Free will re-redux

[Laird]

I'll respond to the rest later - I've got a few replies I owe to respondents here - but I wanted to note this idea of summing all contributions.

I think the challenge here is that if we include the contribution of every aspect of the reality at once it leads us to a kind of Cinematic Universe, in that taking any state of the entire universe  (S1 of U at T1) and then noting the next stage (S2 at U at T2) doesn't give us a real sense of causes.

Fair enough, but I presume you're talking about states of the entire universe because that's what I referred to in my original response to the original paper. They're not directly relevant to my hypothetical response by the necessitarians to the later[1] paper though, a hypothetical response to which you were presumably in turn responding (since it's what you quoted).

[1] "Later" in the sense of when I read and responded to it; by publication date it is actually earlier.

But I would agree that this is not the strongest argument for dispositional causality, which comes into play more clearly when trying to explain the probability distributions that current science takes to be genuine indeterminism. The alternative is Nothing is not just doing Something, in the sense of the "Ex Nihilo" causation assumed by genuine Randomness, but doing a lot of different "somethings" each with a different probability distribution that holds so well people can speak of "probabilistic laws".

Yep, this is a good point.

And once one has entered into the realm of causation as dispositions one has a "ground floor" where reality is moving in ways that are neither pure-Chance nor pure-Necessity. From there go "upward" to start looking at causal powers in mental causation, which in this context [is] continuing through the reading list, and eventually you get to the idea of generalizable/contextual "two-way" powers.

Which is not to say one has to agree with any of that. But at the very least what the reading list provides is a possibility that should be conceivable/coherent. Of course one can disagree with that as well, but then at least something substantial is being debated/discussed where each layer of metaphysics is given a hearing.

Yep. You've laid out quite the banquet. Unfortunately, there's a little story about a banquet...

Uh oh, I'm not sure I know the difference. I don't believe in libertarian free will, but I'm fine if we use the term free will in the legal sense. What does that make me?

~~ Paul

Well then I suppose you would be a hard determinist who compromises for the sake of criminal law, if you believe that free will doesnt exist normally. A compatiblist believes that while we are subject to cause and effect there is no cosmic gun to the back of our head forcing us to choose our decisions, we may always choose to go left over right, but if anything were to change we might not. 

Ive got sympathy towards libertarianism though because I believe the claims that free will has been disproved are stupid. Ignoring the fact that supposed tests showing that it's not real are based on short term studies and tests that may not be as reliable as people want them to be, and not longer examinations that look at increased complexity and consideration like choosing a car, marrying a woman ect. Applying determinism to every aspect of the universe without evidence that it acts there as we think it does is just the wrong way to go about it. What if free will is emergent from human complexity and environment, an irreducible choice that pops up. We don't know, but it seems dumb whenever I see grand articles claiming that it's all solved. Plus I find the implications disturbing, either everything that's ever happened was always meant to happen, the apple falling on sir isaac newton's head, splitting the atom, discovering free will isn't real ect which seems a bit divine hand-y to me OR it's all random, in which case we're fucking lucky that every single major scientific discovery has ever happened.

[Laird]

Fair enough, but I presume you're talking about states of the entire universe because that's what I referred to in my original response to the original paper. They're not directly relevant to my hypothetical response by the necessitarians to the later paper though, a hypothetical response to which you were presumably in turn responding (since it's what you quoted).

I've cross-posted that hypothetical response to your Real Dispositions in the Physical world thread in post #7, which might be a better place for us to continue this exchange (if you care to), but if you prefer to continue it here, then that's fine with me.

I think this all helps, and I agree that it would be useful for Paul to read these papers - the one I've quoted last in particular

Just to note that last paper doesn't really make sense without the context of the previous ones.

Otherwise the idea of a "power" or "disposition" comes across as tautological, in the same way a ball's "bounciness" is not explanatory without a deeper dive into the word.

The Theory of Causal Significance, as the starter, shows that causality just observed is not the lowest explanatory level.

The intervening papers then look into the next layer up, so to speak, arguing for the dispositional nature of causation and how this is makes causation the explanatory force, rather than enemy of free will.

That last paper then deals with some technical issues and elaboration.

