Keith Augustine interview

Yep. She was talking to everyone, as would be expected.

No, Malf she wasn't talking to "everyone", not right after the experience anyway. Greene was the first to hear and Spetzler was second, as you've been told. How many times do you have to be told ? Her family knew too, of course. Apart from that she kept it to herself for a couple of years (she told us this quite a few times and I think it's mentioned in Art Bell's excellent interview with her. 

It's almost comical that you would seek out Woerlee's opinion on this to get at the truth. An atheist materialist debunker who twists the facts of all NDE reports to make them fit his world view and you don't mind that ?

Even worse and it just shows how ludicrous this is all becoming, that interview you've linked to on Woerlee's site was provided by me. I translated it years ago and posted it in an online discussion with Woerlee and many others. He's copied it and stuck it up on his website because he thinks he can pick out material from it that will assist him.

It was Pam's last interview before she died. I have other information about the case but I just can't be bothered posting it to be honest. I'm fed up with the whole thing.

It doesn't matter to me, Malf what you believe anymore; if you prefer to accept the absurd notion that Pam was fed the information (likewise in the Lloyd Rudy case) you stick with that.

Yep. She was talking to everyone, as would be expected.

And what is the relevance of that?

Do you really expect Greene, Spetzler, Sabom, etc. to be so utterly naive as to not ask themselves if that (the unconscious gathering of information and the subsequent contamination of her memory of the NDE with that information) could explain Pam's veridical statements?

If so, you might as well dismiss all case studies that don't match your world view out of hand. But then you shouldn't be surprised if your opponents find you closed-minded!

Also, what is the relevance of the exact order in which she talked to (and with) people? Would it matter if she had first talked about the NDE to Spetzler and then to Greene, or first to a nurse and then to a relative and only then to Greene? Etc.
It could only matter if she was fed the information normally (by one or more of the people directly involved in the surgery, presumably the people she talked to first), even though everyone was still so impressed by her story that they found it inexplicable by normal means, including of course by the very process you're alluding to. And what about the problem that none of these people strike researchers as really gullible and naive?

For a debunker, no anomalous case can ever have any value. Even the most sceptical person (in the sensible, non-materialiist sense) reporting an anomaly would still have to be gullible and naive and easily fooled, because, well, we should know - as "rationalists" in the perverted sense of physicalists - there is absolutely nothing that is incompatible with the physicalist mythology. Even qualia fit perfectly - that's why there is no "hard problem", and every physicalist agrees about the way qualia and the brain relate to each other. Physicalism is the only possible rational interpretation of the results of brain studies, to the extent that it is really rather silly to distinguish between physicalism and other ontologies, rather than between truth and nonsense. 

If so, why shouild you bother to analyze any specific case, malf? Why not just be honest about your views, and say it is all bullcrap, no matter what? You would have your coming out as a true believer in physicalism (or whatever you'd prefer to call it), and some might conclude you're dogmatic (though also less of a troll who pretends to be really open-minded). But at least you'd be true to yourself.

Just two points: 

- How can a brain that is only a simulation have a real effect on our consciousness? It obviously cannot, because it does not really exist. Which would mean that for example Alzheimer patients don't experience the effects of a real brain on their minds, but only the effects of their idea of a brain on their minds. If that is true, then Alzheimer should disappear as soon as one accepts that the brain is just an illusion. There would be no real difference anymore between somatogenic dementia and psychogenic pseudo-dementia, in which cognitive functions such as retrieving memories get impaired by psychological factors. 

How come then that even idealists can become the victims of this nasty Alzheimer's disease? Do you really believe somatogenic mental handicaps are just based on illusions?

Yes. Just as the firmness of the keyboard I am currently writing on is ultimately an illusion, as is the firmness of the illusion of the brain. The problem here is that you are not applying the principle of charity toward idealism and interpreting it in its strongest possible form, and are refuting a crude and simplistic version of it. The simulated reality of us seemingly having brains is as real and concrete as all other seemingly physical aspects of this reality. Trees and stones are simulated, and they seem hard and solid. Our body seem to be very complex, tangible, and systematic, and it too is simulated. Our brain and its tight connection with our human mind is simulated, and it too is real and seemingly there and playing an active role in our cognitive abilities within the context of the simulation.

Again, the simulation is thorough and convincing in many ways. Where is it said and/or argued that the simulation has to be crude, unconvincing, and semi-worthless just because idealism is ultimately true and we are all one consciousness from the highest meta-perspective?

