given any process that gives rise to experience, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instantiated in the absence of experience. It is indeed instantiated in the absence of experience, but then gives rise to experience. Did he mean: Given any process that gives rise to experience, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instantiated without giving rise to experience. That is self-contradictory. But even if we go with it, it certainly does not follow that "no mere account of the physical process will tell us why experience arises." That is a just-so claim.

~~ Paul

I agree that if you are going to assume consciousness as a fundamental, and also assume that full-blown human consciousness is a fundamental or else make no attempt to explain how human consciousness emerges, then nonphysicalist accounts might seem satisfying. (That is, assuming we do not eventually find a physical fundamental consciousness.)

"At the end of the day, the same criticism applies to any purely physical account of consciousness. For any physical process we specify there will be an unanswered question: Why should this process give rise to experience? Given any such process, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instantiated in the absence of experience. It follows that no mere account of the physical process will tell us why experience arises. The emergence of experience goes beyond what can be derived from physical theory."

His third sentence is flawed. To rephrase: Given any process that gives rise to experience, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instantiated in the absence of experience. It is indeed instantiated in the absence of experience, but then gives rise to experience. Did he mean: Given any process that gives rise to experience, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instantiated without giving rise to experience. That is self-contradictory. But even if we go with it, it certainly does not follow that "no mere account of the physical process will tell us why experience arises." That is a just-so claim.

~~ Paul

I'm a bit lost - is this about the video I posted on Kauffman's quantum mind presentation?

Is this an objection to something specific in the video?