A compatiblist believes that while we are subject to cause and effect there is no cosmic gun to the back of our head forcing us to choose our decisions, we may always choose to go left over right, but if anything were to change we might not.

The gun would be in the first part of your sentence, "we are subject to cause and effect".

Ive got sympathy towards libertarianism though because I believe the claims that free will has been disproved are stupid. Ignoring the fact that supposed tests showing that it's not real are based on short term studies and tests that may not be as reliable as people want them to be, and not longer examinations that look at increased complexity and consideration like choosing a car, marrying a woman ect.

Just to be clear the focus of the debate here is more metaphysical, as in could there be a being who is free?

It is after all possible to believe a being in some possible world -say the Ur-Mind of Idealism- could be free while rejecting the idea that a human being is free.

That doesn't answer my question. How do you believe that? It seems that you can't explain. Thus, your belief is incoherent, and you do not actually hold it. Simple logic.

It's a definition. There is no question of evidence and whether to believe it, one way or the other.

Are you asking me why I believe that a person could or could not act without being coerced?

~~ Paul

If you could describe why you think that gets us nowhere, that might do the trick better. What about that do you fail to understand?

I said:

"If you could describe the difference between a contingent decision and a necessitated one, that might do the trick. All I've read just sounds like "contingent" is coined to mean "caused but not dictated," which gets us nowhere."

There is nothing to understand. When I ask "how does libertarian free will work?" I could just as well ask "how does a caused but not dictated decision work?" It's nothing more than a restatement of the original question.

Perhaps our problem is that you see explanation in statements where I see only a rewording of a previous statement. But you can't possibly believe that "caused but not dictated" is an explanation.

~~ Paul

Well then I suppose you would be a hard determinist who compromises for the sake of criminal law, if you believe that free will doesnt exist normally. A compatiblist believes that while we are subject to cause and effect there is no cosmic gun to the back of our head forcing us to choose our decisions, we may always choose to go left over right, but if anything were to change we might not.

I thought a compatibilist believes that free will is compatible with determinism. Do they believe that there is some sort of indeterministic free will that is still compatible with determinism?

Ive got sympathy towards libertarianism though because I believe the claims that free will has been disproved are stupid. Ignoring the fact that supposed tests showing that it's not real are based on short term studies and tests that may not be as reliable as people want them to be, and not longer examinations that look at increased complexity and consideration like choosing a car, marrying a woman ect. Applying determinism to every aspect of the universe without evidence that it acts there as we think it does is just the wrong way to go about it. What if free will is emergent from human complexity and environment, an irreducible choice that pops up. We don't know, but it seems dumb whenever I see grand articles claiming that it's all solved. Plus I find the implications disturbing, either everything that's ever happened was always meant to happen, the apple falling on sir isaac newton's head, splitting the atom, discovering free will isn't real ect which seems a bit divine hand-y to me OR it's all random, in which case we're fucking lucky that every single major scientific discovery has ever happened.

I don't care about the experiments. I just can't conceive how we make a decisions that is not random yet indeterministic. I await a description that sounds coherent.

~~ Paul

[Laird]

There is nothing to understand.

I'll put it this way then: if I understand correctly, you contend that free will is logically impossible because (1) the required contingent causal relations are inconceivable (at least to you) and (2) conceivability is a necessary precondition for logical possibility.

So, let's examine the conceivability of contingent causal relations. We can break this concept down into two parts. First, we have "causal relations". These comprise some cause (or set of causes) according to which an effect occurs. I think we all agree that causal relations are conceivable.

Second, we have contingency (as opposed to necessity). Contingency (as opposed to necessity) is obviously conceivable because it's a well-recognised concept in formal logic: contingent truths are those whose truth is not necessary.

Putting the two together, a contingent causal relation comprises some cause (or set of causes) according to which an effect occurs, but which does not necessitate that effect.

There is no inconceivability at any point.

If you want to argue that there is, then go ahead and try to make a cogent argument to that effect.

ETA:

If you could describe the difference between a contingent decision and a necessitated one, that might do the trick.

This is just inane. It's like asking for a description of the difference between seeing the colour red and seeing the colour blue. The difference is right there in the meaning of the words!