A critique (mine) of Analytic Idealism

[Laird]

A critique of Analytic Idealism

Published today, NYE 2025, by me.

On Analytic Idealism, there is no real self: the self is nominal only; it is emptiness; potentiality, not actuality; amorphous; reduced to a “sense of”.

This is difficult to grasp at first because of all of the lip service paid to the idea of the self as “the universal subject”, but it becomes clear after some analysis.

In combination, these quotes demonstrate that Analytic Idealism lacks the concept of a real self: the self of which it conceives is merely nominal; unreal in another word; non-existent in yet another. Analytic Idealism seen properly, in this light, is a no-self theory.

The only apparent possibility (endorsed in the above quotes) for a real self on Analytic Idealism is for experience (all that really exists on that theory; same caveat as before) to be the self, but this in fact is not possible, because to be and to undergo (experiences) are two incompatible relations: a self can’t “be” the same experiences that it undergoes; it is logically prior to them.

This is not mere semantics: the lack of a real self to ground experience is the most serious problem with this theory (but not the only problem).

🔗 Reasoning

Another challenging faculty to explain on Analytic Idealism is reasoning. Without a real mind capable of guiding the reasoning, it is unclear how and why any subset of experience would faithfully represent a chain of reasoning.

🔗 Intelligence

If reasoning in particular is challenging to explain on Analytic Idealism, then intelligence in general is even more so, given, as I contend, that experience is not in itself causally efficacious in an active sense. Given this contention, there is no reason for one subset of experience to lead in any particular direction over time, let alone in an intelligent one.

Here's a link to the (ongoing?) discussion I've had (am having?) wiith ChatGPT about this critique:

https://chatgpt.com/share/69546e91-33ec-...0c752042c9

I thought it offered some thoughtful analysis and keen insight (and not the obsequiousness for which it is sometimes known, at least, not very overtly).

I'm not so sure about the editing suggestions it's made, and have even reverted one that I originally implemented. I'd be interested in any opinions as to whether they ought to be implemented.

In any case, here is some of its analysis inline, for those who prefer not to click on the link:

Where the objection bites

The critique does score a legitimate point here:

• Kastrup frequently oscillates between:
  • “subjectivity is fundamental”
    
  • “only experience exists”
    
• Without always clearly specifying whether:
  • subjectivity is identical to experience
    
  • or ontologically prior but non-substantial
    

This ambiguity allows the critique to argue that:

• the self is either redundant or empty
  

This is a real pressure point in Analytic Idealism:
Kastrup relies on a non-substantial subject that nevertheless must:

• unify experience
  
• ground dissociation
  
• support identity
  

That burden is heavy, and the critique is justified in highlighting it.

Where the objection overreaches

The analogy:

“Only experience exists” is like “only red exists”

does not land cleanly, because:

• Kastrup explicitly denies that experience is a property of something else
  
• He treats experience as ontologically primitive, not adjectival
  

So the critique is not showing an inconsistency within Analytic Idealism here, but rather rejecting its metaphysical starting point.

In short:

• Strong external objection
  
• Moderate internal pressure
  
• Not a knockdown refutation
  

c) Mental faculties (memory, reasoning, intelligence)

These sections are cumulative rather than independent.

They all rely on:

• denial of an internal dynamical mind
  
• rejection of experience as processual
  

The strongest point here is about memory:

Memory can be experienced, but cannot be experience.

This does reveal a gap in Kastrup’s expositions, which often:

• rely on structural metaphors (semantic networks)
  
• without a clear account of persistence conditions
  

This is a legitimate explanatory lacuna, though not unique to Analytic Idealism.

4. Response to problems of memory, reasoning, and intelligence

Bernardo’s likely reply

He would likely say the critique is demanding a homunculus.

Key points:

• Memory is not stored in a mind
  
• Memory is a recurrent pattern in mentation
  
• Reasoning is the temporal unfolding of structured experiential constraints
  
• Intelligence is pattern sensitivity, not a faculty owned by a substance
  

He might point to:

• Neural network analogies
  
• Dynamical systems
  
• Attractor states
  

And say:

“You are asking where the librarian is, when the library is self-organising.”

---

Assessment

This reply is plausible but underdeveloped in Kastrup’s actual writing.

The critique is right that:

• These explanations are gestural
  
• They rely heavily on metaphor
  
• Persistence and normativity (why reasoning is correct) remain thinly explained
  

So this remains a live vulnerability, not a settled victory for either side.

Overall verdict on Bernardo’s likely responses

Bernardo can respond coherently to every major objection in the critique.

However:

• His responses do not neutralise the critique’s central worry
  
• They repeatedly rely on rejecting the critique’s metaphysical intuitions rather than resolving tensions
  

The deepest unresolved fault line remains:

Can subjectivity be ontologically real without being anything over and above experience?

If yes, Analytic Idealism survives.
If no, the critique succeeds.

That is the real point of decision.

[Laird]

I've added Appendix D: Metaphorical representations and Appendix E: Who am I, why did I write this, and why should it be taken seriously?, along with a table of contents.

The problem here is that the absence (denial) of any sort of dimensionally-extended stuff in motion renders these sort of metaphors inapplicable, because that is the essence of what they convey. WMIB thus trades on the benefit that the extensional representation provides – an accessible and even visual way to account for and explain dissociation – while at the same time explicitly denying that essence by which it facilitates that accessible accounting and explanation.

The network representation – presumably developed in recognition of this problem, although this is never explicitly acknowledged – explicitly does away with any connotations of real, ontological extension, of stuff, of vibration, and of any sort of motion at all. Instead, its core metaphor is that of a relational database, where the relations are purely semantic.

This is much truer to Analytic Idealism's ontological schema, but the trade-off is that it is now much more challenging to explain dissociation: a static network by definition lacks any dynamism that could lead parts of the whole to separate (“dissociate”) from that whole. The dissociation – into what might be termed “subnetworks” – has to be presupposed, in a sort of preharmonisation somewhat similar to that of the monads of Leibniz's monadology. Unlike for Leibniz's monadology, however, on Analytic Idealism there is no God outside of space and time to perform this preharmonisation.

If you want I can link this to the Kastrup Discord and see what they make of it?

I fear my life has left with less time to really spend pondering philosophy at the moment, so I don't think I can give any serious evaluation.

[Laird]

Sure, that would be welcome; I'd be interested in what they have to say. The only caveat is that I might yet add to or tinker with it further in the days to come; I often realise necessary additions/changes only after publishing. I'll of course note significant changes in the changelog, and, of course, any additions/changes might be inspired by their feedback too.

Sure, that would be welcome; I'd be interested in what they have to say. The only caveat is that I might yet add to or tinker with it further in the days to come; I often realise necessary additions/changes only after publishing. I'll of course note significant changes in the changelog, and, of course, any additions/changes might be inspired by their feedback too.

Maybe worth posting on Reddit -> https://www.reddit.com/r/analyticidealism/

[Laird]

Yes, that looks like a good spot too. I'm not a Redditor and have never posted there before, although I do have an old (unused) account.