Everyone should always apply the principle of charity as best as they can to any theory before they dismiss it. Idealists do not deny that our brains are just as responsible for our cognition as our bodies are responsible for our maneuverability. And both the simulated body, and the brain, and the entire universe itself, is highly complex (at least from the perspective of our limited minds). But that reality may feel too complex to be a simulation is not an argument against it being a simulation, for then the implied inference is that the afterlife or whatever is not capable of such simulated complexity. Which I am quite sure that they are, for we have no reason to suspect that they are constrained by any limits whatsoever in their creative output.

- You may say idealism doesn't have the interactionist problem, but this comes at a huge cost. From an intuitive perspective it is very hard to believe that the physical world is just a projection of the mind (unlike the afterlife, which seems to respond much more directly to what's happening in our minds). Idealism goes against this basic intuition that the physical world is really external to our minds, which makes it much harder to accept than interactionism, for anyone who shares that intuition anyway.

Idealism seems to have become the default position within non-dogmatic spiritual circles, but I think idealists need to acknowledge that idealism is rather counter-intuitive.

No argument or disagreement here, idealism is not the first explanation you think of when confronted with the reality of an afterlife and a mind that can exist independently of this physical reality entirely.

And what is the relevance of that?

Do you really expect Greene, Spetzler, Sabom, etc. to be so utterly naive as to not ask themselves if that (the unconscious gathering of information and the subsequent contamination of her memory of the NDE with that information) could explain Pam's veridical statements?

If so, you might as well dismiss all case studies that don't match your world view out of hand. But then you shouldn't be surprised if your opponents find you closed-minded!

Also, what is the relevance of the exact order in which she talked to (and with) people? Would it matter if she had first talked about the NDE to Spetzler and then to Greene, or first to a nurse and then to a relative and only then to Greene? Etc.
It could only matter if she was fed the information normally (by one or more of the people directly involved in the surgery, presumably the people she talked to first), even though everyone was still so impressed by her story that they found it inexplicable by normal means, including of course by the very process you're alluding to. And what about the problem that none of these people strike researchers as really gullible and naive?

For a debunker, no anomalous case can ever have any value. Even the most sceptical person (in the sensible, non-materialiist sense) reporting an anomaly would still have to be gullible and naive and easily fooled, because, well, we should know - as "rationalists" in the perverted sense of physicalists - there is absolutely nothing that is incompatible with the physicalist mythology. Even qualia fit perfectly - that's why there is no "hard problem", and every physicalist agrees about the way qualia and the brain relate to each other. Physicalism is the only possible rational interpretation of the results of brain studies, to the extent that it is really rather silly to distinguish between physicalism and other ontologies, rather than between truth and nonsense. 

If so, why shouild you bother to analyze any specific case, malf? Why not just be honest about your views, and say it is all bullcrap, no matter what? You would have your coming out as a true believer in physicalism (or whatever you'd prefer to call it), and some might conclude you're dogmatic (though also less of a troll who pretends to be really open-minded). But at least you'd be true to yourself.

I suspect that this is one of those areas where we aren't going to find common ground.

Research and experience clearly shows that in settings where feedback is given to the informant, information may be provided non-consciously (the participants don't remember providing the information), and may be mis-attributed as coming from the informant. There's no reason to think that any of the doctors or other health-care workers involved were immune to this (we don't have magical powers in this regard, which is (partly) why medical research evaluations are blinded).

We even see this happening under research conditions, where presumably the researchers are trying to be careful. In Penny Sartori's interviews it can be seen that she provides information to the informants on multiple occasions. And in her report on Patient 10 (https://www.researchgate.net/publication...ed_Healing), she attributes veridical information to the patient when the text shows that it came from her. Again, this seems to be quite non-conscious on her part (not any sort of deliberate attempt to deceive).

Yet, suggestions that this common and ubiquitous effect may ever be present when parapsychology is involved are met with derision and denial.

Yes. Just as the firmness of the keyboard I am currently writing on is ultimately an illusion, as is the firmness of the illusion of the brain. The problem here is that you are not applying the principle of charity toward idealism and interpreting it in its strongest possible form, and are refuting a crude and simplistic version of it. The simulated reality of us seemingly having brains is as real and concrete as all other seemingly physical aspects of this reality. Trees and stones are simulated, and they seem hard and solid. Our body seem to be very complex, tangible, and systematic, and it too is simulated. Our brain and its tight connection with our human mind is simulated, and it too is real and seemingly there and playing an active role in our cognitive abilities within the context of the simulation.

I'm not talking about the apparent solidity of objects or specifically of the brain, but about the fact that it is very hard to believe (for me anyway) that while there seems to be an external, physical cause for Alzheimer symptoms, these symptoms would in reality be purely psychogenic. Intuitively speaking, that is too hard to swallow for me. 


