The Problem of Scepticism in Early Modern Philosophy of Consciousness

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The Problem of Scepticism in Early Modern Philosophy of Consciousness 

Quote:This post is part of a larger project I am working on: a critique of the epistemologically motivated Idealisms of Berkeley, Kant, and the post-Kantians. I am greatly attracted to Idealism, but I think we should accept it primarily on ontological reasons, i.e. because Idealism gives the best explanation of why reality exists and why it is as it is. Hence my critical attitude to the Idealisms of Berkeley, Kant, et al., because for them Idealism was primarily epistemologically motivated, Idealism being their solution to the problem of epistemological scepticism as it arose within early modern philosophy of consciousness, as espoused by Descartes, Locke, and their followers. As I will argue in a next post, modern Idealism, as an answer to this threat of scepticism, fails miserably (thus the only remaining reasons for accepting Idealism must be ontological). To prepare the way for this critique of epistemological Idealism, this post explains how the problem of scepticism arose in the early modern philosophy of consciousness, or the “Way of Ideas” as it was known to Descartes, Locke and their contemporaries.
'Historically, we may regard materialism as a system of dogma set up to combat orthodox dogma...Accordingly we find that, as ancient orthodoxies disintegrate, materialism more and more gives way to scepticism.'

- Bertrand Russell



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