Why think that Ultimate Reality is a Personal Creator

I have a feeling you've misunderstood me. I wasn't asking about the (very existence and nature of the) First Cause in the sense of the (first) causal event, but of the Causer of that event.

Ah ok. I think the argument sort of works out the same for the Causer but let me read the book and get back to you.

[Laird]

Ah ok. I think the argument sort of works out the same for the Causer but let me read the book and get back to you.

Oh, I wasn't referring to the argument working, I was clarifying that when I turned the question back on you...

I am a bit confused here, because if a cause isn't a decision or random what is it? Determined as a brute fact?

Maybe the best way of responding is to turn the question back on you: are the very existence and nature of the First Cause themselves decided or random? If not, what are they? Determined as brute facts?

...by "First Cause" I meant the Causer not the (first) causal event, whereas you seemed to respond as though I meant the latter.

The point I was making was simply that if you think that a cause cannot be other than a decision or random, then surely the same applies to the (uncaused) very existence and nature of the (First) Causer: that very existence and nature must be either a decision or random. So, is that what you think? Or do you think the (First) Causer's very existence and nature are a brute fact? If the latter, then why not for causes in general?

Oh, I wasn't referring to the argument working, I was clarifying that when I turned the question back on you...


...by "First Cause" I meant the Causer not the (first) causal event, whereas you seemed to respond as though I meant the latter.

The point I was making was simply that if you think that a cause cannot be other than a decision or random, then surely the same applies to the (uncaused) very existence and nature of the (First) Causer: that very existence and nature must be either a decision or random. So, is that what you think? Or do you think the (First) Causer's very existence and nature are a brute fact? If the latter, then why not for causes in general?

I would say that even if the nature of the Causer is a brute fact, the enacting of the First Cause that starts a temporal progression of causes still has to be random or an act of mental causation.

That said, I'm not sure we need to know the nature of the Causer to argue that the First Cause requires a freely acting conscious entity?

[Laird]

I would say that even if the nature of the Causer is a brute fact, the enacting of the First Cause that starts a temporal progression of causes still has to be random or an act of mental causation.

Why not "determined as a brute fact" as you put it? (Setting aside my affirmation that given that consciousness and free will are irreducible, they had to be there from the start, because that's not a consideration of the cosmological argument).

Why not "determined as a brute fact" as you put it? (Setting aside my affirmation that given that consciousness and free will are irreducible, they had to be there from the start, because that's not a consideration of the cosmological argument).

Because if the First Cause is determined then we have to ask what came before in a temporal sequence. There would have to be something acting about the Causer - whether it is a mind or not - that compels it to begin the chain of causes.

Also I don't think Unique Events can be determined, though arguably the First Cause is the only such case depending on how strict we are with the word "unique".

(Admittedly for me Determinism is a lost cause, even if materialism were true I don't know how determinism makes any metaphysical sense.)

[Laird]

Because if the First Cause is determined then we have to ask what came before in a temporal sequence.

Set aside "determined" then, and let's stick with "brute fact". What is the (first) Causer if not a brute fact? The existence and nature of He, She, They, It, or whichever pronoun we choose weren't decided and (presumably) aren't random but somehow "just are" as a brute fact. If that is the case for the first Causer, then couldn't that brute facticity be transitive onto the First Cause as a causal event?

Set aside "determined" then, and let's stick with "brute fact". What is the (first) Causer if not a brute fact? The existence and nature of He, She, They, It, or whichever pronoun we choose weren't decided and (presumably) aren't random but somehow "just are" as a brute fact. If that is the case for the first Causer, then couldn't that brute facticity be transitive onto the First Cause as a causal event?

So the nature of the First Causer causes the First Cause?

This seems to suggest time is working on/within the First Causer, and this is what then creates the First Cause. But then clearly the nature of the First Causer precedes the supposed First Cause as a cause?

[Laird]

So the nature of the First Causer causes the First Cause?

This seems to suggest time is working on/within the First Causer, and this is what then creates the First Cause. But then clearly the nature of the First Causer precedes the supposed First Cause as a cause?

The First Cause(r) begins time, so you're right that time isn't (can't be) working on/within the First Cause(r), and I'm not suggesting that it is. I'm simply saying that, logically (so far as the cosmological argument goes, as far as I know, and you can let us know if you discover otherwise as you read the book), it could simply be in the nature - as a brute fact - of the First Cause(r) to begin time, and thus neither a decision nor random.

The whole question of the "timelessness" of the First Cause(r) is a tricky one though, and I'm not sure how to interpret it.

[Laird]

I go a little further and suggest that it's actually the idea of a "decision" that suggests time. A decision implies that at one point in time, the decision is yet to be made, and then at a later point in time, the decision is made.

The First Cause(r) begins time, so you're right that time isn't (can't be) working on/within the First Cause(r), and I'm not suggesting that it is. I'm simply saying that, logically (so far as the cosmological argument goes, as far as I know, and you can let us know if you discover otherwise as you read the book), it could simply be in the nature - as a brute fact - of the First Cause(r) to begin time, and thus neither a decision nor random.

The whole question of the "timelessness" of the First Cause(r) is a tricky one though, and I'm not sure how to interpret it.

I go a little further and suggest that it's actually the idea of a "decision" that suggests time. A decision implies that at one point in time, the decision is yet to be made, and then at a later point in time, the decision is made.

Yeah it gets tricky because how [can] there exist a "before" preceding Time itself?

I would agree that a decision in itself suggests the passage of Time, but it seems to me so would the nature of the First Causer simply compelling it to enact the First Cause. After all for the nature of the First Causer to compel also suggests a state before the compulsion to begin Causality occurred?

I suspect that this is the limit of my current ability to think about this so I'll have to hope the book proves enlightening.