Materialism as a religion

Because subjective doesn’t make sense in that context. Subjective in that context means ‘ based on a special combination of physical mechanisms, morality will arise based on that combinations properties ‘. That’s the natural conclusion from that argument. Morality and ethics would then need to be measurable, much like the higher order properties of molecular velocity ( wind ) is measured independent of molecularly measurement.

Maybe it would help if you presented your notions of how we interact with morality and meaning. Seeing a better (more philosophically or logically consistent?) model may help more clearly focus my error.

I'm still struggling to understand why use of subjective leads to your interpretation "You’re saying a set of physical processes can give rise to an intangible and immeasurable set of physical stuff."? I don't understand why 'subjective' leads to that? I know you say it is so... but I don't understand why.

For instance, I might say that a route through, and position in, what we understand in spacetime may be considered to be the result of a process, and that result may be an individual perspective... 'subjective'. Yet the processing (by which the process leads to a result) may still be shared.

You seem to be suggesting that individuals cannot have an individual experience, whilst also being part of a group...

So how do you intent to measure ethics? I’m not taking aim at the word subjective, I’m taking aim at the concept that you can sweep away the fact that ethics isn’t physical by calling it subjective. The intention wasn’t to say that ethics are ‘ based on a point of reference ‘. It was to say morality and ethics are ephiphenomena to physical processes hides the problem of having to explain them in term of physicalism ( you can’t )

So how do you intent to measure ethics? I’m not taking aim at the word subjective, I’m taking aim at the concept that you can sweep away the fact that ethics isn’t physical by calling it subjective. The intention wasn’t to say that ethics are ‘ based on a point of reference ‘. It was to say morality and ethics are ephiphenomena to physical processes hides the problem of having to explain them in term of physicalism ( you can’t )

I think you need to be careful here. "Ethics" is simply a word, a human construct that tries to describe certain aspects of human behaviour. I'm thinking this is a category error.

"...you can sweep away the fact that ethics isn’t physical by calling it subjective." is similar to your previous statement I've quoted above... where does this interpretation come from? I don't understand it... it doesn't make sense to me...

Is ethics physical?

Is ethics physical?

For the sake of the conversation I'm going to say "no".

For the sake of the conversation I'm going to say "no".

The definition of physicalism: 

1. the doctrine that the real world consists simply of the physical world.
   

The definition of physicalism: 

1. the doctrine that the real world consists simply of the physical world.
   

In that definition is a "doctrine" a physical thing? IMO no, it's a human label. Similarly, ethics is a label we apply to descriptions of behaviour types. See my earlier comment about making a category error. 

Unless you can convince me that there is a source of common ethics that apply to everyone, everywhere at all times, you've painted yourself into a corner.

In that definition is a "doctrine" a physical thing? IMO no, it's a human label. Similarly, ethics is a label we apply to descriptions of behaviour types. See my earlier comment about making a category error. 

Unless you can convince me that there is a source of common ethics that apply to everyone, everywhere at all times, you've painted yourself into a corner.

Ethics is a label we apply to a set of EXPECTED behaviors, not behaviors themselves. And your second sentence proves my point. If you can’t point to an objectively shared common set of ethics or tell me how ethics arises from physical mechanics, and ethics, like most mental phenomena, cannot be measured or directly observed, then the case that they are constructed as higher order patterns by physical mechanation is incomplete. So there clearly ARE things that exist that’s cannot be pinned down to physical machinations, which refutes physicalism. 

If you want to start defining things that are clearly non physical as physical, then physicalism doesn’t mean anything insomuch that it can never be wrong. My point is that the idea that physicalism is a valid premise is refuted by the very fact that we have consciousness and an inner life. This is why people like Denett fight so hard to prove it doesn’t exist.

Edit: also, I’m not assuming you’re supporting a physicalist position, and a lot of what I’m saying isn’t directed to the things you’ve said. They’re more a generic critique against traditional physicalism.

Ethics is a label we apply to a set of EXPECTED behaviors, not behaviors themselves.

Meh

And your second sentence proves my point. If you can’t point to an objectively shared common set of ethics or tell me how ethics arises from physical mechanics, and ethics, like most mental phenomena, cannot be measured or directly observed, then the case that they are constructed as higher order patterns by physical mechanation is incomplete. So there clearly ARE things that exist that’s cannot be pinned down to physical machinations, which refutes physicalism.

I don't think ethics really "exist in the real world" at all in the way you're describing, so are unable to pose a threat to a physicalist position.

If you want to start defining things that are clearly non physical as physical, then physicalism doesn’t mean anything insomuch that it can never be wrong.

At least it has something in common with Bernardo's Idealism.

My point is that the idea that physicalism is a valid premise is refuted by the very fact that we have consciousness and an inner life.

There's the rub. Is there a separate consciousness outside of the biological systems doing their thing... But you appear to be asserting a brute fact here.

Edit: also, I’m not assuming you’re supporting a physicalist position, and a lot of what I’m saying isn’t directed to the things you’ve said. They’re more a generic critique against traditional physicalism.

I get that, and I'll play along