Again, the simulation is thorough and convincing in many ways. Where is it said and/or argued that the simulation has to be crude, unconvincing, and semi-worthless just because idealism is ultimately true and we are all one consciousness from the highest meta-perspective?

I'm not saying idealism is rationally untenable (apart from the idea of one single consciousness, which I resolutely reject myself on logical gronds), I'm saying that it's intuitively unappealing. 

Everyone should always apply the principle of charity as best as they can to any theory before they dismiss it.

Well, as I said before, idealism is not untenable in a rational sense, but very hard to uphold from an intuitive perspective. So rationally, I'm giving idealism (unless it's idealism of the Advaita kind that posits noetic monism) more than enough charity. It's the intuitive side that I'm drawing attention to. 

Idealists do not deny that our brains are just as responsible for our cognition as our bodies are responsible for our maneuverability. And both the simulated body, and the brain, and the entire universe itself, is highly complex (at least from the perspective of our limited minds). But that reality may feel too complex to be a simulation is not an argument against it being a simulation, for then the implied inference is that the afterlife or whatever is not capable of such simulated complexity. Which I am quite sure that they are, for we have no reason to suspect that they are constrained by any limits whatsoever in their creative output.

Again, it is not a matter of rational tenability, but of intuition. It's much easier for me to believe that brains really exist and have a real impact on the mind, in cases like Alzheimer, than to believe that brains are just illusions, and therefore cannot have any real impact whatever, which would mean that what clearly seems somatogenic must be psychogenic after all. I simply don't buy it, at an intuitive level. 

Research and experience clearly shows that in settings where feedback is given to the informant, information may be provided non-consciously (the participants don't remember providing the information), and may be mis-attributed as coming from the informant. There's no reason to think that any of the doctors or other health-care workers involved were immune to this (we don't have magical powers in this regard, which is (partly) why medical research evaluations are blinded).

This paragraph is completely muddled to me. Do you mean that the people responsible for delivering information to a person can unconsciously provide additional information? Or that the person receiving information can unconsciously pick up additional information and mis-remember it as coming from their informant?

This paragraph is completely muddled to me. Do you mean that the people responsible for delivering information to a person can unconsciously provide additional information? Or that the person receiving information can unconsciously pick up additional information and mis-remember it as coming from their informant?

I'll let Linda answer the question, but in the meantime do you think either of those scenarios impossible?

This paragraph is completely muddled to me. Do you mean that the people responsible for delivering information to a person can unconsciously provide additional information? Or that the person receiving information can unconsciously pick up additional information and mis-remember it as coming from their informant?

I'm sorry. I struggled a bit with how to name the different players.

The informant is the person who had the experience who starts to tell others about it. The claim is that the informant spontaneously offers specific and veridical information.

The participant is the person who has specific information about what happened (they were there or they have access to another account of the events, such as a medical record), and in the course of talking to the informant provides specific feedback and information about the events. Please note that everyone agrees with this part of the process. For example, it is agreed that Pam Reynolds told Greene and Spetzler about her experiences, and that they engaged with her and confirmed any correspondence to specific events.

What we know from research and experience is that in that process, when the story is subsequently told, not only can those specific events be substituted for the original vague and less specific statements, but the original source of that specificity can be misattributed.

For example, a less specific statement, such as, "I could see one of the doctors pulling my eye", becomes "he saw the consulting doctor shine a light in his eyes." 

Linda

I'll let Linda answer the question, but in the meantime do you think either of those scenarios impossible?

Of course not.

I'm sorry. I struggled a bit with how to name the different players.

The informant is the person who had the experience who starts to tell others about it. The claim is that the informant spontaneously offers specific and veridical information.

The participant is the person who has specific information about what happened (they were there or they have access to another account of the events, such as a medical record), and in the course of talking to the informant provides specific feedback and information about the events. Please note that everyone agrees with this part of the process. For example, it is agreed that Pam Reynolds told Greene and Spetzler about her experiences, and that they engaged with her and confirmed any correspondence to specific events.

What we know from research and experience is that in that process, when the story is subsequently told, not only can those specific events be substituted for the original vague and less specific statements, but the original source of that specificity can be misattributed.

For example, a less specific statement, such as, "I could see one of the doctors pulling my eye", becomes "he saw the consulting doctor shine a light in his eyes." 

Linda

That's much clearer. But the example you gave says more about reporting and documenting an incident than anything to do with the original incident itself.

That's much clearer. But the example you gave says more about reporting and documenting an incident than anything to do with the original incident itself.

Yes, because all that is talked about (because it is perceived as remarkable) is the post hoc report or story about the incident, rather than the original incident itself. There aren't any cases where the original incident itself has been documented prior to feedback and the incident is regarded as remarkable.

Linda