(2020-06-07, 05:52 PM)nbtruthman Wrote: These indeed are interesting questions. This perhaps relates closely to whether human technology can finally create an artificial general intelligence modeled on human behavior that comes so close that it could be classed as an actual "philosophical zombie" (p-zombie). This amounts to whether there ever will be the settling of the old debate over p-zombies.
Adapted from Wiki:
This is a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that imagines a being that, if it could conceivably logically exist, logically disproves the idea that physical substance is all that is required to explain consciousness. Such a zombie would be indistinguishable from a normal human being but lack conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.
Philosophical zombie arguments are used in support of mind-body dualism against forms of physicalism such as materialism, behaviorism and functionalism. It is an argument against the idea that the "hard problem of consciousness" (accounting for subjective, intrinsic, first person, what-it's-like-ness) could be answered by purely physical means, in particular by means of artificial general intelligence (AGI) systems.
Proponents of the p-zombie argument, such as philosopher David Chalmers, argue that since a philosophical zombie is defined as being totally (in its behavior and appearance) physically indistinguishable from human beings (especially in verbal conversation), even its logical possibility would be a sound refutation of physicalism, because it would establish the existence of conscious experience as a further fact.
I don't think definitive answers to the beginning questions 1 & 2 will ever be forthcoming. Just ever more accurate and convincing (yet still ultimately imperfect) simulacra of human behavior and appearance. But I think that eventually such AGI systems may get good enough to fool everybody, no matter how closely examined. Accordingly, I think that it is clearly, logically possible that such an AGI system could eventually meet the requirements (above) of a true philosophical zombie, therefore refuting physicalism in the mind-body debate.
Of course, philosophical debates are by their very nature endless. Some physicalists like Daniel Dennett counter that philosophical zombies are logically incoherent and thus impossible; other physicalists like Christopher Hill argue that philosophical zombies are coherent but not metaphysically possible.
Interesting stuff, nbtruthman. Thanks for sharing.
I do find the p-zombie argument confusing though - and I think that this is because I am simply unable to conceive of physicalism as coherent in the first place, and so I find it difficult to assess an argument against it which starts with its (incoherent, in my view) presuppositions (in order to refute them). It is known that from a contradiction, anything follows, and perhaps this observation relates at least a little to my confusion over this argument, which, in my view, in some sense "assumes a contradiction" (or at least incoherence) at the start in order to refute it. Better, I think, is to simply point out that incoherence directly: subjective experience is categorically non-physical
by definition, and thus any claim that experience is physical is, categorically and by definition, incoherent.
There ends the philosophical debate.
Some thoughts from my own more dualistic perspective on the possibility of a Turing machine closely approximating a p-zombie: I think that this, too, is incoherent (not surprisingly, since my more dualistic perspective does not share the physicalist premises of the p-zombie argument). When I say "I am conscious", I say it
because I
am conscious: thus, the fact of my being conscious is
causally-efficacious with respect to my statement. This cause cannot, though, apply to a p-zombie, who, by definition, is
not conscious, and thus the p-zombie (imitating/replicating me) would not (cannot) say it (under the same conditions that I would).