A Phenomenological Ontology For Physics: Merleau-Ponty And Qbism

A Phenomenological Ontology For Physics: Merleau-Ponty And Qbism

M. Bitbol

Few researchers of the past made sense of the collapse of representations in the quantum domain, and looked for a new process of sense-making below the level of representations: the level of the phenomenology of perception and action; the level of the elaboration of knowledge out of experience. But some recent philosophical readings of quantum physics all point in this direction. They all recognize the fact that the quantum revolution is a revolution in our conception of knowledge. In these recent readings of quantum physics (such as QBism), quantum states are primarily generators of probabilistic valuations. Accordingly, they should not be seen as statements about what is the case, but as statements about what each agent can reasonably expect to be the case.

Three features of such non-interpretational, non-committal approaches to quantum physics strongly evoke the phenomenological epistemology. These are: (1) their deliberately first-person stance; (2) their suspension of judgment about a presumably external domain of objects, and subsequent redirection of attention towards the activity of constituting these objects; (3) their perception-like conception of quantum knowledge.

But beyond phenomenological epistemology, these new approaches of quantum physics also make implicit use of a phenomenological ontology. Chris Fuch’s participatory realism thus formulates a non-external variety of realism for one who is deeply immersed in reality. But participatory realism strongly resembles Merleau-Ponty’s endo-ontology, which is a phenomenological ontology for one who deeply participates in Being. This remarkable analogy is supported by Merleau-Ponty himself. Indeed, 50 years before QBism, Merleau-Ponty acknowledged the strong kinship between the status of quantum mechanics and his phenomenology of embodiment. He did so in two texts that remained unpublished until after his death: Visible and invisible, and the Lectures on Nature. The final part of this article is then devoted to a study of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of quantum physics.

A Phenomenological Ontology For Physics: Merleau-Ponty And Qbism

M. Bitbol

 "quantum states are primarily generators of probabilistic valuations. Accordingly, they should not be seen as statements about what is the case, but as statements about what each agent can reasonably expect to be the case."

I read this and yell out - OF COURSE!!

But Sci, I am aware that it may not make sense to others.  When deconstructed - it marks a conceptualization that moves directly to Information Realism.  It becomes slight of hand for materialism and sets a foundational framework for a modern worldview.  I hope you will help me explore this introduction of environmental "knowledge".

I opened my copy of Brian Greene's The Elegant Universe for the first time since I put it down in disgust.  I found the mark where I label the assertions as "materialism of greene" (page 146).  I had to use the index to find where he describes quantum particle interactions and - sure enough - there were my underlinings marking a fictional account of information transformations.  Particle interactions seemingly act as if there is a magical property in the essence of matter and energy (page 125).
 

It's as if the photon is not so much the transmitter of force per se, but rather the transmitter of a message of how the recipient must respond to the force in question. - B. Greene

Ok -- in information science if you see a message sent and the outcome being firmly structured at the receiver, you don't assume that some particulate sends messages outside of known science.  An analysis should be able to document its encoding steps, its channel, its decoding at the receiver, its probabilistic distribution, its environmental contingent probability distribution and the structure of the information object so conferred from source to receiver.  We could verify how the mutual information would have been generated by a message.

Information is not a result of an inner essence of materials -- it is extant activity and structure -- in the same way that matter and energy are phenomenal.